S. Bruce Durno

The defendant, Sukhmanpreet Singh, pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability (17 years old) and the nature of the assaults committed in concert with others, and mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, efforts to address drug addiction, remorse, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The central issue was whether to impose a conditional discharge, as sought by the defence due to potential immigration consequences, or a conviction with time served, as sought by the Crown.

The court ultimately imposed a sentence of time served (6 months less 1 day) and 12 months probation, concluding that a discharge was not appropriate given the seriousness of the offence and the paramount need for denunciation and general deterrence in cases involving abuse of minors.

The court emphasized that immigration consequences, while relevant, should not dictate a sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, sought an order staying his obligation to comply with Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) pending the determination of his appeal.

The Crown opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to stay provincial legislation.

The court found that Christopher's Law mandates compliance automatically upon conviction, without requiring a court order, and therefore the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to stay this collateral consequence of a conviction, distinguishing it from stays of court-imposed orders.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought full forfeiture of a $75,000 recognizance against an offender and two sureties following the offender's conviction for breaching bail conditions, including house arrest and a no-contact order with a specific individual.

The sureties argued for a lesser amount.

The court considered factors such as the sureties' diligence, financial means, and the duration of the breach, ultimately ordering partial forfeiture amounts for the offender and each surety.

The appellant, Balwinderpal Mann, appealed a trial judge's finding that he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for threatening his father and nephew.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied the correct legal test under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding the "appreciating the nature and quality of the act" and "knowing the conduct was wrong" criteria.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by incorporating the emotional impact on victims into the "nature and quality" assessment and by relying on the appellant's impaired ability to make rational choices for the "knowing wrongfulness" test, rather than assessing his capacity to know society's moral standards.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial on all issues was ordered.

The appellant, Paul Redmond, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by incorrectly placing the onus on the appellant to prove his alibi on a balance of probabilities, thereby skewing the credibility assessment.

Additionally, the trial judge misapprehended and misused medical records, which documented symptoms but did not confirm an injury, and improperly treated the complainant's prior consistent statements in the records as proof of truth.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, charged with driving with excess alcohol, appealed her conviction.

The appeal court found the trial judge's reasons inadequate for appellate review, specifically noting failures to address the officer's credibility and reliability, a defence witness's evidence, the application of the W.(D.) principles beyond the first prong, and the admissibility of the appellant's statement to the Intoxilyzer operator under *Edgar* and *Laird*.

The trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by focusing solely on the appellant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault causing bodily harm and assault.

The court dismissed the appeal for assault causing bodily harm, finding sufficient evidence for common unlawful purpose.

However, the appeal against the assault conviction was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

This was due to the trial judge's material misapprehension of evidence regarding the sequence of events in the second confrontation between the appellant and the victim, which improperly precluded consideration of self-defence or consensual fight arguments.

The court emphasized the necessity for trial judges to provide sufficient reasons, reconcile divergent evidence, and avoid misapprehending material facts that impact the air of reality of a defence.

The appellant, Matthew Woodham, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, misstated and misapplied the test from R. v. W.(D.), and made palpable and overriding errors in assessing witness credibility by misapprehending evidence, engaging in speculation, and drawing unsupported inferences.

These errors were fundamental to the rejection of the defence's testimony and played a significant role in the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with excess alcohol.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding a Certificate of Analysis unreliable due to a clerical error where it was dated a year prior to the breath samples being taken.

The appellate court, relying on R. v. Moratto, determined that such an immaterial date discrepancy did not render the Certificate inadmissible or constitute "evidence to the contrary." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The court rejected the respondent's request for a new trial, applying the Cassidy criteria and noting that the defense had pursued other avenues at trial, making a new trial speculative.

Michael Oduh, charged with serious drug trafficking offences, applied for a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel (a Rowbotham application) after being denied Legal Aid Ontario coverage.

The court found that Oduh lacked the financial means to retain private counsel for a complex, lengthy trial and that counsel was essential for him to receive a fair trial, given the seriousness of the charges, the potential for a lengthy jail term, and his lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system.

The application was allowed, and proceedings were stayed until state-funded counsel was provided.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for circumstantial evidence, particularly by requiring reasonable doubt to be based on proven facts, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly assessed the circumstantial evidence.

The court held that the alternative explanations for the appellant's erratic driving (weather, medical issue, searching for an item) were speculative and not reasonable inferences from the evidence, especially when combined with the indicia of alcohol consumption.

The court also clarified that while reasonable doubt can arise from a lack of evidence, the alternative explanations themselves must be reasonable, not merely hypothetical.

The applicant, Ethan Miazad, sought certiorari to challenge his committal to stand trial on charges of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that Miazad and a co-accused defrauded Dr. Rhuel Maano by using him as a "straw man" to secure a $350,000 business loan for a medical clinic, personally guaranteed by Maano, while diverting funds to companies associated with the accused and failing to repay the loan, leaving Maano with the debt.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision and the law of fraud and certiorari, finding sufficient evidence for committal based on the overall "straw man" fraud theory and non-disclosure of related-party transactions.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

Akash Ghotra, having been found guilty of internet luring, applied to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

He argued that an undercover police officer, posing as a 14-year-old girl in an internet chatroom, provided an opportunity to commit the offence without a pre-existing reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry.

The Crown contended that merely stating an age of 14 did not create an opportunity and that the officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry in an area where such offences were likely.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officer did not create an opportunity for internet luring, as the applicant initiated the conversation and directed it towards sexual matters.

Furthermore, the court held that the internet chatroom constituted an area where criminal activity was reasonably suspected, thus justifying the police operation as a bona fide inquiry and not random virtue testing.

David Morrisson, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

The application required judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood a jury would unanimously agree to reduce the period.

The applicant argued the old "reasonable prospect" test should apply, citing Charter ss. 11(h) and (i), but the court applied the new "substantial likelihood" test, consistent with prior rulings.

Despite Morrisson's positive institutional conduct and low risk of re-offending, the court found his repeated untruthful statements and evolving accounts of the offence, including admitted perjury, severely undermined his credibility and character.

The court concluded there was no substantial likelihood a jury would unanimously reduce his parole ineligibility, dismissing the application.

The accused, Wayne Isaacs and Azhar Hussain, applied to adjourn their jury trial, citing insufficient time for counsel preparation, lack of retainer, and funding issues, despite a previously agreed-upon trial date.

The Crown initially opposed the adjournment but conceded its necessity.

The court granted the adjournment, acknowledging the practical difficulties and the accused's s. 11(b) Charter concerns, and set new dates for pre-trial motions and the trial.

The appellant, Gordon Machen Jr., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, and misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal court reviewed numerous allegations against trial counsel, including failure to obtain full disclosure, inadequate cross-examination on inconsistencies and omissions in complainant testimony, and an overly narrow "one-pronged" GPS defence.

While acknowledging some deficiencies in counsel's preparation and strategy, the court found that these did not individually or collectively establish a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different or that the trial was unfair.

The court also dismissed the claim of judicial bias due to lack of independent evidence and found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was deemed moot as the jail sentence and probation period had been completed.

The appeal was dismissed.

Jalani Daley pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery.

The sentencing involved an agreed-upon sentence of two and a half years, reduced for pre-trial custody credit on a two-for-one basis.

The primary dispute was the credit for restrictive bail terms, with the Crown proposing six months and the offender seeking 12 to 14 months.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the serious nature of the offences involving an imitation firearm and the planned nature of the robberies, and mitigating factors such as the offender's guilty plea, lack of prior record, community support, employment, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The court ultimately granted 10 months credit for the moderately stringent restrictive bail terms, resulting in a total sentence of 17.5 months in addition to pre-trial custody credit.

Following an earlier ruling declaring two mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court considered whether those provisions were severable from the remainder of the section.

The applicant argued the entire subsection constituted a unitary sentencing scheme that must fall together.

The Crown argued the offending subsections could be removed without affecting the validity of the remaining provisions imposing mandatory minimums for larger-scale cannabis production.

Applying the severance principles from Schachter v. Canada and related authorities, the court concluded the unconstitutional provisions were not inextricably bound to the remaining subsections.

The court held that only ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were of no force or effect and that ss. 7(2)(b)(iii–vi) remained valid.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault arising from an incident in which he allegedly spat at a vehicle and struck a passenger through a partially opened window.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, and unreasonably rejected his denial based on assumptions about driver behaviour in traffic disputes.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s reasons as a whole and concluded the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework were properly applied.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence, rely on corroborating photographs, and apply common sense in assessing credibility.

The conviction was upheld.

The Crown sought estreatment of a recognizance after the accused failed to appear in court while released on bail secured by a $5,000 recognizance consisting of a $2,500 cash deposit and a $2,500 no‑deposit pledge by a surety.

The surety had personally deposited the $2,500 cash but sought its return after attempting to be relieved as surety and reporting the accused’s breach to police.

The court considered the statutory framework governing recognizances and forfeiture under the Criminal Code and authorities addressing standing and ownership of bail deposits.

While recognizing that a surety may deposit bail money and may have standing to seek its return, the court held that in this case the recognizance and receipt clearly recorded the cash deposit in the accused’s name.

As a result, the deposit could not be returned to the surety and was forfeited upon the accused’s default.