Renee Pomerance

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a stabbing during a bar fight.

At trial, the defence sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by a third party, who allegedly confessed to the stabbing to three friends.

The trial judge ruled the statements inadmissible for their truth, finding they lacked threshold reliability, and instructed the jury to use them only to assess the third party's credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the third party's availability for cross-examination and by improperly relying on a subsequent inconsistent statement to police.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a violent bank robbery.

During the investigation, police used a self-styled spiritualist and Obeah practitioner as an agent to elicit a confession from the appellant.

The appellant argued the resulting statement was inadmissible as the product of a 'dirty trick' and protected by religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the relationship between the appellant and the spiritualist was a corrupt criminal relationship aimed at evading police, not a genuine religious confession.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on expert evidence, challenge for cause, and co-conspirator utterances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent bank robbery in which a bank employee was fatally shot by a co-perpetrator.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury violated his right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter by expressing opinions on contested factual issues, and that the comments exceeded common law limits.

The Court of Appeal held that the common law rule permitting judicial comment on evidence does not violate the Charter, provided the judge does not usurp the jury's fact-finding role.

The court found that while some of the trial judge's comments were unfortunate, they did not overwhelm the jury or deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal from conviction and the 17-year parole ineligibility period were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that had excluded derivative evidence of the victim's severed head, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and police investigation deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's own questioning necessitated the admission of the head evidence to restore trial fairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, concluding the Crown presented an overwhelming circumstantial case.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, the Crown introduced expert evidence from an FBI agent who testified that the crime scene had been 'staged' to look like a break-in, and offered opinions on the killer's motive and prior relationship with the victim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while expert evidence of crime scene reconstruction (the 'what') is admissible, the expert's opinions regarding the killer's motive and relationship to the victim constituted impermissible criminal profiling (the 'why' and 'who').

The Court found that the improper admission of this profiling evidence was highly prejudicial and could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were committed to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committals, arguing a denial of natural justice because they were not permitted to make submissions on post-offence conduct evidence.

The reviewing judge found a denial of natural justice but dismissed the application, concluding the appellants suffered no prejudice as committal was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a reviewing judge has inherent jurisdiction to refuse certiorari where no prejudice occurs, and found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to support the committals.

The appellants, who were committed for trial on charges of first degree murder, appealed the dismissal of their applications to quash the committal order.

They brought a motion seeking an order that they not be required to pay for additional copies of the preliminary inquiry transcripts for the appeal, having already paid for copies used in the Superior Court.

They also sought an order requiring the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for a nominal fee.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that rule 8(7) of the Criminal Appeal Rules is intended to avoid unnecessary duplication of expense, and ordered the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for $1 each.

The appellant was convicted of fraud for failing to report employment income while receiving social assistance.

She appealed, arguing that the welfare agency's sharing of her T4 slips with the police violated her rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the compelled production of pre-existing documents like T4 slips does not violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

Furthermore, the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 that the agency would not share evidence of fraud with the police.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to delete a probation term requiring $100 monthly restitution payments due to the appellant's limited means, though the intermittent jail sentence and free-standing restitution order were upheld.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a convenience store robbery.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misdirected the jury by treating intoxication as a separate defence rather than relating it to whether the Crown had proved the specific intent for murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code.

Although the reasonable doubt instruction was flawed, it was held to be in substantial compliance with the governing principles, and the challenge to the jury-task instruction was rejected.

Because a properly instructed jury could have convicted of no less than manslaughter, and the Crown conceded that result, the court quashed the murder conviction and substituted a conviction for manslaughter.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the common law rule of jury secrecy and section 649 of the Criminal Code infringed their Charter rights by preventing them from adducing evidence of jury deliberations to impeach their verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the common law rule of jury secrecy, which prohibits the admission of evidence concerning the intrinsic deliberation process but allows evidence of extrinsic influences, is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court also found that section 649 of the Criminal Code is constitutional and that the trial judge in the appellant Pan's case did not err in declaring a mistrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence regarding the frequency of foreign DNA under fingernails, instructing the jury on his credibility based on an admitted theft, prohibiting evidence of a third party's disposition for violence, and instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant applied for a stay of an order requiring the taking of a DNA sample pending his appeal of that order.

The Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to stay such an order despite section 487.056(1) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the majority granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's privacy interests, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant as he was already in custody.

A dissenting judge would have refused the stay due to the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal on time.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the issuance and execution of a search warrant for records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conditions imposed on the warrant's execution were sufficient and that the appellant failed to show a section 8 Charter violation affecting the issuing judge's jurisdiction.

The Court left open the possibility for the appellant to argue at trial that certain documents are inadmissible due to common-law privilege or a section 7 Charter violation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder.

He argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and the taking of bodily samples, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were inadequate, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant made an informed choice to cooperate with police, the jury instructions substantially complied with the required standards, and trial counsel's tactical decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Criminal conviction appeal arising from a taxi robbery prosecution in which the police obtained an inculpatory statement by threatening to "trash" the accused's mother's home during execution of a search warrant.

The court held that police conduct rendering a statement involuntary at common law infringes s. 7 of the Charter, and that the resulting oral statement and diagram were conscriptive evidence that had to be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court exercised its discretion to allow the accused to advance the Charter argument for the first time on appeal because voluntariness had been fully litigated at trial and the record was complete.

The court further held that the St. Lawrence rule must be modified to recognize a discretion to exclude involuntary confessions despite confirmation by real evidence, with admission justified only in highly exceptional circumstances.

Without the confession, the remaining evidence could not support conviction, so the convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple historical sexual offences arising from alleged abuse over a six-year period beginning when the complainant was a child.

The appeal focused on expert psychiatric evidence describing trauma symptoms and a 24-factor assessment tool said to be consistent with sexual abuse, as well as the adequacy of the jury charge on that evidence.

The majority held that substantial parts of the psychiatrist’s evidence amounted to impermissible oath-helping because it conveyed a belief in the complainant’s truthfulness, and that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury against that use.

Given that credibility was central and there was no independent evidence of abuse, the convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

A dissenting judge would have dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

Sentence appeal by an aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault committed several hours apart against different victims while in a continuous state of extreme intoxication.

The court held the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and to the systemic and background factors bearing on the offender's circumstances.

The court also found error in failing to consider the nexus between the offences and the resulting totality of consecutive sentences.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the assault sentence was made concurrent.

The appellant sought to challenge a conviction for unlawful confinement after an earlier Court of Appeal judgment had already addressed that conviction and directed sentencing following removal of a Kienapple stay.

The court held the prior panel had clearly turned its mind to the unlawful confinement count and purported to enter the conviction.

Because one panel of the court had already disposed of the issue, the present panel lacked jurisdiction to review it.

Any alleged error could only be pursued by seeking leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code DNA warrant provisions authorizing seizure of bodily substances for forensic analysis.

The Court of Appeal held that the challenge was properly resolved under s. 8 of the Charter, and that if the regime satisfied s. 8 scrutiny it could not be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 on the self-incrimination theory advanced.

The court found the statutory scheme contained substantial judicial and privacy safeguards, upheld the ex parte warrant structure, and rejected the lower court's attempt to read in a notice requirement.

Fresh evidence concerning updated DNA technology undermined the basis for striking down the hair-sample provision, which was reinstated.

The cross-appeal was dismissed and the declaratory application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of incest and sexual touching after confessing to police.

The complainant, his daughter, also gave a statement to police detailing the abuse, but recanted at trial.

The accused also recanted his confession at trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could compare the similarities between the two statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the complainant's prior inconsistent statement was substantively admissible for the truth of its contents because the striking similarities between her statement and the accused's confession provided the necessary threshold of reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.