Renee Pomerance

The appellant mortgagee appealed a decision holding that the court had no jurisdiction to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) at the instance of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 103(6)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act confers a broad discretion to discharge a CPL where it is just to do so, including at the request of a mortgagee whose mortgage ranks in priority to the interest claimed in the CPL.

The court found the application judge erred and set aside her order, remitting the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings on whether the discretion should be exercised in the changed circumstances.

The appellant appealed an order declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge had found that the appellant persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings against the respondent college and an individual respondent, including multiple proceedings, repeated attempts to review unfavourable outcomes, and initiation of new proceedings on the same subject matter, accumulating $161,000 in unpaid costs orders.

The Court of Appeal found no errors warranting intervention, confirmed the correct legal test was applied, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $2,500 to the college.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for multiple violent offences including discharging an air pistol at a victim, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a forensic psychiatry program.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision was reasonable, noting the seriousness and recency of the index offences, the appellant's limited insight into his illness, ongoing concerns about substance use and impulsivity, and the lack of suitable community accommodation.

The appeal was dismissed, though the court commended the appellant's significant progress.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent credit card company for unpaid charges.

The motion judge applied the Mountain View factors and found that all but one weighed against the appellant, including a lengthy unexplained delay in bringing the motion and a lack of plausible excuse for the default.

While the motion judge accepted the appellant's proposed defence had an air of reality, she found it weak and insufficient to overcome the other factors.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate interference, holding the motion judge properly exercised her discretion in weighing the factors holistically.

Following a successful appeal from a Superior Court judgment, the Court of Appeal determined costs for the proceedings below.

After reviewing both parties' submissions, the court awarded costs of $25,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to the appellant, payable forthwith.

Costs endorsement following the appeal reasons reported at 2025 ONCA 861.

The respondents on appeal were the more successful parties, having succeeded entirely on one issue and partially on the second, where the court substituted a temporary stay for the motion judge's dismissal.

The court discounted both the motion judge's costs award and the agreed appeal costs by 25% to reflect the divided success, resulting in costs of $18,750 for both the motion and the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of release conditions.

During a court-ordered NCR assessment, the appellant made statements to a forensic psychiatrist.

The Crown introduced those statements at trial without a voir dire on admissibility under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, without first putting the statements to the appellant in cross-examination as required by ss. 10 and 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and without disclosing its intention to use the statements for impeachment purposes.

The Court of Appeal held that the combined effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to challenge a three-year sentence for breaching a long-term supervision order, arguing enhanced pre-sentence credit should have been granted.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged refusal to set aside a struck defence and a default judgment imposing trust-based liability for unpaid construction invoices.

The court upheld the motion judge’s findings on delay, credibility, and absence of arguable defence, and confirmed quantum based on deemed admissions under default rules and Construction Act trust obligations.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its claim for insurance coverage under a Builder's Risk Policy.

The motion judge found the roof collapse was caused by frost heaving, an excluded peril under the policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding summary judgment was appropriate where the respondent's expert evidence was uncontested, the frost or freezing exclusion applied, and the doctrine of nullification did not render the exclusion unenforceable because the policy still covered other perils.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their claim for non-vested stock options under a consulting agreement.

The motion judge found the agreement was not a fixed term contract and that entitlement to unvested options was contingent on the appellants remaining engaged with the respondents on each vesting date.

The appellants raised a new argument on appeal regarding breach of the duty of good faith, which was not advanced below.

The appellants also challenged the costs award.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action against a school board and school officials for failing to protect their child from bullying.

Although the trial judge found that the respondents breached the standard of care by failing to investigate a prior bullying incident and misplacing related documentation, he concluded that none of these breaches caused the subsequent incident in which the child was injured.

The appellants argued that proper investigation of the earlier incident would have prevented the later injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's causation analysis and factual findings.

The appellants sought an application for prohibition to prevent a provincial offence prosecution under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the prohibition application as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The motion judge granted the motion and dismissed the application.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that prohibition is a remedy for jurisdictional issues only, and the appellants' arguments were non-jurisdictional matters properly decided at trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a judgment interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport.

The application judge found that a specific bequest of the Hopewell Avenue property to the testator's predeceased son passed to the son's wife pursuant to section 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the anti-lapse provision), rather than lapsing into the residue of the estate.

The appellant argued the will showed a contrary intention and that the solicitor's evidence should have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the anti-lapse provision or the will's terms.

The court also upheld the occupation rent requirement, finding it was properly raised and calculated.

The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and one count of sexual assault relating to the same complainant and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant raised two related grounds: first, that the trial was rendered unfair because he lacked testimonial capacity due to mental illness; and second, that the trial was unfair because the counts in the indictment were vague and failed to identify specific instances of assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application regarding the appellant's psychiatric condition, finding that the evidence lacked cogency without expert opinion linking the mental illness to testimonial capacity.

The court also rejected the indictment vagueness argument, finding that the counts did not violate the single transaction rule and that the appellant received full disclosure and knew the case he had to meet.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.