Marvin A. Catzman

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and robbery.

On appeal, he argued for the first time that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when police elicited an unrecorded statement from him after he requested counsel but before he was given an opportunity to consult one.

The Court of Appeal allowed the issue to be raised, finding a sufficient evidentiary record and no prejudice to the Crown.

The Court held that subsequent recorded statements, taken after the appellant consulted counsel, were tainted by the initial breach due to their close temporal and contextual connection.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) as conscriptive evidence, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on weapons charges after the trial judge excluded evidence of a loaded sawed-off shotgun found in the trunk of a car.

The accused and three passengers were arrested after police found knives and pellet guns on them and in the car's interior.

The trial judge ruled the trunk search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the accused had a minimal privacy interest in the trunk and the search was a lawful search incident to arrest given the discovery of multiple weapons.

A new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury.

The principal defence was that the appellant accidentally hit the victim, relying on his almost complete blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that blindness was only relevant to the foreseeability of bodily harm and not to the issue of accident.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action based on a release executed in a prior action.

The appellant argued the release did not cover the current claims or protect respondents who were not parties to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the release was unambiguous and barred the action, as the appellant knew the essential elements of the claims when he signed it.

The Court also agreed that the release protected the non-party respondents because it applied to agents and the claims shared the same factual underpinnings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment holding them liable as directors for unpaid wages owed to the respondent employees following the company's bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of two directors, finding that the employees' agreement to postpone payment until the company was in funds ended upon bankruptcy, making the debts payable.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of a third director, finding that the action against him was commenced beyond the six-month limitation period under the Business Corporations Act following his resignation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a guarantee.

He argued the motion judge impermissibly made credibility findings and that the principal debtor's bankruptcy suspended his liability under the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly found the appellant failed to put his best foot forward, and that a debtor's bankruptcy does not release a guarantor absent specific wording in the guarantee.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his common law partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding a lay witness's testimony, gave an inadequate limiting instruction regarding a forensic pathologist's testimony, and that the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding there was a substantial body of circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, errors in credibility assessment, and failure to establish the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation, proper application of the W.D. analysis for credibility, and ample evidence supporting the convictions.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two charges of sexual assault against two young family members.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not properly deal with inconsistencies in the complainants' testimony and erred in relying on the evidence of a nurse practitioner regarding the causes of one complainant's sexually transmitted infection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that there was abundant evidence supporting the conviction.

The appellant husband, a professional hockey coach, appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $27,000 per month in spousal support to the respondent wife.

During the marriage, the husband directed a large portion of his high income into a retirement compensation arrangement to secure the family's financial future.

The appellant argued the support award, which exceeded the wife's immediate day-to-day needs, constituted an impermissible redistribution of capital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the savings pattern was a substantial component of the family's standard of living and the award appropriately met the wife's ongoing need for future financial security.

The appellant husband, a professional hockey coach, appealed a spousal support order of $27,000 per month.

During the marriage, the parties had a practice of saving a significant portion of the husband's income in a retirement compensation arrangement due to the instability of his profession.

The trial judge included a savings component in the spousal support award to allow the respondent wife to maintain the marital standard of living, which included saving for the future.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the award did not constitute an impermissible redistribution of capital, as the wife had become entirely dependent on the husband for both daily necessities and future financial security.

The plaintiff appealed a trial judge's decision to stay the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.

The trial judge, on his own motion during the trial, raised the issue of jurisdiction and applied the Muscutt factors to find no real and substantial connection with Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the defendants had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by participating extensively in the litigation, including pleadings, discoveries, and the trial itself.

The stay was lifted, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for security for costs, authorizing the respondent to control the conduct of the intended action, and awarding costs to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motions judge's refusal to order security for costs, noting the action was neither vexatious nor frivolous.

The court also upheld the costs award and found the order for directions was a sensible interlocutory order authorized by the Canadian Business Corporations Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable under a guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that compliance with financial ratios was a condition for the bank's benefit alone, not the guarantors.

Furthermore, a forbearance agreement signed by the appellant removed any challenge to liability under the guarantee.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents their costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The insurer appealed an order requiring it to indemnify the insured general contractors under two Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies for the cost of repairing structural defects in new homes caused by defective concrete supplied by a subcontractor.

The insurer argued that CGL policies inherently do not cover an insured's own defective work or product.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly focused on the specific language of the policies rather than general insurance principles.

The policies contained an explicit exception to the defective work exclusion for work performed by a subcontractor, which operated to restore coverage.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable on a mortgage and rectifying the principal amount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that a promissory note evidenced a debt secured by the mortgage assumed by the appellant, and that the appellant had actual or imputed knowledge of the correct amount owing, justifying rectification.

The respondent's cross-appeal on trial costs was dismissed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a default judgment awarding lump sum support of $30,748.00, arguing lack of notice and that the amount was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant should have moved to set aside the default judgment in the Superior Court rather than appealing directly.

The court also found the motion judge was entitled to make the support order based on the affidavit evidence before her.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claim for breach of fiduciary duty against their former solicitors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that a breach of fiduciary duty requires a breakdown of trust and loyalty, such as dishonesty or a conflict of interest.

It does not extend to situations where only the quality of advice or representation is at issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.