Mary Jane Binks

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support payable to the respondent, arguing a material change in circumstances due to his unemployment and the respondent's improved financial situation following an inheritance.

The court found a material change had occurred, noting the applicant's substantial and continuous income reduction and the respondent's increased assets.

The court reduced spousal support to $1 per year effective January 1, 2019, but declined to terminate it entirely, finding a continuing compensatory and needs-based entitlement.

The applicant, Mr. Rancourt, sought judicial review to set aside an arbitration award concerning child support, arguing he was denied procedural fairness and the opportunity to present his case due to the arbitrator's refusal to grant an adjournment.

Mr. Rancourt had dismissed his counsel eight days before the hearing and requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The court found the arbitrator failed to judicially exercise discretion by not considering all relevant factors for an adjournment, particularly Mr. Rancourt's right to counsel and the prejudice he suffered.

The court granted the application, set aside the arbitration award and costs award, and removed the arbitrator, remitting the dispute to a new arbitrator.

The responding party brought a motion to set aside the registration in Ontario of a Pennsylvania child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The moving party argued he was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and that registration was contrary to public policy because the order was being enforced elsewhere and he was not in arrears.

The court reviewed the legal test for ordinary residence from leading authorities and considered the moving party’s routine of spending approximately three months each year in Ontario while maintaining property, licences, and other ties to the province.

The court held that a person may be ordinarily resident in more than one jurisdiction and found that the established pattern of returning annually to Ontario constituted ordinary residence.

None of the statutory grounds for setting aside the registration were established.

Following a family law trial concerning spousal support and contractual issues, the successful party sought costs after serving an Offer to Settle that was more favourable to the opposing party than the ultimate trial award.

The court considered Family Law Rule 18(14) and the time‑computation provisions of Family Law Rule 3(1) in determining whether the offer was served at least seven days before trial.

Applying the rule for counting days and drawing guidance from Rule 3.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held the offer satisfied the timing requirement.

Even if it had not, the court would exercise discretion under Family Law Rule 18(16) to award elevated costs given the significant disparity between the offer and the trial outcome.

The respondent was awarded $48,500 in costs inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The respondent sought to set aside a marriage contract and subsequent separation agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, or alternatively obtain spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act despite contractual waivers.

The court found no material financial non-disclosure but concluded that the spousal support waivers in both agreements were obtained through undue influence and misrepresentation and were improvident in light of the parties’ circumstances.

The property provisions of the agreements were upheld, but the spousal support waivers were set aside.

Applying the Miglin framework, the court determined the agreements did not substantially comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent was awarded lump-sum and ongoing periodic spousal support.

The applicant father sought an order under s. 16 of the Divorce Act to have the parties' nine-year-old daughter transfer from a French-language school to an English-language private school with an extended French program.

The respondent mother opposed the transfer, arguing the child needed to maintain her French culture and stability.

The parties shared joint custody with an equal time-sharing schedule.

The court considered factors including the parents' ability to participate in education, the child's stability, cultural heritage, sibling relationships, holiday schedules, and academic performance.

The court found that transferring to the English-language school was in the child's best interests, as it would align her schedule with her sisters, provide smaller class sizes, and not significantly compromise her bilingualism or French culture.

The applicant moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of a family law application seeking equalization and related relief.

The court applied the principles governing motions to set aside dismissal orders and found the delay was largely attributable to prior counsel, the applicant moved with reasonable promptness after learning of the dismissal, and the respondent suffered no prejudice.

The administrative dismissal was therefore set aside.

On the respondent’s cross-application for partition and sale of the former matrimonial home, the court held that a joint owner has a prima facie right to sale and the resisting party had not established a prima facie competing interest under the Family Law Act.

The home was ordered sold with a portion of proceeds held pending determination of equalization.

The respondent, the wife of a notorious convicted murderer, intended to commence divorce proceedings and successfully applied for non-publication and sealing orders to protect her privacy and mental health.

Media organizations appealed the orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the Court held that the respondent failed to provide convincing evidence that the orders were necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, as the psychiatric evidence relied upon was based on unsupported assumptions about media harassment.

The appellant husband, a professional hockey coach, appealed a spousal support order of $27,000 per month.

During the marriage, the parties had a practice of saving a significant portion of the husband's income in a retirement compensation arrangement due to the instability of his profession.

The trial judge included a savings component in the spousal support award to allow the respondent wife to maintain the marital standard of living, which included saving for the future.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the award did not constitute an impermissible redistribution of capital, as the wife had become entirely dependent on the husband for both daily necessities and future financial security.

The appellant husband, a professional hockey coach, appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $27,000 per month in spousal support to the respondent wife.

During the marriage, the husband directed a large portion of his high income into a retirement compensation arrangement to secure the family's financial future.

The appellant argued the support award, which exceeded the wife's immediate day-to-day needs, constituted an impermissible redistribution of capital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the savings pattern was a substantial component of the family's standard of living and the award appropriately met the wife's ongoing need for future financial security.