Erika Chozik

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and two-year custodial sentence imposed following his conviction for criminal harassment and four counts of failure to comply with probation orders.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that criminal harassment constituted a serious personal injury offence and in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing likelihood of inflicting severe psychological damage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dangerous offender designation and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were well-supported by evidence and that the sentencing approach properly emphasized the least intrusive sentence required under the statutory scheme.

The appellant appealed his conviction for incest and sexual assault of his teenage daughter, who gave birth to two of his children.

He received a global sentence of ten years.

At trial, the appellant dismissed his counsel midway through cross-examination and applied for a mistrial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the mistrial application.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to apply the same standard for assessing ineffective assistance claims used on appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, holding that the test for a mistrial application differs from the appellate test and remains within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for failure to comply with a probation order and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The breaches involved possessing internet-capable devices in violation of orders prohibiting such possession, which were imposed following the appellant's second conviction for possession of child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the proper range as it was his first breach and he was not a long-term offender, and that he did not download illegal material.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the offences were flagrant, planned, deliberate, and occurred shortly after release.

The court found no errors in law or principle and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance (x2), and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence.

The appellant pled guilty to all offences except pointing a firearm, which proceeded to trial.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the evidence.

The appellant raised concerns regarding territorial jurisdiction, misuse of his criminal record, and the trial judge's assessment of the victim's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the trial judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal from conviction.

The appellant also sought a one-month sentence reduction to complete his remaining time in a provincial institution, which the Court of Appeal declined to grant.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The complainant testified that she would not have consented to sexual intercourse three weeks after giving birth.

However, a sexual assault questionnaire completed at the hospital on the day of the alleged assault indicated that the complainant had reported consensual intercourse two days prior to the assault.

Trial counsel failed to notice this answer in the questionnaire and did not bring a section 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on this prior sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to attempt a section 276 application constituted ineffective representation that undermined the reliability of the verdict and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Three appellants convicted of first and second degree murder appealed their convictions.

Two were convicted of first degree murder and one of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as inconsistent and unreasonable, and raised multiple grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury charge, including issues regarding post-offence conduct instructions, circumstantial evidence instructions, and the treatment of various pieces of evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed on the acquittal of one appellant on first degree murder.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts neither inconsistent nor unreasonable, and that the trial judge committed no errors in her charge to the jury.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The appellant was convicted of firearm-related offences for importing three guns into Canada in her vehicle.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on wilful blindness, concluding she deliberately chose not to inquire about the contents of her vehicle despite having her suspicion aroused.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the wilful blindness doctrine.

The court clarified that wilful blindness does not require knowledge of the specific nature of the contraband (guns versus other criminal items), only that the accused's suspicion was aroused and she deliberately chose not to inquire.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no basis to interfere with the two-year less a day custodial sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve months plus three years probation for arson, seeking leave to appeal and challenging the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the collateral immigration consequences of the sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old with special needs who was unaware of his non-citizen status at sentencing, would have been deported to a refugee camp in a country where he had no connection or supports.

The court imposed a fit sentence of six months less a day, which the appellant had already served.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against the two daughters of his former girlfriend, with offences alleged between 2002 and 2004.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's denials and accepted the complainants' evidence.

The appellant was sentenced to two years less one day imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding that counsel failed to review a police statement with the appellant, failed to prepare him for cross-examination on that statement, and failed to intervene during cross-examination.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence and sexual assault.

He appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of his right to elect his mode of trial under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on the break and enter charge, which triggered the appellant's right to elect between trial in Superior Court (with preliminary inquiry) or Ontario Court of Justice.

Trial counsel made the election without providing the appellant with adequate advice regarding his options or their respective advantages and disadvantages.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's fundamental right to make an informed election regarding mode of trial had been violated, constituting a miscarriage of justice that undermined the fairness of the trial proceedings.

Two youths, aged 16 at the time of the offence, were convicted of first degree murder in the execution-style killing of another youth.

The Crown applied to have them sentenced as adults.

The youth court judge allowed the Crown's application and imposed life sentences with ten years' parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the adult sentences, arguing that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the intensive rehabilitative custody supervision (IRCS) program would not adequately address their rehabilitation needs and that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness had not been properly considered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the youth court judge had made reversible errors in his analysis of the IRCS program and that the Crown had failed to overcome the presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The court substituted youth sentences with IRCS orders.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting a police officer arising from a confrontation at the doorway of his condominium during a noise complaint investigation.

The central issue was whether the officer was lawfully in the execution of his duty when he stepped into the dwelling and refused to leave after the occupant asked him to do so.

The court held that the officer lacked lawful authority to enter or remain in the residence because none of the recognized exceptions to the common law “sanctity of the home” principle applied, including hot pursuit, exigent circumstances, or a warrant.

The trial judge erred in relying on doctrines of hot pursuit, implied licence, and officer safety to justify the entry.

As the officer was a trespasser and not acting in the execution of his duty, an essential element of the offence was not proven.

The appellant, a non-citizen convicted of drug offences, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment pursuant to a joint submission.

Neither counsel nor the Crown had advised the sentencing judge that a two-year sentence would strip the appellant of his right to appeal a removal order under the IRPA.

The Supreme Court held that collateral immigration consequences are a relevant factor in sentencing, flowing from principles of individualization and parity, but must not be allowed to skew the sentencing process or produce artificial sentences.

Since the Crown conceded the sentence should be reduced by one day and both sentences fell within the fit range, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.