Caitlin Pakosh

Teanna May Young pleaded guilty to Fraud Over $5000 for her involvement in a staged car collision as part of a larger fraud investigation.

The Crown sought a 12-month conditional sentence and $10,900 in restitution, while the defence requested a suspended sentence.

The court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence (two months house arrest, two months curfew) followed by a 12-month probation order.

The court rejected the joint submission for a restitution order, finding it would perpetuate the offender's cycle of poverty and offend the totality principle, given her limited financial means and mental health challenges.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude intercepted communications obtained under a Part VI wiretap authorization issued during a large‑scale police investigation into alleged fraud and violence within the Greater Toronto Area tow‑truck industry.

They argued the authorization was facially invalid, that the Information to Obtain failed to establish reasonable grounds, that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations, and that confidential informant summaries were inadequate.

The court conducted both facial and sub‑facial review of the ITO, including amplification based on cross‑examination of the affiant.

It held that any drafting defects could be addressed through severance and that the ITO, viewed holistically, established a credibly‑based probability that a criminal organization associated with the Paramount Group engaged in fraud and violence.

The court also found no deliberate misconduct by the affiant and ruled the judicial summaries provided a meaningful basis to challenge informant evidence.

The applicants, charged with offences related to a tow truck turf war, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) that supported a wiretap authorization.

The applicants argued that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations regarding witness statements and other evidence.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant on three specific topics where omissions or misstatements could potentially undermine the preconditions for the authorization, while denying leave on other topics that merely challenged reasonable inferences drawn by the affiant.

The offenders were convicted by a jury of sexual assault and being a party to sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and lacked the capacity to consent when the primary offender engaged in prolonged sexual activity with her in the back seat of a car.

The co-offender aided and abetted by driving the car, asking the complainant if she consented while recording her, and taking photos and videos of the assault.

The court sentenced the primary offender to 32 months' imprisonment and the co-offender to two years' imprisonment plus one year of probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a crime of opportunity against a vulnerable victim.

The defendants, F.I. and E.M., applied for a mistrial after being found guilty of sexual assault by a jury.

The application was based on the jury selection process, which did not allow peremptory challenges, following new procedures implemented on September 19, 2019.

This was argued to be contrary to the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which held that the abolition of peremptory challenges should not apply retrospectively to cases where the accused had a vested right to a trial by judge and jury under prior legislation.

The court dismissed the application, noting that counsel had not objected to the new jury selection process at the time of selection.

The judge adopted reasoning from R. v. Azzi, emphasizing the public interest in finality, the impact on the complainant, and the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada had granted leave to appeal the Chouhan decision, militating against a post-verdict mistrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for stunt driving under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, challenging the reliability of LIDAR speed measurement evidence.

The Crown's case rested solely on the testimony of OPP Constable Tihor, who used a LIDAR device to measure the appellant's vehicle speed at 180 km/h on a highway with a 100 km/h speed limit.

The appellant argued that the constable's qualifications to operate the LIDAR device and the device's proper functioning raised reasonable doubt.

The trial justice found the officer qualified and credible, and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding that the officer's training, testing protocols, and device reliability were adequately established to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

At trial, the complainant's mother, who was a police officer, testified that she used trickery to obtain an admission from the appellant.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and found the mother was acting as a police officer, but no voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that given the trial judge's finding that the mother was acting as a person in authority, a voir dire was required.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.