Harvel Bassi

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

At trial, the accused sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged violations of Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b).

The accused argued that placement in the rear of the police cruiser for the approved screening device test violated the right to be free from arbitrary detention, and that the delay in providing rights to counsel violated the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 rights, as the detention was reasonably justified by officer and public safety concerns.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the four-minute delay between arrest and provision of rights to counsel was justified by necessary safety precautions and operational requirements.

The breath test results were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" following a police investigation on April 10, 2016.

Police received dispatch information about a possible impaired driver and attended the registered address.

The investigating officer formed reasonable suspicion based on poor driving and a faint odour of alcohol, and made an approved screening device demand.

The defendant failed the ASD and was arrested.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath readings, alleging an unjustified delay of approximately seven minutes after arrest during which rights to counsel were not provided.

The Crown argued the delay was reasonable and explained.

The court found a breach of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter on a balance of probabilities but determined that the applicant had not established a remedy pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The breath readings were admitted as evidence and the defendant was found guilty.

The applicant was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code following a single-vehicle collision.

At trial, the applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the applicant was unlawfully handcuffed during the breath demand without reasonable justification for officer safety.

The handcuffing was found to be arbitrary and the breath sample demand was conducted in an unreasonable manner.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was not engaged because the Crown failed to prove the defendant actually occupied the driver's seat.

However, applying the risk analysis from R. v. Boudreault, the court found a realistic risk that the defendant would drive while impaired, based on her intoxication, proximity to her vehicle, possession of keys, and lack of a concrete and reliable alternative plan.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following observations by police officers on July 6, 2014.

The Crown proved impairment based on erratic driving conduct, physical symptoms observed at roadside, and evidence of alcohol consumption.

Although the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, depriving the Crown of the statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity, the court found the Crown proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt through viva voce evidence and judicial notice of toxicological principles.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the excess blood alcohol count conditionally stayed as a single delict.

The defendant was charged with assaulting his spouse during a domestic dispute.

The complainant alleged the defendant entered their home without permission and assaulted her, causing visible injuries.

The defendant claimed he entered the home to see his children and acted in self-defence when the complainant attacked him over a cell phone.

The court found credibility issues with both parties but determined that the defendant's evidence, while not entirely persuasive, could not be rejected and entitled him to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded that the impaired operation charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of identification of the driver.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found serious breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights relating to the right to counsel in his first language (Punjabi).

The police failed to advise the accused of the availability of Punjabi-speaking duty counsel despite objective evidence of language difficulties.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample, finding that the serious and well-established Charter breach, combined with the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, outweighed the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation while impaired by alcohol, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the seizure of blood samples obtained for medical purposes.

The court found that continuity of the blood samples was established and that no Charter breach occurred.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's read-back opinions, rendering those opinions inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired and over-80 charges but convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm based on evidence of excessive speeding on a residential street, loss of control, and collision with a tree.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on June 7, 2012.

The Crown presented evidence from two police officers and a forensic toxicologist.

The arresting officer observed the defendant making a wide, slow left turn and noted signs of impairment including unsteadiness, slow speech, strong odour of alcohol, and shaking hands.

Breath samples taken at the police station registered 58 and 49 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

A toxicologist opined that the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving would have been between 40 to 85 milligrams, with impairment occurring at 50 milligrams.

The court found the defendant guilty based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment to at least a slight degree.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle collision on June 26, 2012, in which the accused made a left-hand turn into the path of an oncoming motorcycle, killing the driver and seriously injuring the passenger.

The court applied the test for committal under section 548(1) of the Criminal Code and committed the accused to trial on all counts except the disqualified driving charge, which was withdrawn by the Crown.