Richard Blouin

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching arising from the same transaction.

Before sentencing, the defendant brought a second Charter s. 11(b) application to stay proceedings based on delay.

The trial commenced October 1, 2024, but was adjourned after October 4, 2024, when the Crown prosecutor developed a medical issue.

The trial resumed January 30, 2025, and concluded February 6, 2025.

Submissions were heard April 11, 2025, and judgment was delivered May 2, 2025.

The defendant argued the total delay from charge to conclusion of submissions (27 months and 11 days) violated his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court found net delay of 23 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months.

Although the Crown's illness was recognized as a discrete exceptional circumstance, the court found the system failed to adequately mitigate the delay by not offering continuation dates in a timely manner.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

This criminal trial concerned W.S., charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and indecent exposure against his underage stepdaughter, S.A. The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her mother, brother, a DNA expert, and a sexual assault nurse.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility due to inconsistencies in her initial statements.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and impressive witness, explaining her delayed and partial disclosures as typical for young victims of trauma.

Corroborating evidence included the defendant being found naked in the complainant's bed and significant DNA evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty on all three counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, Cullen McDonald, was charged with common nuisance under Section 180(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, for gathering and encouraging gatherings in contravention of COVID-19 emergency legislation.

The Crown alleged his actions endangered public health and safety.

The court examined the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, concluding that the provincial offence of violating a Stay-At-Home Order could not be elevated to a criminal common nuisance, and that the Crown failed to prove the necessary mens rea, as there was no evidence the accused knew his outdoor protest created a risk of serious harm.

The court also discussed, though rendered moot by the acquittal, the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the provincial COVID-19 restrictions, finding the restrictions likely infringed Charter rights but declining to rule on constitutionality.

The defendant, K.R., was charged under s. 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code for knowingly publishing intimate images of the complainant, G.I., without consent.

The images, which depicted G.I.'s genitalia and sexual activity, were posted to military Facebook groups.

The central issue was whether G.I. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these images at the time of recording and publication, as required by s. 162.1(2)(b) and (c).

The court found that G.I. did not have such an expectation, given his prior widespread distribution of the images on dating sites (Grindr, Scruff) and Pornhub, and his provision of a Facebook password to the defendant.

Applying the contextual assessment from R. v. Jarvis, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the privacy element of the offence.

K.R. was found not guilty.

David Kukoly, a former police officer and unregistered massage therapist, pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual assault involving eleven women over three years.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a reformatory sentence in the community, citing the defendant's genuine but mistaken belief in consent and the mitigating factor of his guilty plea.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of trust and vulnerability of victims, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and risks of incarceration for a former police officer.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence through significant deprivation of liberty (house arrest), along with probation, SOIRA registration, DNA order, and a s. 110 order.

This case concerns a Charter application to exclude firearm evidence in a criminal trial.

The defendant, a Black male, was stopped by police based on a robbery suspect description (white male, skinny build) that he did not match.

The court found that the initial detention was unlawful, violating sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10 (right to counsel) of the Charter, as police lacked reasonable suspicion and failed to provide rights immediately.

Constable Akgul's testimony regarding the reasons for detention was deemed unreliable.

However, the court accepted Constable Mehmoud's evidence that subsequent observations of the defendant displaying signs of firearm possession created reasonable suspicion for the physical takedown, during which the loaded firearm fell out.

The court found no section 8 (unreasonable search) violation.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court acknowledged the seriousness of the Charter breaches due to the officer's wilful disregard and fabricated reasons.

However, the impact on the defendant's Charter rights was deemed fleeting, as the evidence would have been discovered lawfully seconds later.

Crucially, society's interest in adjudicating serious firearm offences on their merits overwhelmingly favored admission.

Consequently, the firearm evidence was admitted.

Both defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over three years, they published a community newspaper called Your Ward News that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorified Nazism, denied the Holocaust, and counselled violence against women.

The court imposed consecutive sentences: James Sears received one year incarceration (six months on each count, the procedural maximum for summary conviction); Leroy St. Germaine received a 12-month conditional sentence (six months on each count served consecutively, with house arrest conditions).

The court declined to impose probation on either defendant, finding such restrictions would unduly curtail Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-year period, the defendants published and edited a community newspaper that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorifying Nazism, denying the Holocaust, and demonizing both groups.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence, the application of consecutive versus concurrent sentencing, aggravating and mitigating factors, community impact, and the scope of probation conditions.

The court imposed a one-year jail sentence (six months on each count served consecutively) and declined to impose probation restrictions on publishing activities, finding such restrictions would violate Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his trial after conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding ineffective assistance and proposed witnesses.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arabia and R. v. Kowall, considering both the Palmer fresh evidence criteria and whether the application was an attempt to reverse tactical decisions made at trial.

The court found that the decision to call no defence evidence was a deliberate tactical choice made by trial counsel based on professional judgment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for re-opening and that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The defendant brought an application four months after conviction and four days before sentencing to re-open the trial and/or declare a mistrial.

The application raised multiple grounds including ineffective counsel, abuse of process, apprehension of bias, constitutional challenges regarding freedom of expression and jury trial rights, and inadequate reasons for judgment.

The court applied the Palmer test for admissibility of fresh evidence after conviction and found most issues lacked merit.

However, regarding the failure to call a defence, the court determined it could not assess the application without hearing from the defendant and counsel, and without a proffer of the evidence sought to be adduced.

The court allowed the application to proceed by way of affidavit evidence to ensure no miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the accused was driving erratically and showed signs of impairment.

The accused was arrested at gunpoint after the officer believed he was attempting to flee.

The accused requested counsel but was not afforded the opportunity to consult before being charged with refusing the breath demand.

The court found the accused not guilty on the refusal charge because his refusal was provisional pending consultation with counsel, which was never provided.

The court also found the accused not guilty of impairment as the evidence did not establish impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on video evidence.

The court additionally found the police violated the accused's Charter rights through arbitrary detention.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The Crown and defence conceded the actus reus—that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and was impaired.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the mens rea of the offence.

The defendant claimed he mistakenly consumed alprazolam (Xanax) believing it was citalopram, a medication he had been prescribed for anxiety, and therefore lacked the intent to consume an intoxicant.

The court found that the defendant's urine sample contained alprazolam and carboxy THC (a cannabis metabolite), which aligned with the drug recognition expert's assessment.

The court applied the presumption under s. 320.31(6) and found no evidence to the contrary.

The court rejected the defendant's involuntary intoxication defence, finding that he was aware of his impairment before and during driving, and chose to continue operating his vehicle despite knowing it was dangerous.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with assault following a physical altercation with a teenage girl on a downtown Toronto street.

The defendant had directed offensive words at the girl and two of her friends, both of whom were wearing hijabs.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated both the verbal and physical confrontation.

The defendant claimed the physical altercation was a consensual fight that began when the complainant punched him first.

The court found that while the defendant's credibility was questionable, his evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to who first applied force.

The court concluded the incident constituted a consensual fight rather than an assault and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant, an Uber driver, was charged with unlawful confinement and assault after cancelling a trip and rerouting a passenger to Scarborough without her consent.

The Crown alleged the defendant confined the complainant and held her hand against her will.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct was reprehensible, the complainant's evidence regarding what she communicated to the defendant was unreliable and ambiguous, and surveillance video from the LCBO suggested the defendant was not acting as someone knowingly confining a person.

The court concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the Crown had established the necessary mens rea, including wilful blindness.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited by court order.

The offences occurred when the defendant, on bail with weapons prohibitions and a curfew, was found in a downtown Toronto bar with a loaded .45 calibre semi-automatic handgun.

Upon arrest, the defendant struggled with police and moved his hands toward the weapon.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years with credit for pre-trial detention and house arrest.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of 1.5 years after applying credit for 300 days of pre-trial custody and 65 days of house arrest, finding the conduct constituted truly criminal conduct posing a real and immediate danger to the public.

The defendant was convicted of assault with a weapon and threatening death following a knife attack in a restaurant, and assault on a police officer.

The trial judge had previously stayed all charges except assault with a weapon due to police brutality during arrest.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 90 days jail while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, finding that a nine-month conditional sentence was appropriate when accounting for the Charter breach involving excessive police force, pre-trial detention, and lengthy bail conditions.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 following a police investigation.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 170 mgs obtained at a police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on three grounds: (1) the time of driving was not accurately recorded to satisfy the two-hour requirement; (2) the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable; and (3) the accused's right to counsel under the Charter was violated.

The court found no violations regarding the timing of the breath samples.

However, the court found that a police officer interrupted and curtailed the accused's consultation with duty counsel by making hurry-up gestures through a window, thereby violating s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath evidence as the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's protected right outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample following a three-vehicle motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a lawful demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on four grounds: lack of subjective reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, lack of objective reasonableness, absence of evidence of driving within three hours, and failure to convey the mandatory nature of the demand.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect based on the defendant's statement regarding his G-2 driver's licence jeopardy and that the defendant was driving within the relevant timeframe.

However, the court found the officer's presentation of the demand created ambiguity regarding its mandatory nature, leaving reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant actually refused or misunderstood his obligations.

The defendant was charged with 14 counts arising from a two-month period of criminal conduct directed at his former intimate partner and her three children, including attempted murder, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation.

The defendant pleaded guilty to nine counts and was tried on the remaining five.

He was acquitted of three counts of attempted murder but convicted of attempted possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application under section 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive criminal harassment involving intimate partners spanning approximately 25 years across two countries.

The court imposed a four-year sentence for criminal harassment followed by a maximum ten-year long-term supervision order, finding that this lesser measure would adequately protect the public, rather than imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on January 15, 2015.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having only reasonable suspicion, and that the officer's credibility and reliability were seriously compromised by inadequate notes, failure to use required recording equipment, and evasive testimony.

The court concluded that the defendant's s. 9 Charter rights against arbitrary detention were violated.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence obtained after the arrest, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct outweighed other considerations.