Meghan Whittaker Scott

The respondent was convicted after a jury trial of assault by choking, assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and criminal harassment against the victim.

He was acquitted of uttering a threat to cause death.

The Crown sought judicial determination of facts for sentencing purposes and for a s. 752.1 assessment.

The respondent challenged the credibility and reliability of the victim's evidence on several material points, including who initiated contact, the frequency of meetings, and who informed the respondent of his mother's death.

The court conducted a thorough credibility assessment of both witnesses and made findings on the disputed facts, ultimately accepting the victim's evidence as more reliable and credible despite some inconsistencies.

Oladele Olafimihan pleaded guilty to sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The court delivered a sentence of 4 years in penitentiary, minus pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA sample, lifetime weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA registration.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as stalking, threats, and victim vulnerability, and mitigating factors including the offender's lack of criminal record, strong family support, self-help initiatives, and a significant guilty plea.

The court accepted the joint submission from the Crown and Defence, finding it proportionate and not bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, while also acknowledging the serious collateral consequences of deportation.

The accused was charged with assault by choking and two counts of sexual assault (anal penetration and breast touching) against a former intimate partner.

The court found the accused guilty of assault by choking and sexual assault by breast touching, but acquitted on the charge of sexual assault by anal penetration.

Key issues included the reliability of dated evidence, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule regarding contradictory evidence, and the legal definition of consent, particularly concerning unconsciousness and bodily harm in a sexual context.

The court determined that a person cannot consent while unconscious and that repeated choking causing temporary unconsciousness constituted non-trifling bodily harm, vitiating any potential consent.

The defendants were sentenced following their convictions for kidnapping (both defendants) and aggravated assault, robbery, and uttering death threats (one defendant).

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm and severe injuries to the victim, and mitigating factors such as youth, lack of prior records, and compliance with release conditions.

The decision also addressed constitutional challenges to minimum sentences and a victim restitution request.

The first defendant received 4 years and 3 months for kidnapping, while the second defendant received a global sentence of 4 years and 9 months for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery (death threats stayed).

The accused, Danna Millan, sought a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious charges including drug trafficking, firearms offences, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and extortion.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 crisis and the addition of a third surety.

The court found that the proposed release plan, including three sureties and strict house arrest, sufficiently addressed the tertiary grounds, and granted release.

The applicant, Zaaman Yusuf, sought a bail review after being denied bail on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious charges including kidnapping, forcible confinement, extortion, aggravated assault, and firearm and drug offences.

The defence argued for release based on a revised supervision plan with two sureties and the material change in circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the addition of a second surety did not constitute a material change and expressed concerns about the sureties' naiveté regarding the applicant's activities and the plan's ability to prevent re-offending or interference with justice.

While acknowledging the pandemic as a material change, the court found no specific health vulnerability for the applicant and noted the correctional facility's measures.

Ultimately, the application for release was denied, concluding that public confidence in the administration of justice would be eroded by the applicant's release given the gravity of the offences, the strength of the Crown's case, and the deficiencies in the proposed supervision plan.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid in December 2016 with trial set for December 2018, resulting in a total delay of 24 months.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court calculated net delay of 19 months after deducting five months of defence delay, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The primary cause of delay was the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure of email communications.

Although the Crown made commendable efforts to mitigate the delay once the disclosure deficiency became apparent, the Jordan framework provided no relief.

The application for a stay was granted.

The Crown applied for forfeiture of an $81,000 bail surety pledged by the respondent, Cassidy Phillips, after her father, the accused, absconded shortly after being released on bail.

The respondent acknowledged the breach but sought a reduction, arguing she was manipulated and had acted diligently as a surety by reporting her father's disappearance.

The court considered the overarching principle of maintaining the proper functioning of the bail system and the seriousness of the breach, while also acknowledging the respondent's good faith efforts.

The court ordered a forfeiture of $60,000, representing a 25% reduction from the pledged amount.

This pre-trial ruling addressed the admissibility of the defendant's statement to the police.

The court found the statement to be voluntary, rejecting arguments of exhaustion, physical discomfort, mental state, or police trickery.

However, the court determined that the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated in two ways: first, when the defendant expressed confusion about whether he had spoken to a lawyer, triggering a duty for police to offer a second consultation; and second, when the police questioning shifted to a significantly more serious offense (murder) without re-advising the defendant of his right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing state conduct, despite not being in bad faith, was serious and had a significant impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

On balance, the admission of the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with six offences arising from a police search of his residence: five counts of unsafe storage of non-restricted firearms and one count of ammunition storage.

The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant under section 8 of the Charter.

The court conducted a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reliable information from a complainant regarding the defendant's firearm possession and concerns about safe storage.

The defendant was found guilty on three counts (unsafe storage of a .22 calibre rifle, unsafe storage of an SKS rifle in an unlocked case, and unsafe storage of a loaded Chiappa shotgun) and not guilty on three counts (two rifles stored in a glass cabinet and ammunition storage).

The defendant was charged with Aggravated Assault following an incident at the complainant's apartment.

The trial established that the defendant attacked the complainant in the early morning hours, pulling her from bed by her hair and gouging at her face.

The complainant sustained a fractured wrist with ruptured tendon, chipped tooth, two black eyes, and a possible broken nose.

The defendant's alibi that he was in Niagara Falls at the time was rejected as false.

The court found the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault.

At sentencing, the court considered the defendant's prior domestic assault convictions, including one against the same complainant, his substance abuse issues, and the serious injuries sustained by the victim.

The defendant was sentenced to 19.5 months imprisonment with credit for pre-trial detention, followed by 18 months probation.

A 19-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, failure to comply with recognizance, and criminal harassment.

The offences occurred over seven hours on October 14, 2013, when the defendant confined his former girlfriend, threatened her with a shank made from scissors, stabbed her arm causing a permanent scar, bit her face, and obstructed her breathing while she was asthmatic.

The defendant was on bail at the time and breached his curfew conditions.

The court sentenced the defendant to 11 months in custody, with credit for 87 days of pre-trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 200 days remaining to be served.

The defendant was placed on two years probation with conditions including non-association, weapons prohibition, and mandatory counseling.

In a homicide prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce several hearsay statements attributed to a deceased victim and to unidentified bystanders during a fight.

The court considered whether the statements fell within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and whether they satisfied reliability requirements under the principled approach articulated in R. v. Khelawon.

The court admitted a statement reported by a witness that the victim said “Budja stabbed me” and described others holding him down, finding it spontaneous and proximate to the startling event and not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion.

However, statements allegedly shouted by unidentified bystanders during the fight were ruled inadmissible for the truth of their contents because the declarants were unknown and reliability could not be assessed.

Those statements were admissible only for the non-hearsay purpose of demonstrating what may have been audible to the accused during the altercation.