Lindsay L. Daviau

R.O., a 14-year-old at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of 14-year-old Devan Selvey.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the senseless nature of the crime and R.O.'s flight, and mitigating factors, such as his guilty plea and significant personal challenges.

Applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles, particularly diminished moral culpability and rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission for the maximum youth sentence: a seven-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, comprising four years in custody (with 24 months credit for pre-sentence custody) and three years under conditional supervision, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and no-contact order.

The appellant, J.R., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his two young daughters.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against cross-count reasoning and propensity reasoning, and by instructing them that cross-count reasoning was permissible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding these errors required the convictions to be set aside.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges including pointing a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for the acquittals, specifically by not addressing credibility and reliability issues related to the officers' testimony and not explaining how the evidence led to reasonable doubt despite compelling forensic evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on the disputed counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his 12-month sentence.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the testimony of the appellant and the complainant, and whether the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no uneven scrutiny in the trial judge's comprehensive assessment of the complainant's credibility and no error in the trial judge's conclusion regarding the absence of a realistic motive to fabricate.

The court also found the 12-month sentence for a random and violent sexual assault to be fit, despite potential immigration implications for the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and five-year sentence for importing opium and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings regarding Crown witnesses.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the five-year sentence was not unreasonable, especially considering the appellant's previous convictions for similar drug offences.

In a criminal trial for wilfully promoting hatred, the Crown sought to introduce various blog posts and internet articles as "proposed motive evidence" to demonstrate the accused's animus towards gay people.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the proposed evidence was not capable of demonstrating the intense and extreme hatred required for motive.

The court ruled that the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence, which risked distracting the jury with debates over the accused's political and religious views rather than the elements of the offence, significantly outweighed its limited probative value.

The appellant appealed convictions for failing to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter breach but declined to exclude evidence under s. 24(2), having speculated on the nature of legal advice the appellant would have received.

The Superior Court found this speculation to be a reversible legal error, contrary to Supreme Court precedent established in R. v. Bartle and R. v. Black.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted for a new trial, as the s. 24(2) analysis required a fresh consideration of all evidence by a judge of first instance.

The applicant sought an order to quash an indictment as a nullity due to improper joinder of charges, or to stay the charges as an abuse of process.

In the alternative, the applicant sought to sever the Toronto and Peel charges.

The court found no legal impediment to the Crown's procedure of withdrawing an information and laying a new one combining charges from different regions, nor did it constitute an abuse of process.

The court also dismissed the application for severance, finding a sufficient factual and legal nexus between the charges and a viable similar fact application, which outweighed the risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The applicant, Waqar Ali, sought a stay of charges for sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm, alleging an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay was approximately 36 months.

The court calculated the net delay by subtracting periods attributable to the defence, including a change of counsel and an adjournment of trial dates.

The net delay was found to be approximately 27.25 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that he took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, primarily due to his counsel's unavailability for earlier trial dates.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on a single charge of sexual interference following a judge-alone trial.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge improperly curtailed defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant's mother regarding cash payments for child support.

The appellant argued the mother had been motivated to encourage false allegations due to family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found no unfairness in the curtailment, noting that the central issue turned on the complainant's evidence, which the trial judge found clear and compelling.

The mother's evidence was largely peripheral and provided only corroboration.

The court also refused to admit fresh evidence as it failed to satisfy the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of break, enter and assault and two counts of breach of probation, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment less 24 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both conviction and sentence.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider exculpatory evidence in his video statement regarding the intentional nature of contact with the homeowner.

The court also rejected numerous other arguments raised for the first time on appeal that were not raised at trial or contained in the trial evidence.

Regarding sentence, the court found no error in principle in the imposition of probationary terms, including non-communication provisions and a requirement to seek counselling for gambling addiction.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for 15 offences including criminal negligence causing death, fail to remain at the scene of a collision, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the court found that while the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, this error was inconsequential given the numerous other aggravating factors, particularly the appellant's extensive criminal record for similar offences.

The court upheld the sentence as fit but clarified that the s. 743.6 parole eligibility order applied only to the criminal negligence conviction, not the entire sentence, and set aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence of 15 months' imprisonment plus one year probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to account for his cognitive difficulties and memory problems when assessing his credibility, and that the judge used these difficulties against him.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge provided ample reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony that were unrelated to his cognitive difficulties, including identifying patently untrue aspects of his evidence and noting collusion between the appellant and his mother.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant did not identify any error in principle in the sentence, which the court found to be entirely fit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 12 years for manslaughter in the stabbing death of her sister-in-law.

The appellant was tried on a charge of second-degree murder but was convicted of manslaughter.

The sentencing judge imposed a 12-year sentence, characterizing the offence as aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant, through duty counsel, challenged three factual findings made by the sentencing judge: that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the neck, that the stabbing would cause bodily harm, and that the deceased was holding her baby at the time of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and proper.

The Crown brought a motion to strike affidavits filed by the appellant in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The Crown raised concerns that the fresh evidence materials were prepared by a lawyer found to be in a conflict of interest and sought to put the appellant on notice that it would challenge the admissibility or weight of evidence tainted by that conflict.

The court held that the appellant was now on notice of the Crown's position and that the Crown could raise these concerns before the appeal panel.

An appeal date was set for December 10, 2018, with provisions for the Crown to request an adjournment if necessary.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid in December 2016 with trial set for December 2018, resulting in a total delay of 24 months.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court calculated net delay of 19 months after deducting five months of defence delay, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The primary cause of delay was the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure of email communications.

Although the Crown made commendable efforts to mitigate the delay once the disclosure deficiency became apparent, the Jordan framework provided no relief.

The application for a stay was granted.

The appellant appealed his sentence for flight from police and driving while disqualified.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence with credit for 283 days of presentence custody on a one-for-one basis, refusing enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating violations of federal statutory release with provincial institutional misconduct.

The court held that the loss of early release eligibility alone generally justifies enhanced credit at 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 142 days.

A 35-year-old female offender was subject to a dangerous offender application following guilty pleas to aggravated assault and breach of probation.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(i) and/or (ii) of the Criminal Code with an indeterminate sentence.

The court found the offender met the threshold for a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating substantial indifference to foreseeable consequences under section 753(1)(a)(ii), establishing dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court declined to impose an indeterminate sentence, finding a reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence with a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The court imposed 7 years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years 9 months, leaving 3 years 3 months to serve) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.