Fraser McCracken

This decision concerns an application by Brandi Stewart-Sperry for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown’s case in a first-degree murder trial.

Stewart-Sperry argued that there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict her, particularly regarding her knowledge of the co-accused’s possession of a firearm and intent to shoot a police officer.

The court reviewed the legal principles for directed verdicts, the use of circumstantial and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses an application by several media organizations for virtual access to a high-profile murder trial, invoking the open court principle.

The court reviews the constitutional and statutory foundations of open courts, the discretion of judges to permit or deny virtual access, and the practical realities facing media coverage.

Ultimately, the court finds that while the open court principle does not require virtual access, it may be granted at the court’s discretion in light of modern realities and the decline of local news coverage.

The court sentenced A.S. to three years and six months' imprisonment for sexual assault of a 16-year-old, following a judge-alone trial.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offence and offender, victim impact, and the applicable sentencing principles, including proportionality, parity, and restraint.

The court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact of immigration consequences, and the appropriateness of conditional sentences or discharges.

The court found that the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility warranted a custodial sentence within the range of three to five years, as established by appellate authority, and imposed ancillary orders including a SOIRA order, DNA order, weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order.

The Crown appealed an absolute discharge granted to the respondent for mischief and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying the "best interests of the accused" and "public interest" tests under s. 730(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court found the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the respondent's criminal record and specific deterrence, and by narrowly defining "public interest" to exclude the broader community.

The appeal was allowed, the absolute discharge vacated, a conviction entered, and a suspended sentence with probation was imposed, but its execution was permanently stayed due to the passage of time and the respondent's compliance with conditions.

This decision concerns a Stage Two hearing under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code regarding the admissibility of two documents authored by the complainant and given to the accused.

The accused sought to adduce these documents to challenge the complainant's credibility, arguing they were inconsistent with her police statement about the nature of their relationship.

The Crown and complainant opposed the admission, citing risks of twin myths and prejudice.

The court found the documents relevant and of significant probative value, not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The application was allowed, permitting the accused to cross-examine the complainant on the documents for the limited purpose of establishing any inconsistency, with the scope of questioning to be carefully circumscribed by the court.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an outbreak at the detention centre, and a new release plan including electronic monitoring and additional sureties.

The original bail hearing had already considered the pandemic.

The court found no error in the initial detention order and determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances under the modified Palmer criteria, as the updated information regarding COVID-19 and the enhanced release plan did not sufficiently alter the primary and secondary ground concerns, particularly given the applicant's history of non-compliance and the seriousness of the fraud charges.

The application for bail review was dismissed, and continued detention was ordered.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to a breach of the respondent's section 11(b) Charter rights.

The trial judge erred in characterizing periods of delay and in accounting for exceptional circumstances, particularly the death of the first trial judge.

The appeal court re-evaluated defence-caused delay and exceptional circumstances under the *R. v. Jordan* framework, finding the total net delay to be below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The stay was set aside, and the matter remitted for trial.

A bail hearing for a young person charged with theft, possession of stolen property, obstructing a peace officer, breach of recognizance, possession of marijuana, and breach of probation.

The Crown and duty counsel jointly submitted for release on a recognizance with a surety (the young person's mother) and proposed conditions, including that the young person "be amenable to the routine and discipline of his residence." The Justice of the Peace declined to impose this condition, finding it vague, unnecessary, and unrelated to the grounds for detention under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant, an OPP officer convicted of breach of recognizance and mischief to data, brought an application to introduce fresh evidence on her summary conviction appeal.

The proposed evidence included alibi witnesses, computer forensic expert evidence, and evidence attacking the complainant's credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, applying the Palmer test.

The court found that the evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence and that the expert computer evidence lacked sufficient cogency to reasonably affect the verdict.

During a sexual assault trial, the complainant began testifying but left the courthouse during cross‑examination after experiencing a mental health crisis and attempting self‑harm.

She was apprehended under the Mental Health Act and involuntarily admitted to hospital for psychiatric assessment.

The court addressed how the trial should proceed while the witness’s ability to complete testimony remained uncertain, noting potential reliance on Criminal Code provisions regarding prior testimony and video‑link evidence if the witness could not return.

The court directed that the trial continue with other evidence that would not prejudice the defence pending the complainant’s anticipated return.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on August 1, 2010.

An information was sworn on August 9, 2010.

A trial date was set for June 20, 2011, but the trial did not proceed due to disclosure issues, particularly the late delivery of a 911 call recording and surveillance footage from the police division.

A second trial date was set for May 23 and 24, 2012, resulting in a total delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the delay infringed his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and granted the stay.