Antonio Skarica

The court ruled on the admissibility of three police statements made by the accused, Rebecca Eden, in a first-degree murder investigation.

The first two statements (audio and video) were made on June 10, 2021, when she was a person of interest.

The third statement was made on March 11, 2022, after her arrest for first-degree murder.

The court found that the accused was detained during the second statement, and her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) were violated due to police conduct, including failing to inform her of the true reasons for detention and the seizure of her phone without informed consent.

Applying the "tainting" doctrine from R. v. Pino, these Charter breaches retroactively rendered the first (audio) statement inadmissible as part of the same transaction.

For the third statement, the court found that the police violated the accused's section 7 right to silence by persistently questioning her despite her repeated assertions (106-108 times) that she wished to remain silent on advice of counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that admitting all three statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

All three statements were ruled inadmissible.

A Hamilton jury awarded the plaintiff over $1 million in damages for serious injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

The jury award exceeded both the plaintiff's and defendants' offers to settle.

This decision addresses the plaintiff's application for costs, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest.

The court applied Rule 49.10, entitling the plaintiff to partial indemnity costs up to the date of their offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court also exercised its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to fix prejudgment interest at 3% and post-judgment interest at 7%.

The total award for costs and interest was $1,104,557.50.

The accused, Cadence Beauparlant, pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a firearm under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code, following an incident where a 17-year-old girl was fatally shot by a co-accused using the firearm Beauparlant brought to a party.

The court considered mitigating factors (no prior record at the time of the offence, youth, guilty plea) and numerous aggravating factors (reckless disregard for safety, flight from scene, continued drug trafficking, unrecovered firearm).

The judge emphasized the need for strong denunciation and deterrence for gun crimes, noting the alarming increase in such crimes in Hamilton despite judicial calls for stricter sentences.

The court found the accused's rehabilitation prospects poor given his post-offence conduct.

A sentence of seven years in penitentiary, consecutive to existing sentences for drug trafficking, was imposed, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a non-communication order.

The accused, Mark Champagne, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to edit his prior criminal record for cross-examination on credibility.

The defence sought to exclude portions of both his adult and youth records and to limit the scope of cross-examination.

The court, applying the Corbett factors (nature, similarity, remoteness, risk of distorted picture), ruled that the accused's entire adult criminal record, including serious convictions like attempted murder and aggravated assault, was admissible for cross-examination on credibility.

The court found the probative value outweighed any prejudice, especially given the accused's attacks on Crown witness credibility.

However, the court ruled that the youth record was inadmissible, finding its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect due to its age, similarity to adult convictions, and limited relevance to credibility.

The cross-examination was restricted to the fact of conviction, not the details of the offences.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of hearsay statements made by a deceased victim, Alan Rutherford, identifying his assailant in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as dying declarations and spontaneous utterances.

The defence challenged their reliability due to inconsistencies among witnesses and a minor factual error by the declarant.

The court found that the statements met the criteria for both traditional hearsay exceptions and the principled approach, concluding that the defence's objections went to the weight of the evidence rather than its threshold admissibility.

The Crown's application to admit the statements was granted.

This ruling addresses an application by an accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, to sit at counsel table during trial.

The court outlines twelve principles governing such applications, emphasizing a balance between the accused's right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and courtroom security.

The court rejects the notion that the defence bears an onus to show exceptional circumstances.

Applying these principles, the court grants the application, permitting the accused to sit at counsel table, subject to being restrained by silent ankle shackles and appropriate security placement.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking to exclude evidence (cocaine, money, cell phones) seized incident to his arrest, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the arresting officer's testimony unreliable and incredible, concluding that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and failed to promptly inform the accused of the reasons for his arrest.

Consequently, the search incident to arrest was unlawful.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court determined that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's rights warranted the exclusion of the evidence, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, Mato Josipovic, applied for judicial interim release (bail) pending a new trial for second-degree murder, citing the potential lethal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in detention and probable trial delays.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

While the primary ground (flight risk) was satisfied, the court found the Crown's case to be overwhelming and the gravity and circumstances of the offense (a public, brutal execution involving multiple shots and danger to bystanders) necessitated detention on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The specific risks posed by COVID-19 in the detention centre were not found to be higher than in the general population, and potential trial adjournments were deemed uncertain at the time of the application.

The bail application was denied.

The accused sought a bail review following his detention on multiple criminal charges.

The review, conducted remotely via ZOOM during the COVID-19 pandemic, raised two main issues: an alleged error in law by the initial justice of the peace and a material change in circumstances due to a new surety and the risk posed by COVID-19 in custody.

The court found no error in law by the initial justice and determined that neither the proposed new surety nor the general risk of COVID-19 constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant release, particularly given the accused's history of breaching court orders and the serious nature of the charges.

The plaintiff was parked in his vehicle with a friend when approached by police.

The police demanded his driver's licence, which he refused to provide, questioning the reason for the stop.

The police forcibly removed him from the vehicle, grounded him, handcuffed him, and searched his vehicle, finding only a Bluetooth device.

He was then released.

The plaintiff sued for negligence, assault, false arrest, and Charter breaches.

The court found the police were conducting a criminal investigation without articulable cause, not a Highway Traffic Act stop.

The detention, arrest, and search were unlawful, and the force used was unreasonable.

The court awarded the plaintiff and his family $59,800 in tort damages, but declined to award additional Charter or punitive damages.

Erick Reid was found guilty of manslaughter following a jury trial where his accomplice was convicted of first-degree murder.

The court made findings of fact consistent with the jury's verdict, establishing Reid's involvement in a planned armed robbery where the victim was shot and killed by his accomplice.

Reid brandished a firearm to intimidate a bystander and failed to assist the dying victim.

The court considered Reid's significant criminal record, including prior firearm and violence offences, and his lack of credibility during testimony.

Aggravating factors included the planned nature of the crime, the use of firearms, the victim's vulnerability, Reid's criminal history, and his refusal to identify the shooter.

Mitigating factors included that Reid did not fire the fatal shot, his supportive family, and pre-sentence custody credit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearm-related violence, the court sentenced Reid to 15 years imprisonment.

With a credit of 42 months for pre-sentence custody, he was sentenced to a further 11.5 years.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA sample.

In a pre-trial motion for a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce hearsay evidence from the deceased victim's wife regarding a 2013 robbery allegedly committed by the accused.

The court applied the principled exception to hearsay and the test for prior discreditable conduct.

The court found the identification evidence for the 2013 robbery was frail, failing to meet threshold reliability.

Furthermore, the prejudicial effect of admitting the unproven prior robbery and a related newspaper article outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's motion to introduce the evidence was denied.

The defence applied to exclude evidence of prior discreditable conduct, known as the "Austin incident," in a murder and aggravated assault trial involving Tyrone Chambers and Joshua Warner.

The Austin incident, a minor assault accompanied by a threat to shoot, occurred shortly before the main shootings.

The defence argued its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The Crown contended the incident was relevant to the accused's knowledge of each other's gun possession, their willingness to back each other up, and the overall narrative of the night's events, forming part of a continuing transaction.

Applying the R. v. Handy test for similar fact evidence, the court treated the Austin incident as prior discreditable conduct but found its high probative value, particularly concerning narrative, the accused's knowledge and state of mind, Section 21 party liability, and self-defence, greatly outweighed the limited moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence admissible.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a pre-trial motion under s. 276.2 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant, M.M., at a strip club.

The accused argued this evidence was necessary to explain the presence of his DNA on a vaginal swab taken from M.M. hours after the alleged assault and to challenge M.M.'s credibility regarding her earnings that night.

The court applied the two-step Darrach procedure, finding the accused's affidavit sufficiently detailed and his evidence credible enough to raise a reasonable doubt.

The court determined the evidence was admissible as it was a specific instance of sexual activity, relevant to an issue at trial (explaining DNA), and had significant probative value not outweighed by prejudice, upholding the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The accused, O’Neil Harriott, was convicted by a jury of weapons trafficking (offer to transfer a handgun) and cocaine trafficking (offer to sell 2 ounces of cocaine), but acquitted on three counts of actual cocaine trafficking based on a duress defence.

The defence brought a constitutional challenge to the three-year mandatory minimum sentence for weapons trafficking under section 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate, both in the accused's specific circumstances (a hollow offer to sell a gun with no intent or ability to provide it, under duress) and in reasonable hypothetical scenarios (e.g., licensing infractions).

The mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The court then sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence on the cocaine trafficking charge and 6 months less a day consecutive on the weapons trafficking charge, along with three years' probation and a lifetime weapons prohibition, considering mitigating factors such as duress, limited record, and pre-sentence custody.

The applicants, co-accused in a first-degree murder trial, sought to admit an audio statement made by their co-accused, Joshua Barreira, for the truth of its contents.

Joshua's statement suggested that the shooter acted in a drug-induced frenzy without the prior knowledge or intent of the other accused, potentially exonerating some and reducing the shooter's liability.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, requiring necessity and reliability, and considered a relaxed standard of admissibility for defence evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Finding necessity met due to Joshua's election not to testify, and sufficient indicia of reliability under a relaxed standard, the court ruled that Joshua's audio statement was admissible for the truth of its contents on behalf of the applicants.

This mid-trial ruling addresses Corbett applications by three accused (Brandon Barreira, Chad Davidson, and Joshua Barreira) in a first-degree murder trial.

Brandon and Chad sought to exclude their criminal convictions from cross-examination, while Joshua sought reconsideration of a previous ruling regarding his convictions.

The court applied the Corbett factors, balancing the probative value of the records against their prejudicial effect.

For Brandon and Chad, their youth records were excluded due to their age, similarity to adult convictions, and the policy objectives of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

However, their adult criminal records were deemed admissible due to a continuous pattern of criminal conduct relevant to credibility.

Joshua's request to edit specific convictions (possession of firearm/ammunition contrary to prohibition order and counsel to commit murder) was denied, as the court found the full description relevant to his credibility and not overly prejudicial given the trial context.

This corrigendum clarifies a mid-trial ruling regarding the admissibility of a composite video.

It corrects the reference to Mr. Michael Plaxton, a certified forensic video analyst, from 'Officer Plaxton' to 'Mr. Plaxton', noting that he is a civilian despite potentially being a peace officer.

This change does not alter the substance of the original ruling.

In a first-degree murder trial involving multiple co-accused, Joshua Barreira applied for remedies to address alleged procedural unfairness arising from the alphabetical order of names on the indictment.

He sought rights to re-cross-examine witnesses, an alternating order of cross-examination with co-accused Chad Davidson, and changes to the order of leading evidence and jury addresses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the tactical disadvantages were inherent in the adversarial process and did not meet the high threshold for fundamental unfairness.

The court also determined that re-cross-examination was not warranted as the matters raised were foreseeable.

This ruling addresses a defence application to edit three statements made by accused Joshua Barreira, which were previously ruled admissible in his first-degree murder trial.

The court considered principles of post-offence conduct, the right to silence, and the probative value versus prejudicial effect of various parts of the statements.

The judge ordered specific redactions from Statement #1 and Statement #2, including references to past criminal activity, irrelevant personal comments, and discussions about police taking information to the Crown for a potential deal.

The court also ruled that Joshua's willingness to undergo a polygraph test was admissible, given the parties' agreement and the lack of substantial prejudicial effect.