A. Cornelius

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited," applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.

The applicant, Shayan Syed, sought bail release under s. 522(1) of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder.

The court considered the secondary ground for detention, focusing on the protection and safety of the public.

Despite a proposed house arrest plan with his mother as surety and electronic monitoring, the court found the applicant presented a high risk due to violent tendencies, unpredictability, a history of violence (assault, uttering threats, breaches of court orders), and unmanaged schizophrenia and psychosis exacerbated by drug use.

The proposed surety's credibility was severely damaged by her denial of a prior threat incident involving the applicant, to which he had pled guilty.

The court dismissed the bail application, concluding the applicant failed to satisfy the secondary ground.

A young offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role as a lookout during a fatal shooting in a fast food restaurant washroom.

The Crown sought the maximum three-year sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, while the defence sought a sentence of time served with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court denied enhanced credit, finding no exceptional circumstances, and sentenced the offender to two years and nine months in closed custody, less time served, followed by two years of probation.

The accused, a young person, was on trial for first-degree murder.

This decision provides reasons for the judge's instructions to the jury regarding the use of post-incident conduct evidence.

The Crown sought to use this evidence for all elements of the offence, including planning, deliberation, and intent to kill.

The defence argued for a "no probative value" instruction.

The court ruled that post-incident conduct was not relevant to the shooters' intent to kill or whether the murder was planned and deliberate, citing risks of speculation and inferring intent.

However, the court found the evidence relevant to whether the accused aided the shooters in carrying out their plan and the accused's knowledge of the plan, particularly regarding flight and disposal of weapons.

A young person, A.D., charged with first-degree murder, brought a voir dire application to determine the admissibility of two statements: a conversation with his mother and an interview with Cst.

Irwin.

The court ruled that the conversation with his mother was a privileged consultation under section 146(2)(b)(iii) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and was inadmissible for any purpose.

The statement to Cst.

Irwin was found to be voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, with a specific portion excluded due to concerns about threats or inducements related to sentencing.

The court emphasized the enhanced procedural protections for young persons and the privacy of consultations with parents.

The young person, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged the young person aided and abetted two others in the planned and deliberate shooting of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, assessing whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict based on the circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the young person knew of the plan and acted as a lookout, the court dismissed the motion.

The applicants sought certiorari with mandamus in aid to review rulings made by a preliminary inquiry judge in a first‑degree murder prosecution.

They argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred by permitting a key witness to testify by closed circuit television under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code based on hearsay evidence and by refusing to hold a voir dire regarding the witness’s appearance, including alleged use of a wig and tinted glasses.

The reviewing court held that evidentiary and procedural rulings at a preliminary inquiry are not reviewable on certiorari unless they amount to jurisdictional error or a denial of natural justice.

The challenged rulings were within the preliminary inquiry judge’s jurisdiction and did not impair the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The application for certiorari was therefore dismissed.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of statements and physical evidence and a stay of proceedings in a prosecution involving kidnapping, extortion, and forcible confinement.

The court considered the voluntariness of statements made before and after arrest, alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and the impact of lost evidence including a wallet and driver’s licence.

Applying the confessions rule and the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused had sufficient English comprehension and had knowingly waived counsel.

A brief s.10(b) breach occurred when an officer asked for identification immediately after arrest, but the statement about the location of the accused’s pants was admitted under s.24(2).

The court also held the accused lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where the pants were seized and therefore had no standing for a s.8 challenge.

The request to stay proceedings based on lost evidence was adjourned until the conclusion of the trial evidence.

The accused brought a voir dire seeking exclusion of statements made to police following his arrest for offences including kidnapping and extortion.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter due to investigative detention without timely access to counsel.

The court rejected claims of language barriers, intoxication, coercion, and police oppression, finding the accused understood English, had an operating mind, and spoke voluntarily in the hope of improving his situation.

Although a brief 10‑minute breach of s. 10(b) occurred before counsel rights were given, the impugned statement was spontaneous and the breach was minor.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to admit the accused’s police statement and initiated a voir dire to establish voluntariness.

The issue was whether the Crown could meet its burden where it failed to call one of the arresting officers who had contact with the accused prior to the statement.

The court held that the Crown must call all persons in authority who had legally meaningful investigative or custodial contact with the accused or who were in a position to influence the giving of the statement, unless their absence is satisfactorily explained.

Because an officer present during the arrest spoke with the accused’s distraught mother within the accused’s earshot and was not called to testify, a material evidentiary gap existed.

The Crown therefore failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was excluded.

The defence applied to exclude evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, specifically his flight from police nine months after the alleged homicide.

The defence argued the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence relevant and probative to the issue of whether the accused committed a culpable homicide and did not act in self-defence.

The court held that the jury should be allowed to weigh the evidence with appropriate instructions.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to edit his criminal record before testifying before the jury.

He requested that a prior robbery conviction be referred to as a theft and that a conviction for flight from police be excluded.

The court granted the application, finding that admitting the robbery conviction carried a serious risk of impermissible propensity reasoning given the factual matrix of the current charges.

The court also excluded the flight from police conviction, noting it was not a crime of dishonesty and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value, particularly since the Crown intended to lead after-the-fact conduct evidence of the accused fleeing police upon arrest.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after stabbing his landlord to death.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused should be found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under section 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified that the accused suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or a delusional disorder, and that his actions were driven by persecutory delusions.

The court applied the test from R. v. Oommen and concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the accused's mental illness prevented him from knowing that his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The accused was found not criminally responsible.