Deniz Sarikaya

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous operation causing death and failure to stop after an accident causing death.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the truck that struck and killed a pedestrian.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of video surveillance evidence under Nikolovski, failed to apply W.(D.) to exculpatory evidence, and misapprehended evidence regarding the vehicle's features.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the extensive video evidence tracing the appellant's vehicle and properly considered all potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against children, which arose from guilty pleas.

He argued the pleas were involuntary due to pressure after his trial counsel was released and his adjournment request was denied, leaving him to face self-representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary.

The court held that emotional pressure and fear of self-representation did not impair his ability to make a conscious volitional choice.

The applicant, convicted of multiple sexual offences against a child including making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, and sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The applicant argued the appeal was not frivolous on two grounds: insufficiency of the trial judge's sparse six-page reasons and material misapprehension of evidence.

The Crown conceded no public safety or flight risk concerns but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found the insufficiency of reasons argument was not frivolous and that the sparse reasons generated lower confidence in the justice of the conviction, diminishing the public interest in continued detention.

Bail was granted on terms agreed between the parties.

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of fraud involving 15 victims and proceeds totalling $178,573.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of six months in jail (after accounting for pre-sentence custody and Duncan credit), followed by three years of probation.

Ancillary orders included a secondary DNA order, a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $178,573 payable within five years of release, a Financial Activities Prohibition order for 10 years prohibiting employment in financial or vehicle-related roles, forfeiture of property, and a restitution order requiring minimum monthly payments of $1,000 commencing January 1, 2026.

The court emphasized the serious impact on victims and the need for denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence.

The court sentenced Lance Burkhard for second-degree murder following a guilty plea after a successful appeal of his first-degree murder conviction.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the character and rehabilitation of the offender, and the impact on the victim’s family.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, considering the seriousness of the offence, Burkhard’s criminal record, his rehabilitation efforts, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Joao Guimaraes was found in contempt of court for refusing to testify as a Crown witness at a preliminary inquiry.

Despite being cautioned, he repeatedly refused to answer questions, citing fear for his safety.

At the subsequent contempt hearing, he did testify and answered all questions.

The court considered the seriousness of contempt, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, but also noted mitigating factors: Guimaraes' youth (23), lack of prior record, genuine fear, and the limited impact of his refusal on the preliminary hearing's outcome.

He had also been acquitted of the underlying firearms charges and had served 40 days (credited as 60 days) in pre-sentence custody for the contempt.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with six months of probation, finding the pre-sentence custody sufficient accountability given the unique circumstances.

The accused, Ashton Bell, faced serious firearms charges and brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude evidence (a firearm) alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), primarily due to racial profiling during a traffic stop, search, and arrest.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach (delay in access to counsel) but argued for admission of evidence.

The court found no racial profiling or s. 8/9 breaches, but confirmed the s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that admitting the firearm would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the less serious nature of the breach, minimal impact on the accused, and high societal interest in adjudicating serious firearms offences.

The evidence was admitted, leading to conviction on all charges.

The respondent, an in-custody witness, refused to testify at a preliminary inquiry, citing a general fear for his safety due to the 'jailhouse code' against testifying.

The presiding judge cited him for contempt.

At the contempt hearing, the respondent argued that a preliminary inquiry judge lacks jurisdiction to cite for contempt and that his fear amounted to duress.

The court held that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to find a witness in contempt for conduct in the face of the court.

The court further held that a generalized fear of retribution without a specific threat does not meet the criteria for the defence of duress.

The respondent was found in contempt.

Ezekel Vincent pleaded guilty to manslaughter after initially being charged with second-degree murder.

The charge stemmed from Vincent fatally shooting Kenroy Benjamin, who had just killed Vincent's friend, Sheldon Taylor, at a banquet hall.

The court determined that Vincent brought the handgun to the scene.

The sentencing decision considered aggravating factors, including the use of a prohibited firearm in a public place, the pursuit and close-range shooting of the victim, and the non-recovery of the weapon.

Mitigating factors included Vincent's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, difficult upbringing, experience with racial discrimination, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed an 11-year sentence, reduced to 10 years due to harsh custody conditions, and further reduced by 30 months for pre-trial credit, resulting in a net sentence of 7.5 years.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order were also imposed.

The accused were charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences following a warrantless arrest and search of their vehicle.

The arresting officer claimed to have observed hand-to-hand drug transactions from a distance, but his testimony was found to be highly unreliable, inconsistent, and physically impossible in several respects.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, rendering the arrest and subsequent search unlawful and in breach of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the seized drugs and firearm under s. 24(2), resulting in the acquittal of the accused.

The defendant, John Cochrane, was charged with one count of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The prosecution's case was primarily circumstantial, focusing on whether Cochrane possessed the heroin (either solely or jointly) and if the purpose of possession was trafficking.

The court applied legal principles regarding the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, proof of possession (including constructive and joint possession), and the assessment of circumstantial evidence.

The court found that while Cochrane had legal control over the apartment where the drugs were found, the evidence did not rule out the reasonable possibility that a co-occupant, Ms. Petersen, was in sole possession of the heroin.

As the prosecution failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was found not guilty.

The applicant, Alden Nunes, brought an application to exclude evidence (guns, fentanyl, ecstasy) obtained via a search warrant, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds to believe evidence would be found at the searched residence (21 Redvers Street, Whitby), as the police failed to establish Mr. Moore's current residency there or investigate beyond his outdated bail conditions.

Despite the absence of police bad faith, the Charter-infringing conduct was deemed serious due to the lack of investigation and the high expectation of privacy in a dwelling.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The defence applied to re-open and re-consider an earlier ruling that admitted a Super 8 video from the day before an alleged murder.

The defence offered admissions of fact under Section 650 of the Criminal Code to obviate the need for the video.

The Crown opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the video's unique visual probative value, particularly in demonstrating the accused's familiarity with the firearm and concerted action, extended beyond the offered admissions and justified any additional prejudicial effect.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited" applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.

Nathaniel Nelson, facing serious charges including robbery and firearms trafficking, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances: the heightened health risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in the correctional facility.

The court considered the proposed release plan, which included electronic monitoring, and the impact of the pandemic on the administration of justice and public safety.

Despite acknowledging the increased risk of contracting the virus in custody, the court dismissed the application, finding that Nelson's prior criminal record, the seriousness of the charges, the weakness of the proposed release plan, and the absence of specific medical evidence did not satisfy the court that confidence in the administration of justice would be maintained by his release.

The Crown applied to admit discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence consisted of video surveillance showing the accused in possession of a long-barrelled firearm at a motel the day before the homicide.

The court found that the evidence was highly probative of the accused's possession, concealment, and familiarity with the weapon, which was relevant to the issues of intention, planning, and deliberation.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the video admissible.

The applicant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, two counts of assault resist arrest, and possession of cocaine following his arrest by Durham Regional Police Service officers.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging excessive use of force by police, including repeated tasering and punching to the face, claiming violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the applicant's evidence of punching as implausible and internally inconsistent, and found the use of tasers was proportional and justified.

The applicant was convicted on the two assault resist arrest counts but acquitted on the impaired care or control and possession charges due to insufficient evidence.