Vickramjeet Aujla

The applicants, Mahmoud Al-Ramahi and Atour Paul, sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging improper interception and handling of solicitor-client privileged communications during a wiretap investigation ("Project Siphon").

Al-Ramahi claimed widespread violations of his ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights due to intercepted audio calls and text messages with his lawyers.

Paul joined the application, arguing the overbroad search and "unfair advantage" to police affected him.

The court found that Al-Ramahi failed to prove improper interception or handling of audio calls but succeeded in demonstrating that his privileged text messages were improperly accessed and handled, breaching his ss. 7 and 8 rights.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it too drastic, but ordered the exclusion of all of Al-Ramahi's text messages intercepted after May 29, 2020.

Paul's application was dismissed as he did not suffer a breach of his own Charter rights and lacked standing to claim a remedy based on breaches of another's rights.

Ezekel Vincent pleaded guilty to manslaughter after initially being charged with second-degree murder.

The charge stemmed from Vincent fatally shooting Kenroy Benjamin, who had just killed Vincent's friend, Sheldon Taylor, at a banquet hall.

The court determined that Vincent brought the handgun to the scene.

The sentencing decision considered aggravating factors, including the use of a prohibited firearm in a public place, the pursuit and close-range shooting of the victim, and the non-recovery of the weapon.

Mitigating factors included Vincent's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, difficult upbringing, experience with racial discrimination, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed an 11-year sentence, reduced to 10 years due to harsh custody conditions, and further reduced by 30 months for pre-trial credit, resulting in a net sentence of 7.5 years.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order were also imposed.

H.P. was found guilty of five sexual offences against his stepdaughter, with two counts conditionally stayed.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the breach of trust, and the protracted nature of the abuse.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, pro-social life, and low risk of re-offending.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing that such sentences are rarely appropriate for sexual violence against children, and imposed a sentence of four and a half years of incarceration.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a non-communication order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The court granted an exemption from SOIRA registration due to the low risk of re-offending but imposed specific s. 161 prohibitions to protect children.

The applicant, Ravinder Kainth, admitted guilt to child luring but sought a stay of proceedings due to police entrapment.

The court found that the police engaged in random virtue testing by posing as a 14-year-old girl on a casual sexual encounter website without prior reasonable suspicion that the applicant was interested in sexual activity with minors.

The court applied the "bright line" test from R. v. Ahmad, concluding that the officer's immediate disclosure of being 14 years old, in the context of the applicant's general sexual ad, constituted an overt opportunity to commit the offence before reasonable suspicion was established.

The court ruled that the police overstepped their bounds, constituting an abuse of process, and stayed the prosecution.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, sexual assault, mischief, and breach of recognizance against his former intimate partner.

The trial turned on credibility, with the complainant alleging non-consensual sexual acts and physical abuse, while the accused denied the sexual assaults and claimed the physical altercations were justified or exaggerated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence and accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the physical assaults and the first sexual assault.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the second sexual assault due to inconsistencies in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting.

The accused was found guilty on seven counts and acquitted on one count of sexual assault.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order.

The court found material changes in circumstances due to a psychological report detailing the applicant's intellectual deficits and the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the proposed release plan, including an unsuitable primary surety and insufficient details on electronic monitoring, failed to adequately address secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court dismissed the bail review application, finding continued detention warranted to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the applicant's asthma making him vulnerable to COVID-19.

The Crown sought a detention order for an 18-year-old accused charged with eight firearms offences and one drug possession offence.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded 40-calibre semi-automatic handgun with 11 rounds of ammunition in his waistband during a RIDE check.

The defence proposed a strict house arrest plan with parental supervision and a $5,000 monetary pledge.

The court found that while the accused's youth and lack of criminal record were mitigating factors, the serious nature of the allegations, the strength of the Crown's case, and the escalating risk posed by the loaded firearm in a vehicle where drugs were being consumed justified detention under the tertiary ground of section 515(10)(c) to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant was charged with public mischief and brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in trial.

The Crown failed to disclose a critical video statement for nine months after the charge was laid.

Although the net delay of 13 months and 2 days fell below the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the applicant was required to demonstrate both meaningful defence initiative and that the case markedly exceeded reasonable time requirements.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings, particularly by not seeking earlier judicial intervention regarding disclosure delays.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Prabhjeet Singh, brought a motion to exclude post-incident statements made by himself and Abhijeet Nagra to a relative of the deceased and their employer.

The statements allegedly minimized their involvement by claiming the air hose was applied to the deceased's legs rather than his anus, following an incident resulting in the deceased's death.

The Crown argued the motion was untimely and, alternatively, that the evidence was probative as it demonstrated the accused's knowledge of danger and attempt to minimize responsibility.

The court declined to dismiss the motion as untimely due to the accused's liberty interests but dismissed it on its merits, finding that the circumstances (video evidence, statements made to employer and next of kin) provided independent evidence of fabrication, making the statements admissible and relevant to the issue of assault.

The accused, charged with unlawful act manslaughter, brought multiple motions during their trial.

These included a motion to exclude the testimony of a lawyer, Mr. Sodhi, on the grounds that his evidence was tainted by a breach of an exclusion of witnesses order and late disclosure by the Crown.

They also sought, in the alternative, a mistrial, a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, and permission to call Crown counsel and an officer as witnesses.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the breach of the exclusion order to be minor and technical, the evidence not unduly tainted, no Charter breach affecting fair trial rights, no abuse of process warranting a stay, and no basis to call Crown counsel or re-examine the officer.

The court emphasized that alternative remedies, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to the jury, were sufficient to address any concerns.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with consuming alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration thereof in her blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offences were alleged to have occurred on September 18, 2014.

The Crown relied on breath samples taken outside the two-hour window for the presumption of identity, requiring expert toxicological evidence.

The defendant testified that she consumed alcohol in response to phone calls from her abusive ex-husband and that she poured alcohol on her car floor when she saw police pulling her over.

The court found the defendant's credibility seriously undermined by her false statements regarding requesting a Punjabi interpreter and her implausible account of pouring alcohol on the car floor.

The court acquitted on the over 80 charge because the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's opinion, given evidence that the defendant was consuming large quantities of alcohol while driving.

However, the court convicted on the impaired driving charge based on poor driving, slurred speech, swaying, and stumbling observed by police officers.

The defendant was charged with assault with a weapon following an altercation with a City of Mississauga bylaw enforcement officer who attended the defendant's property to investigate a property standards complaint.

The defendant claimed he was the victim and that the officer assaulted him.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as unreliable and incredible, finding numerous internal inconsistencies and evasiveness.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, corroborated by video evidence, the 911 call, and police observations.

The court found the defendant deliberately struck the officer in the face with a camera he was holding, causing a significant injury that left a permanent scar.

The defendant was convicted of assault with a weapon.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown alleged the accused was pulled over for traffic violations, exhibited signs of impairment, and failed to provide a suitable breath sample.

The defence challenged both the validity of the breath demand and whether impairment was proven.

The court found that the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, having confused the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard applicable to approved screening device demands with the higher "reasonable and probable grounds" standard required for breath demands.

The court also found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting inconsistencies in officer observations, the absence of translation of field sobriety test instructions, and the accused's apparent competent performance on the tests.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found two distinct breaches of the defendant's right to counsel: a four-minute delay in informing her of her rights, and a more serious violation of her right to counsel of choice when police failed to disclose that a contact was attempting to arrange for a lawyer and instead rushed her to speak with duty counsel.

The court excluded evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the serious nature of the violations and their impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on the merits.

The court also dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding the admissible evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving following an incident in which he drove away from police officers who had approached his parked vehicle.

The Crown alleged the accused drove in a manner dangerous to the public by accelerating aggressively and nearly striking one of the officers.

The accused testified he drove slowly and deliberately to avoid the officers, stopping at a red light before turning.

The trial judge found material inconsistencies in the police evidence and determined that the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove the actus reus of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision that resulted in the death of a pedestrian.

The Crown alleged the defendant was driving at an inappropriate speed for wet road conditions.

The defendant claimed his vehicle's brakes suddenly failed, causing the loss of control.

The trial judge found the road was wet at the time of the collision, rejected the mechanical failure defence as speculative, and found the defendant's testimony regarding road conditions and vehicle speed to be unreliable due to inconsistencies with his earlier statement to police.

The defendant was convicted of careless driving.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and refusal to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle incident on March 17, 2011.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove erratically on Highway 427, struck a curb, and entered a residential driveway.

Police responded to a 911 call, attended the residence, and observed signs of impairment.

The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station where she made numerous attempts to provide breath samples but failed to provide a suitable second sample.

The defendant challenged the police entry into her home and the validity of the breath demand.

The court found no Charter breaches, that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, that the defendant was impaired, and that she intentionally failed to provide suitable breath samples.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a rear-end collision in Brampton.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the equivocal nature of the evidence, particularly the absence of overt signs of intoxication such as slurred speech or significant balance problems.

However, the court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol based on the breath test results.

The court also dismissed the accused's Charter application regarding trial delay, finding the delay was reasonable under the Morin factors.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10, specifically claiming the screening demand was not made forthwith as required by section 254(2) and that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that the police did not breach the accused's constitutional rights.

The screening demand was made promptly once grounds were formed, the overall delay was reasonable given the volatile circumstances requiring officer safety and situation stabilization, and there was no realistic opportunity to provide counsel before the screening test given the brief nine-minute window and unstable conditions.