Nicole Rozier

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the validity of three judicial authorizations: a tracking warrant and two general warrants permitting covert entry.

They sought to excise information from the Informations to Obtain (ITOs), argued the affiant failed to provide full, frank, and fair disclosure, and claimed the general warrants improperly circumvented the requirements of a CDSA search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding no basis to excise information, that the affiant properly exercised his discretion, and that the general warrants were appropriate for the multiple covert entries sought.

The warrants were validly issued, and no s. 8 Charter breach occurred.

The accused, charged with unlawful act manslaughter, brought multiple motions during their trial.

These included a motion to exclude the testimony of a lawyer, Mr. Sodhi, on the grounds that his evidence was tainted by a breach of an exclusion of witnesses order and late disclosure by the Crown.

They also sought, in the alternative, a mistrial, a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, and permission to call Crown counsel and an officer as witnesses.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the breach of the exclusion order to be minor and technical, the evidence not unduly tainted, no Charter breach affecting fair trial rights, no abuse of process warranting a stay, and no basis to call Crown counsel or re-examine the officer.

The court emphasized that alternative remedies, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to the jury, were sufficient to address any concerns.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including procuring a woman to engage in prostitution, possession and transmission of child pornography, marijuana trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and failure to comply with probation.

The court found the defendant not guilty on the charge of making an arrangement for the sexual abuse of a child, accepting his testimony that he was attempting to identify and rob child predators rather than actually arrange abuse.

The sentencing reflects the lower end of the range for the offences committed, with significant credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest conditions.

The court imposed concurrent sentences with probation and community service requirements.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code after a Justice of the Peace denied his release pending trial on charges including kidnapping, drug trafficking, and conspiracy.

The applicant argued the Justice erred in applying the onus, relying on an alleged breach of a Manitoba recognizance, and overemphasizing an outdated criminal record.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances and concluding that the Justice did not err in law or render an unreasonable decision in justifying detention on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, sought to bring several pre-trial applications, including a recusal motion, a jurisdictional challenge against transferring the trial out of Brampton, a section 10(b) Charter application, and an application for removal of counsel.

Due to counsel's medical issues and scheduling conflicts, the court had to set a firm timetable for the filing of materials and the hearing of these applications to ensure the scheduled trial date could be maintained.

The court ordered strict deadlines for the filing of application records and factums, scheduling the recusal application first, followed by the substantive applications.

Marcus Berger pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four to five years, while the defence requested three years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of cocaine and the commercial nature of the activity, alongside significant mitigating factors.

These mitigating factors included Berger's guilty plea, his status as a first offender, his serious drug addiction at the time of the offence, and his impressive rehabilitative efforts since his arrest, including achieving sobriety, re-establishing family relationships, and building a successful business.

The court also noted that Berger pleaded guilty despite a breach of his Charter rights that would have weakened the Crown's case at trial.

The judge exercised discretion to impose a sentence below the Crown's requested range due to these unique circumstances.

The case involves three accused charged with manslaughter.

Due to courtroom shortages in Brampton, the trial was scheduled to be held in Kitchener.

Counsel for one of the accused suffered medical issues, leading to an adjournment.

Counsel subsequently indicated an intention to bring motions to transfer the trial back to Brampton or be removed from the record, but later attempted to unilaterally delay bringing these motions.

The case management judge rejected this delay, emphasizing the need for efficiency under the Jordan framework, and ordered strict deadlines for the defence to perfect any such applications.

This is a preliminary inquiry ruling on committal following a shooting incident on November 17, 2016, in which two defendants were jointly charged with multiple offences including attempt murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought committal on all charges; the defence conceded committal on most counts but contested the attempt murder charges and one aggravated assault count.

The court applied the well-settled test for committal, requiring assessment of whether sufficient evidence exists to permit a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants on attempt murder, based on the nature and location of gunshot wounds to vital areas, the number of shots fired, evidence of planning and coordination, and the circumstances of the shooting.

The court also committed both defendants on aggravated assault and various firearm-related offences.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge ruled on several motions.

The judge excused a prospective juror for obvious partiality under s. 632(c) of the Criminal Code.

A motion to sever one of the co-accused due to his counsel's illness was dismissed, as the jury was willing to wait and the public interest favoured a joint trial.

The judge also dismissed a Charter application alleging that the consumption of a DNA negative control by the Centre of Forensic Sciences breached the accused's rights, finding the control was an analytical tool rather than first-party disclosure.

Finally, a request for a mid-trial instruction regarding an in-dock identification was denied, with the judge opting to provide a general warning about eyewitness identification instead.

During jury deliberations in a first-degree murder trial, the jury requested to take a view of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred.

The Crown opposed the request due to logistical and security concerns, while one of the accused argued a view constitutes real evidence.

The trial judge refused the request, finding that a view would not provide a real and demonstrable advantage given the extensive photographic and video evidence already adduced.

Furthermore, the judge held that a view at the deliberation stage was not in the interests of justice due to the passage of time, the risk of the jury drawing untested inferences, and significant logistical challenges.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.

During a sentencing hearing, defence counsel objected to portions of several victim impact statements and requested that the offending portions be excised before the statements were received.

The court declined to redact the statements in advance, ruling that pursuant to s. 722(8) of the Criminal Code, the statements would be provisionally accepted and the court would disregard any irrelevant or inadmissible portions.

The court also provided directions on the order of proceedings for the remainder of the sentencing hearing.

During a sentencing hearing for manslaughter, the offender filed an affidavit seeking enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the offender 'at large' to elicit aggravating factors, arguing section 724(3)(c) of the Criminal Code does not limit cross-examination.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, ruling that statutory interpretation requires reading the provision in context, which limits cross-examination to the specific contested fact of the jail conditions.

The accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

During pre-charge conferences, the Crown and defence counsel raised several issues regarding the jury instructions.

The court declined the Crown's request to leave section 21(2) of the Criminal Code and unlawful confinement under section 231(5)(e) as routes to liability, finding insufficient evidence to support those theories.

The court also dismissed defence requests to remove planning and deliberation or section 229(a)(ii) intent from the charge for one of the accused, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to consider.

Further defence requests for a specific identification instruction and modifications to the summary of eyewitness testimony were also dismissed.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused had been in custody for two years prior to the murder.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to prove the accused did not have access to a cell phone during that time, thereby refuting a potential defence claim that the accused was a contact in the deceased's phone.

The defence offered to admit the accused was 'out of the area' without cell phone access for two months.

The court held that the extended two-year period of non-access was irrelevant.

Furthermore, the court ruled that even if relevant, the prejudicial effect of revealing the accused's prior incarceration to the jury outweighed its probative value, and prohibited the Crown from leading the evidence.

In a murder trial, the Crown applied to exclude references to the name 'CJ' from the deceased's phone records, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay.

A co-accused also sought to redact text messages involving 'Scarface' on similar grounds.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the evidence relevant to the live issue of DNA transfer and identification.

The court held that the admission of the contact list and text messages engaged issues of authentication rather than hearsay, as they were not being adduced for the truth of their contents but to determine whether the communications were actually made by the accused.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to file a DNA expert's written report as an exhibit after the expert had already provided viva voce evidence.

The defence objected, arguing the report was prejudicial.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, ruling that the report was inadmissible because it added nothing to the oral testimony, contained matters not explored in evidence, and risked misleading or confusing the jury.

The court emphasized that the expert's evidence is their testimony, not their report.

During a criminal trial for a shooting death, the court issued written reasons for several oral evidentiary rulings.

The court ruled that the defence could not elicit self-serving admissions from a Crown witness during cross-examination.

The court allowed two photographs to be entered as numbered exhibits, finding them relevant and authenticated.

The court permitted the Crown to re-examine a witness regarding phone numbers to clarify answers given in cross-examination, but denied re-examination on the circumstances of an identification, finding it more prejudicial than probative.

Finally, the court prohibited the defence from introducing investigative hearsay about a third-party suspect without a proper voir dire.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to exclude cell phone numbers they had provided to their probation officers, which were subsequently disclosed to the police.

The accused argued the disclosure violated their rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and that the statements were not voluntary.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the probation officers were not persons in authority at the time the numbers were provided.

Furthermore, the court held there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers, and the disclosure was lawfully permitted under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act.

The court also found no evidence that the accused were compelled to provide the numbers in violation of section 7.

The phone numbers were ruled admissible.

The accused were on trial for first degree murder.

During the trial, the defence filed a section 24(1) Charter application alleging a breach due to the Centre of Forensic Sciences consuming a 'negative control' sample during DNA testing.

The Crown sought directions, arguing the court should determine the relevancy of the consumed sample before the Crown's DNA expert testified, and restrict cross-examination if relevance was not established.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, holding that the defence was entitled to cross-examine the expert on the DNA extraction process, including the use and consumption of the negative control.

The court deferred ruling on the Charter application until the end of the trial, when the full evidentiary record would allow for a proper assessment of prejudice.