Andrew Lawrence Edgar

The Attorney General of Canada applied for a further detention order under section 490(3) of the Criminal Code in relation to items seized from the respondent, Mohammed Ehteshamul Huq, during an investigation into alleged fraud and related offences involving the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS).

The court reviewed the complexity of the investigation, the progress made, and the need for continued detention.

While recognizing the investigation's complexity, the court limited the further detention period to five months, until April 3, 2025, rather than the nine or twelve months sought by the applicant.

The accused, L.S., was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old victim.

This decision outlines the sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the gravity of the offence and the victim's severe impact, alongside mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of criminal record, intellectual disability, and family circumstances.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-month penitentiary sentence, reduced to 26 months after credit for house arrest bail, and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 15-year-old complainant.

The accused raised the defences of mistake of age and consent.

The court applied the three-step framework from Carbone to assess the mistake of age defence, finding that the accused took virtually no steps to ascertain the complainant's age, thereby negating the defence.

The court also found that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity and that there was no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, L.S., facing charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, sought to admit new defence expert evidence from Brandie Stevenson regarding his intellectual deficits and their impact on his decision-making, specifically his ability to ascertain age.

This voir dire followed an earlier ruling that deemed a previous expert inadmissible.

The Crown challenged the new expert's impartiality.

The court, applying the two-step test for expert evidence admissibility from White Burgess and Mohan, found Ms. Stevenson to be aware of her duty and capable of providing fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence, noting that concerns about the foundation of her opinions, particularly regarding information from the accused's mother, would go to weight, not admissibility.

N.N. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, while K.H. and Y.N. pleaded guilty to manslaughter, all related to the killing of Hashim Kinani.

The court determined the appropriate youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, focusing on the length of the custodial portion and credit for pre-sentence detention.

The decision balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, considering the serious nature of the offences, the young persons' backgrounds, and the impact of COVID-19 on their detention conditions.

During a judge-alone trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the defence sought an adjournment to retain a new expert witness regarding the accused's cognitive functioning, after their initial proposed expert was rejected.

The Crown opposed the adjournment.

The court granted the application, finding it prudent to reserve determination on the admissibility of the new expert's evidence until a voir dire could be held, as the evidence could potentially be relevant to the mens rea component of the offences.

During a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the defence sought to introduce expert opinion evidence regarding the accused's cognitive and intellectual functioning.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing the proposed expert lacked independence and relied on hearsay.

The court found that while the expert was adequately qualified, he acted as an advocate for the accused rather than an independent witness for the court.

Furthermore, the expert's opinions were based almost entirely on inadmissible hearsay from the accused and his mother.

Consequently, the application was dismissed and the expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand and arrest.

The court found that while the officer had a subjective belief of impairment, it was not objectively reasonable, thus constituting a breach of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the Charter-infringing conduct was less serious, the impact on the accused was low (due to discoverability), and society's interest in adjudicating on the merits was high.

Consequently, the breath sample evidence was admitted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge, while the impaired operation charge was dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application during trial requesting the court to call a witness that the Crown had decided not to call.

The defence argued this was necessary for the discovery of truth, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Finta.

The court dismissed the application, finding that unlike in Finta, it was not necessary for the court to call the witness because the defence was perfectly capable of doing so and could utilize the Canada Evidence Act if the witness resiled from her prior police statement.

The Crown applied for a ruling on a voir dire that the accused's formal statement to the police was voluntary and admissible at trial.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to meet its burden because it did not call every police officer who had contact with the accused at the police station.

The court found that there is no rule requiring the Crown to call every officer, and based on the evidence presented, the statement was given freely and voluntarily.

The statement was ruled admissible.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant and two breaches of bail prohibiting contact with the complainant.

After a Gardiner hearing, the court found the sexual interference occurred without the complainant’s actual consent and treated the offence as a highly invasive, cruel, and exploitative act marked by significant psychological harm, abuse of a friendship-based trust relationship, and aggravating post-offence threats and contact.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against the offender’s youth, lack of prior record, some remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

A penitentiary sentence of 46 months less enhanced credit for pre-trial custody resulted in a final sentence of 44 months, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after 1.44 kilograms of the drug were found in a hidden compartment of his luggage upon arrival at Pearson International Airport from St. Lucia.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge of the drugs.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, as documentary evidence and testimony established that the accused's bag had been lost for two days in St. Lucia, raising the reasonable inference that third parties planted the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference and bail breaches, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the admitted intercourse was factually non-consensual for sentencing purposes, and also adjudicated related counts of uttering a threat, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

The court held that the complainant's account of forced intercourse was credible despite significant reliability problems, relying on the contemporaneous video statement, forensic DNA evidence confirming ejaculation, and post-event emotional state evidence used for limited permissible purposes.

The court rejected defence theories of fabrication based on fear of pregnancy, lateness for curfew, and alleged stereotypical expectations of victim behaviour.

The court found the intercourse occurred without actual consent, acquitted on the threat count because the particularized threat was not proven as directed to the complainant, and acquitted on the August 15 touching counts because the sexual nature of the act was not established.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his parked car in a plaza parking lot at 3:31 am.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued the presumption did not apply because the accused's body was slumped across the front seats, and alternatively, that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of a concrete plan to stay at a friend's residence.

The court found the presumption applied but was rebutted on the balance of probabilities regarding initial intent.

However, the court found the accused presented a realistic risk of danger to the public given his intoxication, possession of car keys, and lack of a reliable alternative plan.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

At trial, the defendant sought to exclude breath samples and Intoxilyzer test results on grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to administer the approved screening device (ASD) test, violating section 8.

The court also found that the defendant was denied a reasonable opportunity to contact his counsel of choice, violating section 10(b).

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the breath evidence as the cumulative effect of the breaches was serious and significantly impacted the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

The defendant was acquitted of the over 80 charge.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on one count of sexual assault and two counts of breach of probation, the court assessed whether the Crown had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision emphasized that credibility and reliability remain distinct concepts in sexual assault cases and that ordinary scrutiny applies, while guarding against improper myths about expected victim behaviour.

The court found multiple material inconsistencies between the complainant’s testimony, prior statements, police evidence, and nursing evidence.

Those inconsistencies raised a reasonable doubt, and all charges were dismissed.

The applicants, Brian Nelson and Andrew Ramdass, brought certiorari applications to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for manslaughter.

The charges arose from a physical altercation between two groups that resulted in a death.

The court dismissed Nelson's application, finding there was direct evidence from a witness that he punched the victim, which was sufficient for committal.

However, the court granted Ramdass' application and quashed his committal, concluding there was no admissible evidence from which a properly instructed jury could infer he intentionally applied force to the victim.

This is a preliminary inquiry ruling on committal following a shooting incident on November 17, 2016, in which two defendants were jointly charged with multiple offences including attempt murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought committal on all charges; the defence conceded committal on most counts but contested the attempt murder charges and one aggravated assault count.

The court applied the well-settled test for committal, requiring assessment of whether sufficient evidence exists to permit a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants on attempt murder, based on the nature and location of gunshot wounds to vital areas, the number of shots fired, evidence of planning and coordination, and the circumstances of the shooting.

The court also committed both defendants on aggravated assault and various firearm-related offences.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of 81 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under $5000 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The offender was a street-level dealer and addict who had no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a nine-month custodial sentence for the trafficking count and an 18-month concurrent conditional sentence for the proceeds count, followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that while deterrence and denunciation are important principles in drug trafficking cases, rehabilitation remains significant, particularly for first-time offender addicts.

The court rejected the Crown's initial position of 30 months imprisonment and instead imposed a more lenient sentence that reflected the offender's status as a street-level dealer motivated by addiction rather than greed, his genuine efforts at rehabilitation post-arrest, and his improved family circumstances.

Applicants charged with serious drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging delay in trial.

The trial was scheduled approximately 29 months after charges were laid, well exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that defence delay should be subtracted, bringing the net delay below the ceiling, or alternatively that exceptional circumstances applied.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, particularly the Information to Obtain the search warrant and surveillance materials, constituted the primary cause of delay.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization of defence delay and found no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The application was granted and proceedings were stayed.