Andrew Lawrence Edgar

The Attorney General of Canada applied for a further detention order under section 490(3) of the Criminal Code in relation to items seized from the respondent, Mohammed Ehteshamul Huq, during an investigation into alleged fraud and related offences involving the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS).

The court reviewed the complexity of the investigation, the progress made, and the need for continued detention.

While recognizing the investigation's complexity, the court limited the further detention period to five months, until April 3, 2025, rather than the nine or twelve months sought by the applicant.

The accused, L.S., was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old victim.

This decision outlines the sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the gravity of the offence and the victim's severe impact, alongside mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of criminal record, intellectual disability, and family circumstances.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-month penitentiary sentence, reduced to 26 months after credit for house arrest bail, and ancillary orders.

The accused, L.S., facing charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, sought to admit new defence expert evidence from Brandie Stevenson regarding his intellectual deficits and their impact on his decision-making, specifically his ability to ascertain age.

This voir dire followed an earlier ruling that deemed a previous expert inadmissible.

The Crown challenged the new expert's impartiality.

The court, applying the two-step test for expert evidence admissibility from White Burgess and Mohan, found Ms. Stevenson to be aware of her duty and capable of providing fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence, noting that concerns about the foundation of her opinions, particularly regarding information from the accused's mother, would go to weight, not admissibility.

N.N. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, while K.H. and Y.N. pleaded guilty to manslaughter, all related to the killing of Hashim Kinani.

The court determined the appropriate youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, focusing on the length of the custodial portion and credit for pre-sentence detention.

The decision balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, considering the serious nature of the offences, the young persons' backgrounds, and the impact of COVID-19 on their detention conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand and arrest.

The court found that while the officer had a subjective belief of impairment, it was not objectively reasonable, thus constituting a breach of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the Charter-infringing conduct was less serious, the impact on the accused was low (due to discoverability), and society's interest in adjudicating on the merits was high.

Consequently, the breath sample evidence was admitted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge, while the impaired operation charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his parked car in a plaza parking lot at 3:31 am.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued the presumption did not apply because the accused's body was slumped across the front seats, and alternatively, that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of a concrete plan to stay at a friend's residence.

The court found the presumption applied but was rebutted on the balance of probabilities regarding initial intent.

However, the court found the accused presented a realistic risk of danger to the public given his intoxication, possession of car keys, and lack of a reliable alternative plan.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

At trial, the defendant sought to exclude breath samples and Intoxilyzer test results on grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to administer the approved screening device (ASD) test, violating section 8.

The court also found that the defendant was denied a reasonable opportunity to contact his counsel of choice, violating section 10(b).

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the breath evidence as the cumulative effect of the breaches was serious and significantly impacted the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

The defendant was acquitted of the over 80 charge.

This is a preliminary inquiry ruling on committal following a shooting incident on November 17, 2016, in which two defendants were jointly charged with multiple offences including attempt murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought committal on all charges; the defence conceded committal on most counts but contested the attempt murder charges and one aggravated assault count.

The court applied the well-settled test for committal, requiring assessment of whether sufficient evidence exists to permit a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants on attempt murder, based on the nature and location of gunshot wounds to vital areas, the number of shots fired, evidence of planning and coordination, and the circumstances of the shooting.

The court also committed both defendants on aggravated assault and various firearm-related offences.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of 81 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under $5000 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The offender was a street-level dealer and addict who had no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a nine-month custodial sentence for the trafficking count and an 18-month concurrent conditional sentence for the proceeds count, followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that while deterrence and denunciation are important principles in drug trafficking cases, rehabilitation remains significant, particularly for first-time offender addicts.

The court rejected the Crown's initial position of 30 months imprisonment and instead imposed a more lenient sentence that reflected the offender's status as a street-level dealer motivated by addiction rather than greed, his genuine efforts at rehabilitation post-arrest, and his improved family circumstances.

Applicants charged with serious drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging delay in trial.

The trial was scheduled approximately 29 months after charges were laid, well exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that defence delay should be subtracted, bringing the net delay below the ceiling, or alternatively that exceptional circumstances applied.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, particularly the Information to Obtain the search warrant and surveillance materials, constituted the primary cause of delay.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization of defence delay and found no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The application was granted and proceedings were stayed.