Maija C. Martin

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant, Kyle Watson, appealed his sentence for robbery and failure to comply with a release order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s application of the principles of restraint and consideration of the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had taken into account the appellant’s Indigenous identity, personal history, and the conditions of pre-sentence custody, and provided appropriate credit for time served.

The sentence imposed was found to be within a reasonable range given the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from sentence, finding that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a two-year weapons prohibition under s. 51(3) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) following a youth's guilty plea to first-degree murder.

The Court held that the correct provision was s. 51(1), which requires a longer prohibition for offences subject to mandatory orders under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

Both parties agreed to set aside the two-year prohibition and impose a 12-year weapons prohibition.

The Court substituted the appropriate order, noting the respondent's planning and aggravating circumstances.

This decision addresses a constitutional challenge to section 9(5)(a)(i) of the Cannabis Act, which prohibits discharges for indictable offences of possession of cannabis for the purpose of distribution.

The court upholds the constitutionality of the provision, finding that the infringement on liberty is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad, does not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence, and does not create a distinction based on race in its impact.

The court sentences the accused, Rene Smith, to a fine of $7,500 and makes several ancillary orders.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years in jail.

He appealed the conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge erred by not applying Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and failing to provide sufficient reasons for relying on it, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a Vetrovec caution is not mandatory in judge-alone trials and the trial judge was aware of the witness's credibility issues, relying only on corroborated aspects of his testimony.

The court also found the verdict reasonable, as the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, amply supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly possessed the package.

The appellant, J.F., appealed his convictions for multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering death threats, and careless storage of firearms.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the explanation of memory gaps due to trauma, reliance on testimonial demeanour, and the use of lack of exaggeration.

The appellant also argued insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, did not reverse the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the verdict.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.

The appellant, Cory Joseph Marsh, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's out-of-court demeanor evidence and provided insufficient reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's out-of-court demeanor as admissible circumstantial evidence alongside other confirmatory evidence, and that the reasons for conviction, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review given the straightforward nature of the case and the agreed statement of facts.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

The Crown appealed the seven-year sentence imposed on the respondent for attempted murder of his pregnant intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to adequately apply the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in a domestic context, by misunderstanding the aggravating impact of planning and deliberation, and by misidentifying the appropriate sentencing range.

The Court emphasized that rehabilitation should not outweigh denunciation and deterrence in such serious cases and that sentencing ranges evolve with societal understanding of domestic violence.

The Court also found an error in the application of "Duncan" credits, which were treated as a direct reduction rather than a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of 15 years imprisonment was substituted, less credit for time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing heroin, possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing proceeds of crime over $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 12 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's refusal of a mistrial due to non-disclosure of alternate suspects, the handling of eyewitness identification evidence (applying the curative proviso), the admission of police opinion evidence, or the instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-year global sentence fit given the seriousness and quantity of the drugs involved.

The appellant, Tyrell Stewart, appealed convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm with ammunition and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's possession of a handgun and ammunition found during a search warrant execution at a basement apartment.

The trial judge inferred knowledge and control based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant having keys to the premises and a "lived-in quality" of his possessions there.

The appeal raised arguments concerning misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, unreasonableness of the verdict, and lack of formal arraignment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and that any procedural irregularities did not cause prejudice.

The appellant, Asher Veliz, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and a related firearm offence, and his global net sentence of 4.5 years.

He argued breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) concerning arbitrary arrest, an invalid search warrant, and denial of his right to counsel of choice.

He also appealed the sentence, alleging the trial judge imposed a higher custodial sentence for the drug offence than sought by the Crown without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the validity of the search warrant, or the right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting the global sentence imposed was lower than what the Crown had sought.

The appellant, O.A., appealed convictions for six firearms offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, arising from an incident where he allegedly shot at a car.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning car dents and the reasonableness of the verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference available, even without expert evidence or recovery of the firearm.

The court affirmed that common sense inferences are permissible and that the definition of "firearm" under the Criminal Code could include replica or BB guns if they cause similar damage.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, Nicholas Baksh, appealed his convictions for four counts of drug trafficking and three firearm offences.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of similar act evidence across trafficking counts, erroneous limitation of cross-examination on an arresting officer's prior discreditable conduct, and unreasonable firearm verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly distinguished between similar act evidence and cross-count evidence used for identification, properly limited cross-examination consistent with precedent, and that the firearm verdicts were reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

Jerome Derby pleaded guilty to four firearm-related offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a vehicle with a prohibited firearm, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offences, the public setting of the shooting, and the offender's significant criminal record, including a prior manslaughter conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, the offender's lived experience with anti-Black racism and poverty, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.5 years, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.