Robert Valentine Wright

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

K.S., a young person, was sentenced after being found guilty of common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

She was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The court considered whether the gateway to custody was open and if further custody was warranted, given her 242 days in secure detention.

Based on psychological and presentence reports indicating low risk of reoffending and positive trajectory, the court imposed a 3-year probation order with specific conditions, a 2-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, declining further incarceration.

A young person, K.S., was charged with multiple offences including common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assisting Jacob A. to escape, and second-degree murder, all stemming from a violent incident at a party.

The court found K.S. guilty of common assault on two individuals (A.D. and F.K.), aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on M.O., and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

However, K.S. was acquitted of second-degree murder due to reasonable doubt regarding her direct participation and intent in the fatal stabbing of F.N. The judgment details K.S.'s role as an accomplice to Jacob's rampage, balancing the Crown's theory of aiding and abetting against the defence's argument of protective behaviour.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a forensic biologist to testify by video conference at a second-degree murder trial.

The application was brought in light of the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the risk of virus transmission.

The defence opposed the application, citing concerns about opening the floodgates for remote testimony.

The court allowed the application, finding that remote testimony was appropriate given the pandemic, the non-contentious nature of the expert's credibility, and the benefits to the administration of justice.

During a homicide proceeding, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent from the deceased's phone to her father shortly before her death.

The Crown argued the messages were admissible to show the deceased's state of mind and to help establish the date of death.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, finding the messages admissible to show the deceased's intention that the accused move out of their shared apartment, and relevant to the date of death.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied to be seated outside the prisoner's dock during jury selection and trial.

He argued that sitting in the dock would reflect negatively on the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the seating of the accused is within the trial judge's discretion and that the customary position in the dock does not violate Charter rights or undermine the presumption of innocence.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a jury instruction that text messages sent from the victim's phone and handwritten notes left by the accused constituted fabricated evidence.

The court ruled that there was circumstantial evidence allowing the jury to infer the accused sent the text messages after the victim's death to deflect responsibility, which would constitute fabrication.

However, the court found the accused's handwritten denial of involvement did not rise to the level of fabrication and should be assessed under the W.(D.) principles without an adverse inference of fabrication.

A young person charged with second degree murder, accessory after the fact, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and three counts of assault simpliciter arising from stabbings at a party in Toronto on October 31, 2019, was the subject of a Crown application to permit two key eyewitnesses to testify via videoconference under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence opposed the application for two witnesses.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the witnesses' mere preference to testify remotely due to COVID-19 health concerns, without evidence of personal vulnerability or exceptional circumstances, was insufficient to justify departure from the default standard of in-person testimony in a serious criminal matter where credibility was central to the case.

The offenders participated in a group assault on the victim following an altercation at a rave.

Triolo stabbed the victim in the chest, committing second-degree murder.

Lozada and Ramos participated in the group assault, making the victim vulnerable to the stabbing, and were convicted of manslaughter.

Triolo was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 12 years.

Lozada and Ramos were each sentenced to three years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment and disobeying a court order.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of both charges based on two incidents where he was within 500 meters of the complainant, contrary to a court order.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in her use of extensive evidence of prior discreditable conduct, particularly hearsay, when determining the "repeatedly followed" element of criminal harassment.

The failure to make findings on these allegations and explain their limited use rendered the basis for conviction unclear.

Consequently, the criminal harassment conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for disobeying a court order was upheld as it was based on evidence unrelated to the prior misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of assault and appealed the conviction.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant, and whether the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did apply different standards of scrutiny, rejecting the appellant's evidence for tenuous reasons while glossing over weaknesses in the complainant's account and engaging in speculation to find corroboration.

This resulted in an unfair and unsafe conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

During a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Crown sought to introduce twenty-two post-mortem photographs of the deceased through a forensic pathologist.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and of limited probative value.

The court balanced the probative value against the risk of reasoning prejudice, finding the photographs were relevant to the nature of the injuries and corroboration of eyewitnesses.

The court admitted twenty-one of the photographs, directing that three be presented in black and white to minimize any potential prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" despite delays caused by a new police booking system (Versadex) and the dismissal of a Charter application regarding the grounds for a breath demand, specifically concerning mouth alcohol.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct legal tests for "as soon as practicable" and for the officer's reasonable belief in the accuracy of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed the applicant based on circumstantial evidence, including the applicant bringing a knife to collect a debt from the deceased.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture, as there was no evidence of how the fatal altercation began or that the killing was planned.

The application was granted, the committal for first-degree murder was quashed, and the matter was remitted for committal on second-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for intimidation, assault, and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence and rendered inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on one count of sexual assault while convicting on others.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the defence witness's credibility was justified and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court also held that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as each sexual assault count related to a distinct event and had to be evaluated individually based on the evidence of consent at the time.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and refusal to make a DNA order imposed on the respondent for breaching a no-contact bail condition.

The respondent had met his wife for coffee while on bail for domestic assault charges.

The summary conviction appeal judge found no error in principle in the trial judge's reasoning and held that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The refusal to order a DNA sample was also upheld, as a sample had already been ordered for the underlying assault conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges arising from a domestic relationship, including confinement, threats with a knife, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, partly by requiring expert evidence to explain the complainant's delayed reporting and continued contact with the respondent, and by finding her testimony problematic.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law by requiring expert evidence for assessing the complainant's credibility regarding delayed disclosure and continued contact, contrary to Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. D.D.).

This error flawed the assessment of the complainant's evidence, which was critical in a "she said, he said" case.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon and assault, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, failure to interview/review disclosure, denial of the right to testify, failure to challenge a search, and inadequate cross-examination.

The court found the appellant's fresh evidence regarding his lack of awareness of counsel's role to be incredible and untruthful.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court found no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim, no improper conflict of interest, that the decision not to testify was made by the appellant based on counsel's reasonable advice, and that the tactical decision not to challenge the search was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for uttering a threat, arguing his guilty plea was not informed due to a mistaken belief that a conditional discharge was guaranteed following a judicial pre-trial.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding that the appellant understood the sentence was not guaranteed.

However, the court allowed the appeal against sentence, concluding that the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending the severe immigration consequences of a suspended sentence.

The suspended sentence was vacated and replaced with an absolute discharge.