Robert Valentine Wright

K.S., a young person, was sentenced after being found guilty of common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

She was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The court considered whether the gateway to custody was open and if further custody was warranted, given her 242 days in secure detention.

Based on psychological and presentence reports indicating low risk of reoffending and positive trajectory, the court imposed a 3-year probation order with specific conditions, a 2-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, declining further incarceration.

A young person, K.S., was charged with multiple offences including common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assisting Jacob A. to escape, and second-degree murder, all stemming from a violent incident at a party.

The court found K.S. guilty of common assault on two individuals (A.D. and F.K.), aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on M.O., and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

However, K.S. was acquitted of second-degree murder due to reasonable doubt regarding her direct participation and intent in the fatal stabbing of F.N. The judgment details K.S.'s role as an accomplice to Jacob's rampage, balancing the Crown's theory of aiding and abetting against the defence's argument of protective behaviour.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

A young person charged with second degree murder, accessory after the fact, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and three counts of assault simpliciter arising from stabbings at a party in Toronto on October 31, 2019, was the subject of a Crown application to permit two key eyewitnesses to testify via videoconference under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence opposed the application for two witnesses.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the witnesses' mere preference to testify remotely due to COVID-19 health concerns, without evidence of personal vulnerability or exceptional circumstances, was insufficient to justify departure from the default standard of in-person testimony in a serious criminal matter where credibility was central to the case.

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment and disobeying a court order.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of both charges based on two incidents where he was within 500 meters of the complainant, contrary to a court order.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in her use of extensive evidence of prior discreditable conduct, particularly hearsay, when determining the "repeatedly followed" element of criminal harassment.

The failure to make findings on these allegations and explain their limited use rendered the basis for conviction unclear.

Consequently, the criminal harassment conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for disobeying a court order was upheld as it was based on evidence unrelated to the prior misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of assault and appealed the conviction.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant, and whether the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did apply different standards of scrutiny, rejecting the appellant's evidence for tenuous reasons while glossing over weaknesses in the complainant's account and engaging in speculation to find corroboration.

This resulted in an unfair and unsafe conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" despite delays caused by a new police booking system (Versadex) and the dismissal of a Charter application regarding the grounds for a breath demand, specifically concerning mouth alcohol.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct legal tests for "as soon as practicable" and for the officer's reasonable belief in the accuracy of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges arising from a domestic relationship, including confinement, threats with a knife, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, partly by requiring expert evidence to explain the complainant's delayed reporting and continued contact with the respondent, and by finding her testimony problematic.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law by requiring expert evidence for assessing the complainant's credibility regarding delayed disclosure and continued contact, contrary to Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. D.D.).

This error flawed the assessment of the complainant's evidence, which was critical in a "she said, he said" case.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon and assault, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, failure to interview/review disclosure, denial of the right to testify, failure to challenge a search, and inadequate cross-examination.

The court found the appellant's fresh evidence regarding his lack of awareness of counsel's role to be incredible and untruthful.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court found no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim, no improper conflict of interest, that the decision not to testify was made by the appellant based on counsel's reasonable advice, and that the tactical decision not to challenge the search was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for uttering a threat, arguing his guilty plea was not informed due to a mistaken belief that a conditional discharge was guaranteed following a judicial pre-trial.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding that the appellant understood the sentence was not guaranteed.

However, the court allowed the appeal against sentence, concluding that the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending the severe immigration consequences of a suspended sentence.

The suspended sentence was vacated and replaced with an absolute discharge.

The Crown sought to quash the preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent, Justin Allison, on firearms and drug charges via a certiorari application.

The police found a loaded firearm, drugs, and Allison's identification in an apartment he was seen entering with a key.

The preliminary inquiry judge found the evidence of Allison's knowledge and control over the contraband to be speculative.

The Superior Court, reviewing for jurisdictional error, affirmed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, emphasizing the limited scope of review and that occupancy alone is insufficient to establish knowledge.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Christopher Husbands, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider mistaken belief in consent, insufficient reasons for rejecting the accused's evidence, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no air of reality to the mistaken belief in consent defence given the accepted facts, sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony based on inconsistencies, and no error in applying differential credibility findings as long as the same standard of scrutiny was applied.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

A youth was convicted of robbery and use of an imitation firearm to commit robbery.

The Crown sought a serious violent offence (SVO) designation and a custodial sentence of 6-8 months.

The defence argued for open custody with substantial credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found the SVO threshold met and imposed a sentence of 90 days custody followed by 45 days community supervision and 18 months probation, with the custody to be served in an open facility.

The court considered the offender's significant mental health issues, history of instability, lack of remorse, and the serious psychological harm to the victim, balanced against the offender's youth and the rehabilitation plan developed by his support team.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after obtaining accounts receivable financing from a factoring company through false representations.

The Crown alleged the accused impersonated a purported majority shareholder and corporate officer to secure financing based on fabricated receivables and misrepresentations about corporate ownership.

Evidence included witness identification, banking records, ATM surveillance images, and testimony from a corporate signatory showing the accused controlled the company and received most of the advanced funds.

The court found the accused intentionally misrepresented his identity and corporate structure to induce the advance and diverted the funds for personal benefit.

The court concluded the Crown proved deceit, deprivation, and fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal trial for fraud over $5,000, the Crown sought to admit statements allegedly made by the accused to a police detective while in custody.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statements were voluntary.

The accused testified that he only spoke after being told that his girlfriend had been arrested and could face jail if he did not cooperate.

Given the absence of a recording and conflicting evidence regarding what the officer said, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether an inducement had been made.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, and the statements were ruled inadmissible.

A witness subpoenaed in a murder trial refused to answer questions after being sworn, despite being warned that his refusal could result in contempt.

At a show cause hearing, the witness testified that he declined to testify because of concerns about his reputation in prison and potential consequences of being perceived as an informant.

The court reviewed the elements of contempt in the face of the court, including actus reus and mens rea, and considered whether the defence of duress applied.

The court found the refusal to testify was deliberate and interfered with the administration of justice.

The defence of duress was rejected because the evidence did not establish threats of death or serious bodily harm.

In a homicide prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce several hearsay statements attributed to a deceased victim and to unidentified bystanders during a fight.

The court considered whether the statements fell within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and whether they satisfied reliability requirements under the principled approach articulated in R. v. Khelawon.

The court admitted a statement reported by a witness that the victim said “Budja stabbed me” and described others holding him down, finding it spontaneous and proximate to the startling event and not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion.

However, statements allegedly shouted by unidentified bystanders during the fight were ruled inadmissible for the truth of their contents because the declarants were unknown and reliability could not be assessed.

Those statements were admissible only for the non-hearsay purpose of demonstrating what may have been audible to the accused during the altercation.