Brian Weagant

K.S., a young person, was sentenced after being found guilty of common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

She was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The court considered whether the gateway to custody was open and if further custody was warranted, given her 242 days in secure detention.

Based on psychological and presentence reports indicating low risk of reoffending and positive trajectory, the court imposed a 3-year probation order with specific conditions, a 2-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, declining further incarceration.

A young person, K.S., was charged with multiple offences including common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assisting Jacob A. to escape, and second-degree murder, all stemming from a violent incident at a party.

The court found K.S. guilty of common assault on two individuals (A.D. and F.K.), aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on M.O., and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

However, K.S. was acquitted of second-degree murder due to reasonable doubt regarding her direct participation and intent in the fatal stabbing of F.N. The judgment details K.S.'s role as an accomplice to Jacob's rampage, balancing the Crown's theory of aiding and abetting against the defence's argument of protective behaviour.

At the first appearance in child protection proceedings, the Society sought to place a child in the care of the maternal aunt.

The mother had been charged with assault on her six-year-old child and was released on a recognizance prohibiting contact except under CCAS supervision.

The court found the term "supervision" in the bail condition to be ambiguous and noted that supervision under the Child and Family Services Act encompasses a spectrum of possible levels.

The court declined to make orders due to this ambiguity and suggested the Society support the mother in an application to vary the bail condition, recommending that contact be subject to a valid family court order under the Child and Family Services Act.

This is a youth criminal justice matter involving a defence application regarding the proper procedure for using materials obtained from a parallel civil proceeding.

The defence sought a ruling that counsel was properly in possession of materials the complainant produced in civil litigation and that the section 278 Criminal Code regime did not apply.

The Crown objected to cross-examination questions based on medical records obtained through civil discovery.

The Superior Court had previously found a breach of the deemed undertaking rule when civil counsel provided the materials to defence counsel without prior judicial oversight.

The trial judge determined that the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Shearing applied, permitting the defence to proceed with cross-examination on documents already in its possession, subject to admissibility considerations.

A young person was charged with assault, criminal harassment, and sexual assault of a complainant.

The defence brought a motion under section 278 of the Criminal Code seeking production of diary excerpts from the complainant.

The Crown had mistakenly disclosed the diary excerpts to the defence.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Shearing to determine that once the information had already been produced, the section 278 regime for compelled production of third-party records was no longer applicable.

The court dismissed the section 278 application but ordered re-disclosure of the excerpts pursuant to the Crown's Stinchcombe disclosure obligations, without prejudice to the Crown raising admissibility objections based on probative value versus prejudicial effect.

A young person was charged with impaired driving and driving with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the roadside breath demand, arguing that the demand was made in violation of section 8 of the Charter due to a failure to comply with the "forthwith" (immediacy) requirement.

The court found that the demand was unconstitutional and excluded all evidence obtained as a result, applying the section 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant.

The decision emphasizes the heightened protections afforded to young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the obligation of law enforcement to jealously guard their rights.