Jeffrey Warren Mass

A young person was charged with impaired driving and driving with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the roadside breath demand, arguing that the demand was made in violation of section 8 of the Charter due to a failure to comply with the "forthwith" (immediacy) requirement.

The court found that the demand was unconstitutional and excluded all evidence obtained as a result, applying the section 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant.

The decision emphasizes the heightened protections afforded to young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the obligation of law enforcement to jealously guard their rights.

The young person was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The police officer delayed making a roadside breath demand for at least 12 minutes after forming a reasonable suspicion, violating the immediacy requirement of s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code and the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the seriousness of the breach given the enhanced procedural protections and special guarantees afforded to young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The accused brought a motion pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the combined institutional and Crown delay exceeded the Morin guideline of eight to ten months by more than two months.

The Crown had adjourned the original trial date to allow an officer to testify in another matter, and subsequently failed to make officers available for numerous rescheduled dates.

The court inferred prejudice to the accused's security of the person and found that the delay was unreasonable.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused was charged with driving while the quantity of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

The defence raised Charter violations regarding the roadside screening demand, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, failed to consider residual mouth alcohol, failed to verify calibration of the screening device, and failed to inform the accused of his rights to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations in the unique context of the case, which involved concurrent safety concerns on the Gardiner Expressway and railway tracks.

The court found the accused guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The principal issue at trial was whether an admitted breach of the accused's Charter right to counsel should lead to exclusion of breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The breach occurred because the first duty counsel provided was difficult to understand, and the accused complained about this to officers.

A second duty counsel was provided between the two breath tests.

The court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence and found the accused guilty.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant, finding the state conduct was at the low end of the breach spectrum, the impact on Charter-protected interests was relatively minor, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission of the evidence.