Sheila Ray

The accused, Hussein Assaad and Jason Ishraki, brought an application under Section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay for Assaad was over 26 months and for Ishraki over 30 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued complexity and the COVID-19 pandemic as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that while the case had some hallmarks of complexity, the primary cause of delay was the Crown and police's chosen method of disclosure triage, not inherent complexity.

The court also found the pandemic did not justify the extent of the delay.

The proceedings against both accused were stayed.

The accused brought a motion alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under the Charter.

The information was sworn on July 31, 2017, and trial was scheduled to conclude on July 10, 2020, representing a total elapsed time of two years, eleven months, and eleven days.

The Crown argued that the defence caused significant delays, including the accused's failure to return to Toronto (approximately 18 months) and the defence's refusal to attend a pre-trial meeting due to incomplete disclosure (seven months).

The court found that the police made reasonable efforts to locate the accused and rejected the Crown's characterization of the accused as having fled.

The court also found that the defence's insistence on complete disclosure was justified based on the trial judge's notes.

After deducting the time attributable to police efforts to locate the accused, the remaining delay was one year, seven months, and eleven days, which falls below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months.

The court found that the defence had taken useful steps demonstrating sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, but was not satisfied that the trial took substantially longer than it reasonably should have.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the quantity of alcohol in her blood was over the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that while there was a minor technical breach of section 8 regarding the requirement to exit the vehicle, the more serious breaches involved violations of section 10(b) rights to counsel.

The police failed to provide timely notice of rights to counsel at the roadside and failed to exercise adequate diligence in facilitating access to counsel of choice at the police station, instead channelling the defendant to duty counsel.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, a high school student, alleged that the accused, a first-year university student, sexually assaulted her in his residence room following a fraternity party.

The central issue was whether the sexual intercourse was consensual.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be incoherent, implausible, internally and externally inconsistent, and marked by a pattern of dishonesty.

The roommate's evidence was found to be credible and reliable, corroborating key aspects of the accused's account.

The court concluded that the complainant was apprehensive initially but was persuaded by the accused to engage in sexual activity, and after being reassured about the roommate's presence, she consented.

The court found insufficient evidence to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused, who suffered from bipolar disorder, PTSD, severe depression and anxiety, was living in her car with her therapy dog when stopped by police.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the breath demand was made as soon as practicable, there was a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel.

Police failed to exercise adequate diligence in contacting the accused's counsel of choice and did not offer her the option of speaking to alternative counsel when her preferred lawyer was unavailable.

The evidence was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, a nurse, was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who was brought to a hospital emergency room in a highly intoxicated and unresponsive state.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate touching, including fondling her breasts and placing her hand on his genitals while inserting an intravenous line.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her impaired cognitive state, internal inconsistencies, and demonstrated motive to tailor her testimony.

A credible eyewitness who observed the relevant portion of the alleged assault testified that he did not see any of the alleged inappropriate conduct.

The accused's evidence was consistent with the eyewitness account and video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of marijuana, and failing to comply with a condition of his recognizance.

A Charter application was brought alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant sought a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that while the initial investigative detention was lawful, the police conducted an unjustified strip search in the field without exigent circumstances.

The court determined that a pat-down search would have been sufficient to address officer safety concerns.

The strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

Evidence of all drugs seized was excluded as a remedy under section 24(2).

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of criminal harassment contrary to section 264 of the Criminal Code for non-consensually distributing intimate images of the complainant on a pornographic website.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court found the offence to be serious given the prevalence of non-consensual sexting, the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the accused's degree of responsibility.

However, the court considered the accused's exemplary character, rehabilitation efforts, remorse, guilty plea, and the collateral consequences already suffered.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, no contact with the complainant, and restrictions on possessing intimate images.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The Crown dismissed the Over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether statements made by the defendant to police officers at the scene—that he was the driver and had been drinking—were admissible as evidence.

The defendant argued the statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible as a violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant held a reasonable belief that he was obliged to answer police questions about the accident and his drinking, and that the state overreached by compelling information beyond what was required in an accident report.

The court allowed the Soules application and excluded the statements.

The accused was charged with three drug-related offences: unlawful possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, unlawful possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of cannabis resin, all alleged to have occurred on September 27, 2010, at the Toronto West Detention Centre.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from detention centre officers who seized drugs allegedly handed to them by the accused.

The trial judge found serious inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence, inadequate note-taking by officers, and credible defence testimony.

The court concluded that while drugs were undoubtedly found, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they belonged to the accused or that he possessed them for trafficking purposes.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused was tried on five criminal charges arising from an incident on July 10, 2011, in a Toronto Community Housing Complex known for drug and gang activity.

Police officers, responding to community complaints about drug trafficking, encountered the accused in the complex.

When approached, the accused fled, and during the chase, officers observed him reaching into his waistband and discarding a substance.

Officers apprehended him and found crack cocaine in his possession.

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine and marijuana, wilfully obstructing a police officer by falsely identifying himself, failing to comply with a recognizance condition regarding drug abstinence, and failing to comply with a probation order to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The court found the accused guilty of cocaine possession, obstructing police, and failing to comply with probation, but dismissed the marijuana possession charge and the breach of recognizance charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to s. 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Justice of the Peace convicted the appellant based on hearsay evidence regarding vehicle ownership and circumstantial evidence that the owner permitted the driver to use the vehicle.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by accepting proof of ownership that violated the best evidence rule and by drawing an unreasonable inference from circumstantial evidence.

The court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The accused was charged with driving while the quantity of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

The defence raised Charter violations regarding the roadside screening demand, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, failed to consider residual mouth alcohol, failed to verify calibration of the screening device, and failed to inform the accused of his rights to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations in the unique context of the case, which involved concurrent safety concerns on the Gardiner Expressway and railway tracks.

The court found the accused guilty.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five offences under the Securities Act, including trading in unregistered securities, distributing securities without a prospectus, and violating multiple Cease Trade Orders issued by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The defendant, acting as a commissioned salesman for an unregistered securities scheme, solicited over $220,000 from investors using an alias and received approximately $44,000 in commissions.

The court sentenced the defendant to 18 months imprisonment, with sentences on the CTO violation counts served consecutively to the trading and distribution counts, but concurrent with an existing 27-month sentence for related offences in the Shallow Oil matter.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and brought a Charter application under sections 7, 11(b), and 24(1) seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The trial commenced approximately 18 months after the charge date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, considering the overall length of delay, waiver periods, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

After deducting waived time and characterizing various periods as inherent time requirements, institutional delay, or neutral time, the court found approximately 6 months and 14 days of institutional delay.

The court concluded this fell well below the Morin guideline of 8 to 10 months and that societal interests in a trial on the merits outweighed the moderate prejudice suffered.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction on four provincial offences: failing to surrender an insurance card, proceeding contrary to an intersection sign, driving without a current plate validation, and driving while under suspension.

The trial justice found all charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed fines totalling $1,270.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Crown failed to prove the location of the offences was in Toronto, an essential element; and second, that the trial justice provided excessive assistance to the prosecution, creating a reasonable perception of bias.

The appellate court dismissed both grounds, finding that the well-known intersection of Queen Street West and Bathurst could be judicially noticed, and that while the trial justice's interventions were unfortunate, they did not compromise the overall fairness of the trial when assessed in their totality.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance condition not to communicate with the complainant.

The assaults occurred during a domestic relationship and involved the complainant and her ten-year-old son.

The defendant had a serious criminal record including armed robbery and multiple breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days custody followed by two years probation, with conditions including no contact with the victims, a 500-meter exclusion zone, and mandatory counselling for substance abuse, psychotherapy, and domestic abuse.

A DNA order and weapons prohibition were also imposed.

The accused was charged with three offences: possession of cannabis marijuana not exceeding 30 grams contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, wilfully obstructing a police officer by providing a false name, and breaching an undertaking by entering a restricted area.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and search.

The court found that the accused was unlawfully detained without being informed of his right to counsel, and that the detention and subsequent searches violated his Charter rights.

The marijuana evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of obstruct police and breach of undertaking, but acquitted of marijuana possession.