Craig Power

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public" and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

The offender, a lawyer and real estate developer, was convicted of two counts of theft over $5000 for misappropriating approximately $1.8 million in mortgage proceeds from two jointly-owned corporate projects.

The court found the offender abused her position of trust as a corporate director and engaged in a sophisticated pattern of collateral dishonesty to cover up the thefts.

Applying the principles of general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale commercial frauds, the court sentenced the offender to three years' imprisonment and imposed a fine of $220,286 in lieu of forfeiture.

The accused, a nurse, was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who was brought to a hospital emergency room in a highly intoxicated and unresponsive state.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate touching, including fondling her breasts and placing her hand on his genitals while inserting an intravenous line.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her impaired cognitive state, internal inconsistencies, and demonstrated motive to tailor her testimony.

A credible eyewitness who observed the relevant portion of the alleged assault testified that he did not see any of the alleged inappropriate conduct.

The accused's evidence was consistent with the eyewitness account and video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, following a rear-end collision on October 31, 2015 in Toronto.

The trial addressed two main issues: whether the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached due to delay in breath testing, and whether the breath testing on an approved screening device was conducted "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter breach, finding that the defendant was adequately informed of her right to counsel despite the delay.

The court also found that the "forthwith" requirement was satisfied given the unusual circumstances, including the off-duty status of the initial officer and the heavy police workload on Halloween night.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80mg per 100ml of blood.

The accused was found asleep in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot at Exhibition Place.

The Crown alleged the accused was in care and control; the accused argued he had no intention to drive and was waiting for a friend to pick him up.

The court found no breach of Charter rights regarding the arrest and breath demand.

On the care and control issue, the court found the accused successfully rebutted the presumption of intention to drive and that there was no realistic risk of danger in the particular circumstances, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

A police officer received a report that the accused appeared intoxicated at a drive-through window, stopped the vehicle, and requested a roadside screening device (ASD) test.

The ASD arrived approximately 15 minutes later, and the test was administered 18 minutes after the initial stop.

The accused was not advised of his right to counsel until after failing the ASD test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test evidence showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 160 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on multiple grounds, including that the ASD demand and test were not made "forthwith" as required by statute, and that the breath tests were not taken "as soon as practicable" as required to trigger the evidentiary presumption of identity.

The accused was convicted of child luring after engaging in online chat and text message exchanges with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The exchanges became progressively sexual and were clearly leading towards an intended live sexual encounter.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the accused sought a conditional sentence or shorter imprisonment.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence of imprisonment followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA Data-Banking Order, a SOIRA Order, and a prohibition order under section 161 for five years.

The court ruled on the admissibility of a statement made by a young person (D.T.) to his school vice-principal regarding an alleged robbery.

The Crown and defence agreed that the vice-principal was a "person in authority" but the court disagreed.

The court found that the vice-principal was not a person in authority because she was not acting as an agent of the state, had no control over the police investigation, and was conducting an educational meeting rather than an interrogation.

The statement was therefore admissible as an admission rather than a confession requiring compliance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a suitable breath sample following a motor vehicle collision in Brampton.

The accused pled not guilty and alleged violations of her Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption, based on the totality of evidence including the collision, observations of physical signs of impairment, and admissions of alcohol consumption.

The court also found that the accused willfully failed to provide suitable breath samples despite numerous opportunities, clear instructions, and warnings.

The court rejected the accused's Charter arguments, finding no unlawful search or seizure and no violation of procedural fairness.

The accused was convicted on both counts.