Sukhwant Singh Baidwan

The Superior Court of Justice provided reasons for two evidentiary rulings made during a criminal trial for aggravated assault and assault.

First, the court granted the Crown's application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness, Jaskeerat Singh Mann, to testify by videoconference, finding it appropriate given his personal circumstances, cost implications, and the nature of his evidence, which primarily involved introducing videos.

Second, the court permitted Samneet Guraya to give identification evidence from trial videos, determining that a Leaney Application was not required as she had a pre-existing relationship with the accused, placing her in a better position than the jury to identify them.

The accused sought a bail review following his detention on multiple criminal charges.

The review, conducted remotely via ZOOM during the COVID-19 pandemic, raised two main issues: an alleged error in law by the initial justice of the peace and a material change in circumstances due to a new surety and the risk posed by COVID-19 in custody.

The court found no error in law by the initial justice and determined that neither the proposed new surety nor the general risk of COVID-19 constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant release, particularly given the accused's history of breaching court orders and the serious nature of the charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the roadside screening demand, failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel, and failed to take breath samples 'as soon as practicable'.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police evidence credible and the delays reasonable.

The court also noted the lack of audio and video recording of the police interaction, urging police services to adopt such technology.

The accused was found guilty.

This was a summary conviction sentence appeal arising from a child luring conviction under s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code based on communications with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The appeal court held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by applying an indictable sentencing range in a case prosecuted summarily, and by treating the absence of a risk assessment report as an aggravating factor.

The court rejected the submission that the offence was victimless merely because no actual child existed, emphasizing the community harm inherent in online child luring.

After reassessing the aggravating and mitigating factors and reviewing comparable authorities, the court reduced the custodial sentence from 12 months to 8 months.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results obtained through an approved screening device at the roadside and an approved instrument at the police division.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable grounds to demand the roadside breath test and that the samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds for the initial demand but determined the Crown failed to establish that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable due to an unjustified twenty-minute delay at the roadside.

Without the statutory presumption of identity, the Crown could not prove the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, and the charge was dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of uttering a threat and assaulting his wife during an argument.

The assault consisted of a single slap to the face with no lasting physical harm.

The offender had no prior criminal record, had completed anger management and parenting programs prior to trial, and had already served 4 days in pre-sentence custody.

The court found that a conditional discharge was in the best interests of the offender and not contrary to the public interest.

The offender was granted a conditional discharge with 2 years of probation and a 5-year weapons prohibition.

A DNA order was declined.

Following dismissal of an application seeking a certificate of pending litigation and specific performance relating to two Brampton properties, the successful respondents sought costs exceeding $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued the requested costs were excessive given the limited length and complexity of the hearing.

The court agreed that the hours claimed and counsel fee were excessive for a matter argued in under two hours.

Costs were reduced and fixed at $5,807 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The accused was convicted of child luring after engaging in online chat and text message exchanges with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The exchanges became progressively sexual and were clearly leading towards an intended live sexual encounter.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the accused sought a conditional sentence or shorter imprisonment.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence of imprisonment followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA Data-Banking Order, a SOIRA Order, and a prohibition order under section 161 for five years.

Following the dismissal of the respondents’ motion, the court considered the applicant’s entitlement to costs.

The respondents argued that no costs should be awarded because the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in their motion.

The court rejected that submission and held that the applicant was completely successful and therefore entitled to costs.

Although the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, the court found that the respondents’ conduct did not rise to the level required for such an award.

Costs were fixed at $6,800 payable forthwith.

The respondents brought a motion seeking to set aside earlier orders made by other judges of the Superior Court of Justice, including orders validating service, ordering contempt proceedings, and issuing garnishment.

The moving parties argued insufficient service, improper commencement of the proceeding by application under Rule 14.05(3), and lack of personal service for contempt proceedings.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside or overrule orders made by other judges absent authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court further found that the moving parties failed to meet the requirements of Rule 38.01 and that full and fair disclosure had been made on the earlier motion.

The motion was dismissed.