Gabriele Settimi

The accused was charged with second degree murder after stabbing a stranger who was trying to help him.

The accused conceded he caused the death but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the psychotic episode was solely substance-induced due to the accused's heavy drug use.

The court applied the holistic approach, considering the internal cause and continuing danger factors, and found the accused suffered from a pre-existing delusional disorder that was operative at the time of the offence.

The court concluded the accused lacked the capacity to know his act was morally wrong and rendered a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The applicant sought a detention review, arguing material changes in circumstances and errors by prior courts regarding his release plan and Gladue factors.

The court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances, upholding the prior decisions that continued detention was justified on secondary and tertiary grounds due to the applicant's history of re-offending, particularly driving while disqualified, and the proposed release plan's inability to mitigate public safety risk.

The court also addressed the application of Gladue factors, concluding that while systemic factors were present, the proposed plan did not sufficiently address the risk to public safety.

The accused, an Indigenous land protector, pled guilty to mischief and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The central issue on sentencing was whether to grant an absolute discharge or a suspended sentence under section 730 of the Criminal Code.

Relying on expert evidence regarding Haudenosaunee legal traditions and the Two Row Wampum, the court interpreted the 'public interest' requirement in section 730 to mean the Haudenosaunee public interest.

Finding that the accused's actions as a land protector were not contrary to the Haudenosaunee public interest, the court granted an absolute discharge.

Timothy Clarke Anthony applied for bail review and detention review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

He faced multiple charges, including criminal negligence causing death and numerous counts of driving while disqualified, with a significant criminal record involving breaches of court orders.

The application argued errors in law by the Justice of the Peace, a material change in circumstances with a new release plan and sureties, and unreasonable delay.

The court found no errors in the original decision, determined the new release plan did not constitute a material change sufficient to mitigate the high risk of re-offending, and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable under the Jordan framework.

The application was dismissed, and detention was warranted due to the compelling risk of re-offending.

The accused, J.S., was charged with sexual assault, assault, and sexual interference involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter, E.S., on two separate occasions.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused, applying the principles from R. v. W.D. and cautioning against stereotypical myths in sexual assault cases.

The court found the complainant's testimony compelling and corroborated by another witness, while the accused's testimony was deemed unbelievable due to inconsistencies and his callous behavior.

The court found the accused guilty on all charges, noting that for the second incident, a conviction would be registered for one of the three charges as it was a continuing transaction.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code seeking an order to permit the complainant to give evidence by videoconference.

The complainant, residing on the east coast with a young child, faced significant travel burdens and health concerns due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the factors enumerated in section 714.1, including the witness's personal circumstances, the broad interpretation of "costs" (encompassing non-financial burdens like childcare and anxiety), the suitability of video technology for credibility assessment, and the accused's right to a fair and public hearing.

The court found that the public health emergency constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying remote testimony and that modern video technology adequately preserves the ability to assess witness evidence.

The application was granted, with a preference for the witness to testify from an official location rather than her home.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample after his truck was found in a ditch.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, unreasonable search due to cell video surveillance, and overholding.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds, the cell surveillance was balanced by the offer of a privacy blanket, and the release timing was appropriate.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, concluding he was slightly impaired, in care or control of the vehicle, and feigned attempts to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the roadside screening demand, failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel, and failed to take breath samples 'as soon as practicable'.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police evidence credible and the delays reasonable.

The court also noted the lack of audio and video recording of the police interaction, urging police services to adopt such technology.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on first degree murder for the death of Shana Carter, alleging the murder was planned and deliberate.

The accused's counsel conceded sufficient evidence existed for committal on second degree murder but opposed committal on first degree.

The court found that while the evidence could support inferences of deliberation, the evidence regarding planning was more problematic.

However, applying the legal test for committal, the court determined that a jury could reasonably infer planning from the totality of the evidence, including the accused's motive (protecting his son), his animus toward the deceased, prior attempted strangulation, post-offence conduct (body disposal, cleanup, false statements), and statements to an undercover officer.

The court committed the accused to trial on first degree murder.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a high school bathroom.

The accused claimed she acted in self-defence, asserting that the victim was about to assault her and she struck preemptively.

The Crown presented evidence from three witnesses indicating the accused attacked the victim from behind without provocation, causing a broken nose requiring two surgeries, blackened eyes, and swollen cheeks.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and determined that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused assaulted the victim without lawful justification under sections 34 or 37 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples into an approved screening device.

The court considered two issues: whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code, and whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body.

The court found that while the officer detected an odour of alcohol on the accused's breath and the accused admitted to consuming one beer hours earlier, the officer's subjective state of mind did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard.

The officer appeared to be seeking to determine whether the accused had any alcohol in his system to contravene the conditions of his G2 driver's licence, rather than acting on a pre-existing reasonable suspicion.

The accused was acquitted.