R. D. Baran

The defendant, Enrique Humberto Martinez-Reynosa, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on a sexual assault count at the close of the Crown's case.

The defence argued insufficient circumstantial evidence of lack of consent or capacity to consent.

The Crown contended the evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's prior disinterest in the accused, her high level of intoxication leading to a blackout, her post-event confusion and distress, and the accused's own statements, to allow the jury to consider the count.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the discharge of a juror during a sexual assault trial.

The trial judge received multiple notes from a single juror and the jury foreperson, indicating the juror was engaging in discriminatory thinking, speculating on matters not in evidence, misapprehending the law, and refusing to collaborate.

Despite the defence's request for a mistrial, the judge discharged the juror under section 644(1) of the Criminal Code, finding the juror's conduct prevented proper deliberation.

The remaining jury subsequently returned verdicts of not guilty on one count and guilty on two counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample after his truck was found in a ditch.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, unreasonable search due to cell video surveillance, and overholding.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds, the cell surveillance was balanced by the offer of a privacy blanket, and the release timing was appropriate.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, concluding he was slightly impaired, in care or control of the vehicle, and feigned attempts to provide a breath sample.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts of bank robbery and one global count of wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

He was sentenced for robbing six different banks and one attempted robbery over a period of approximately one month.

The offences were sophisticated, pre-planned, and involved the use of stolen vehicles and disguises.

The total amount stolen was $104,800.36, with net losses to the banks of $93,190.36.

The accused was a 20-year-old first offender with no prior record, from a supportive family background, and demonstrated significant potential for rehabilitation.

The court balanced the extremely serious nature of the offences and substantial victim impact against the accused's youth, lack of record, and mitigating circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and two months incarceration, with a restitution order and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle with over 80 ml of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

A police officer responded to a radio call about a possibly impaired driver and found the accused sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The accused failed a breath screening device and subsequently provided breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused occupied the driver's seat, which would engage the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found the accused's evidence unreliable and internally inconsistent, while accepting the officer's credible testimony.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was seated in the driver's seat, engaged the presumption, and the accused failed to rebut it on a balance of probabilities.

Guilty verdict entered.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE checkpoint stop on November 8, 2013.

The defendant sought to contact counsel of choice (Shauna Pemberton) but was unable to reach her.

Police made reasonable efforts to contact her, left a message, waited approximately 29 minutes, and then offered duty counsel.

The defendant spoke with duty counsel and subsequently provided breath samples registering 106 and 101.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing his right to counsel was infringed.

The court found no breach of Charter rights and admitted the evidence.

On a pre-trial application in a criminal jury matter, the accused sought permission to remain seated at counsel table or, alternatively, directly behind defence counsel rather than in the defendant’s box.

The court held that although the customary position of an accused is in the dock and the Criminal Code is silent on courtroom seating, the trial judge retains discretion to depart from that practice.

In the particular courtroom, the glass-enclosed design of the defendant’s box carried a stigma that could reasonably influence the jury and also impeded counsel-client communication.

The application was granted in part, and the accused was permitted to sit behind defence counsel for the duration of the trial unless otherwise ordered.

The defendant applied to admit statements he made to police upon arrest, in the cruiser, and at the detachment as res gestae.

The Crown conceded the arrest statements were res gestae but opposed the admission of the cruiser and detachment statements for their truth.

The court held that the cruiser and detachment statements were temporally separated from the arrest and there was sufficient time to fabricate a simple defence.

Therefore, they were not admitted as res gestae, but could be admitted as evidence of reaction and consistency under the rule in Edgar if the defendant testified.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed four issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make a screening demand; whether the officer could reasonably rely on the screening test result given the mouth alcohol effect; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter violations and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The accused was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.