Marcel Buchler

The accused, Enrique Martinez-Reynosa, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault.

The court determined a fit sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the complainant's intoxication and sleep state, the breach of trust, and the unprotected nature of the assaults, as well as mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior criminal record (save for one impaired driving conviction), family support, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years in custody, reduced to three years after applying Summers credit for pre-sentence custody and considering harsh detention conditions and restrictive bail.

This ruling addresses the discharge of a juror during a sexual assault trial.

The trial judge received multiple notes from a single juror and the jury foreperson, indicating the juror was engaging in discriminatory thinking, speculating on matters not in evidence, misapprehending the law, and refusing to collaborate.

Despite the defence's request for a mistrial, the judge discharged the juror under section 644(1) of the Criminal Code, finding the juror's conduct prevented proper deliberation.

The remaining jury subsequently returned verdicts of not guilty on one count and guilty on two counts.

The defendant, Enrique Humberto Martinez-Reynosa, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on a sexual assault count at the close of the Crown's case.

The defence argued insufficient circumstantial evidence of lack of consent or capacity to consent.

The Crown contended the evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's prior disinterest in the accused, her high level of intoxication leading to a blackout, her post-event confusion and distress, and the accused's own statements, to allow the jury to consider the count.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused was charged with "over 80" and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following an accident in Brampton.

The Crown sought to rely on three sets of statements made by the accused to police and a breath technician.

The defence challenged the admissibility of all statements under section 7 of the Charter, arguing they were obtained in violation of the accused's rights.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that only the accused's spontaneous remarks to himself in the police cruiser were admissible.

All other statements were excluded because they were made under an honest and reasonably held belief that the accused had a statutory duty to report the accident.

Without the excluded statements, the Crown could not establish the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, Omar McLeod, sought judicial interim release by applying to vacate a prior detention order, claiming a material change in circumstances.

The Crown conceded a material change but argued it did not favor release, opposing bail on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court, applying the criteria for material change from *R. v. St. Cloud*, acknowledged that the proposed 24-hour surety supervision by the applicant's mother constituted a favorable change.

However, the court found that the additional 16 charges laid against the applicant since the initial bail hearing, revealing a pattern of aggressive, predatory, and stalking conduct against multiple complainants, also constituted a material change that significantly increased the risk to public safety and undermined confidence in the administration of justice.

The court dismissed the application, maintaining the detention order on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit, following a traffic stop for running a red light at high speed.

The accused sought to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter violations.

The court found violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter: the accused was unlawfully detained in a police cruiser without reasonable necessity, was not promptly advised of the reasons for detention, and was not advised of his right to counsel without delay.

However, the court exercised its discretion under section 24(2) to admit the evidence, finding that while the violations were serious, they had limited impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests and there was a strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was convicted on both counts.