Helena Gluzman

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Rodolfo Sanchez-Neria to 8.5 years imprisonment for attempted murder, following a planned murder-for-hire shooting targeting Harpreet Hanjra.

The offender, aged 22 with no prior criminal record, shot Hanjra multiple times while he was driving his 6-year-old daughter to school.

The court considered significant aggravating factors including the use of a firearm, the presence of a child, and the public risk posed by the shooting.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, guilty plea, harsh pre-trial custody conditions, and strong rehabilitative prospects supported by a solid community and family network.

The judge applied a 1.5:1 credit for 470 days served pre-trial, reflecting exceptionally harsh conditions including lockdowns, triple-bunking, and health risks.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Huynh Nguyen, was charged with dangerous operation of a vehicle causing bodily harm after her minivan rolled forward in a school parking lot, pinning a four-year-old boy.

The court first addressed the admissibility of Ms. Nguyen's police statement, ruling it voluntary and admissible despite defence arguments regarding her right to remain silent and lack of a Vietnamese interpreter during questioning.

The court then considered the charge of dangerous operation, focusing on the mens rea requirement.

Ultimately, the court found that while the incident was a tragic accident, the Crown failed to prove the mens rea of the offence, concluding that Ms. Nguyen's actions amounted to a momentary lapse in attention or carelessness, not criminal conduct.

Ms. Nguyen was found not guilty.

The applicant brought a motion to stay criminal proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant was charged with two counts each of assault, overcoming resistance, and unlawful confinement on April 13, 2018, with an offence date of April 9, 2018.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 17 months and 21 days, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 10 days.

The court found no periods of defence delay attributable to the applicant and determined that the applicant had demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case had taken markedly longer than reasonable.

The motion was granted and the charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates from April 2016 to September 2017.

The accused was found asleep in the passenger seat of a parked vehicle with a flat tire.

Police arrested him and demanded a breath sample, which he refused.

The accused argued he was not in care or control because he was a passenger, and that he had a reasonable excuse for refusing the breath sample due to health concerns.

The court found the accused not guilty of impaired care or control but guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on trial delay in a transitional case under R. v. Jordan.

The applicant was charged with care or control "Over 80," driving while disqualified, and failure to comply with probation.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2016, and the delay application was argued on July 7, 2017.

The court calculated the net delay at 12½ months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the applicant had not established meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed as not constituting a clear case for a stay.

The offender pleaded guilty to communicating by computer with a person he believed to be under 16 years of age for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-week period, the offender engaged in sexually explicit communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl, including requesting intimate images and sending explicit videos.

The offender arranged an in-person meeting and travelled to the meeting location with items the purported victim had requested.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, along with mandatory DNA and SOIRA orders and a 20-year s. 161 prohibition on computer and internet use for communicating with minors.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged that on October 14, 2015, the accused operated a vehicle while impaired.

The court examined whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, whether any Charter violations occurred, whether the Crown could rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the arresting officer had proper grounds based on poor driving, slurred speech, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes.

The court admitted the breath sample evidence and found the approved instrument was functioning properly.

The accused was found guilty of both offences.

A youth criminal justice trial involving allegations of sexual assault and incest against a young person.

The complainant alleged multiple incidents of sexual abuse by her older half-brother occurring over several years during her childhood.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was at least twelve years old (the age of criminal responsibility in Canada) when the alleged offences occurred.

The court found reasonable doubt on the timing issue and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert evidence from a toxicologist regarding the maintenance and operation of an Intoxilyzer 8000C breath testing device in an over 80 operation case.

The expert sought to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the breath test results by analyzing historical maintenance records and COBRA data.

The court excluded the expert evidence on multiple grounds: the opinions were not logically relevant as they could not raise a reasonable doubt about the specific breath test results; the opinions were based on speculation and erroneous factual information; and the opinions constituted novel science lacking sufficient reliability and peer review.

The court emphasized that maintenance deficiencies must be directly linked to unreliable results, and that historical records cannot address the working status of the instrument at the time of the subject test.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court found the trial judge miscalculated the institutional delay and erred in characterizing delay caused by the Crown's failure to notify its witness as neutral and institutional rather than Crown delay.

After recalculating the delay to 11 months and 26 days and finding specific prejudice to the appellant, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and the proceedings stayed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit, following a traffic stop for running a red light at high speed.

The accused sought to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter violations.

The court found violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter: the accused was unlawfully detained in a police cruiser without reasonable necessity, was not promptly advised of the reasons for detention, and was not advised of his right to counsel without delay.

However, the court exercised its discretion under section 24(2) to admit the evidence, finding that while the violations were serious, they had limited impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests and there was a strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired care and control and excess blood alcohol arising from a six‑day trial.

He challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings, alleged a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and argued that his vehicle was inoperable such that he lacked care and control.

The court held that credibility findings by the trial judge were entitled to deference and disclosed no palpable or overriding error.

The appellant had not raised a s. 11(b) issue at trial and provided no evidentiary basis for such a claim.

The evidence supported the finding that the appellant had care and control of an operable vehicle while impaired.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the defendant to Constable Foreman in the Intoxilyzer room for purposes of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs. per cent blood alcohol.

The court conducted a voluntariness voir dire and found that the Crown failed to call all persons in authority who had dealings with the defendant, specifically the Staff Sergeant and booking officer who were observed in conversation with the defendant on video.

The court excluded the statement, finding that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses prevented it from satisfying the burden of proving the statement was voluntarily made.

The accused was charged with two counts of robbery, two counts of robbery with an imitation firearm, and one count of arson arising from incidents on February 19, 2014.

The Crown sought detention on primary and secondary grounds.

The accused, who is of Aboriginal descent, proposed his mother as surety with a house arrest plan.

The court found that the Crown satisfied its onus on both the primary ground (ensuring attendance in court) and the secondary ground (protection of the public).

The accused's extensive criminal history involving violence and weapons, combined with his demonstrated non-compliance with court orders and supervision, established that detention was necessary.

The court ordered the accused detained in custody.

The defendant, age 63, was convicted after trial of two counts of sexual touching, one count of sexual assault, and one count of invitation to sexual touching involving two young male victims (ages 8 and 10) over a six-month period in early 2011.

The defendant was a tenant in the home of the boys' grandmother.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 5-6 years, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years custody concurrent, less pre-trial custody of 26 months on an enhanced 1.5:1 credit ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months, followed by one year probation with conditions including no contact with the victims and their family members, DNA sampling, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and lifetime registration on the Sexual Offender Registry.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing assault therein, assault, and breach of recognizance.

The central issue was whether a causal nexus existed between the accused's chronic schizophrenia and his offending conduct.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused's delusional beliefs regarding the victim were of delusional intensity and significantly drove his behaviour.

The court found the accused represented the lowest risk to community safety and imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, prioritizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a motion alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The total delay from the date of the alleged offence to the scheduled trial dates was approximately 15 months.

The court found that while most of the delay was attributable to institutional resource limitations, there was also delay caused by the Crown's failure to provide police notes in a timely manner.

The court determined that the applicant had demonstrated a probable violation of his section 11(b) Charter rights and granted the application, staying the charge.

A 63-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference, and one count of invitation to sexual touching against two young boys (ages 10 and 12 at the time of the alleged incidents) who lived in the same household between early 2011 and March 31, 2012.

The allegations involved unwanted touching of the boys' genitals and buttocks, exposure to pornography, and requests for sexual acts.

The defendant denied all allegations.

The court applied the W.D. test and found the defendant's evidence not credible and raising no reasonable doubt.

The court accepted the evidence of both complainants and found the Crown had proven all essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in convictions on all counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand on two Charter grounds: first, that the accused's initial statement was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the demand, thereby infringing section 8 rights.

The defence also argued that evidence of the accused's alcohol consumption demonstrated her blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The court rejected all defence arguments, finding no statutory compulsion, that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable suspicion, and that the accused's evidence was unreliable and did not raise a reasonable doubt.