G. Henderson

The accused was charged with publishing, distributing, or transmitting an intimate image of his wife without consent contrary to section 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent photographs of his wife via Snapchat to an unknown male, including one photograph of her in a bra and another digitally altered image with her head placed on a nude body.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The court found that neither photograph met the statutory definition of "intimate image" under section 162.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The photograph of the wife in a bra did not depict her as nude or with her breasts exposed, and the digitally altered photograph was not of her actual body.

The motion for a directed verdict was granted and the accused was acquitted.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion claiming unreasonable delay and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm in relation to his ex-wife.

The total delay from the date of formal charges to the anticipated completion of trial was 1,179 days (approximately 38 months and 22 days).

The Crown failed to disclose critical evidence—video-recorded statements of the complainant and accused taken in Punjabi by police—and their translations for nearly two years.

The court found that the Crown's disclosure failures were unexplained and constituted a serious breach of its disclosure obligations.

After deducting legitimate defence delay periods, the net delay was 949 days (31.2 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The trial focused on whether the accused's Charter-protected rights were violated during the investigation and whether the arresting officer complied with statutory prerequisites for admission of breath samples.

The officer's evidence was marked by significant inconsistencies and gaps in recollection regarding the timing and circumstances of key investigative steps.

The court found violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter and determined that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath demand was made and samples obtained as soon as practicable, thereby losing the benefit of the presumption of identity.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded as a blended hearing addressing both the merits and a motion to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter violations.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath and blood samples on grounds of violations to sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court rejected all Charter claims except finding a minor breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device demand.

Despite this breach, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and found the defendant guilty as charged.

The appellant was convicted of driving with excess blood alcohol after being detained in a police cruiser for a suspected hit and run.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter but declined to exclude the breath test results under section 24(2).

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a proper Grant analysis.

Conducting the analysis anew, the court found the police conduct in detaining the appellant for nearly 30 minutes without providing the right to counsel was serious and significantly impacted his Charter-protected interests.

The appeal was allowed, the breath results were excluded, and an acquittal was entered.

The applicant was charged with possession of a prohibited firearm.

During the execution of a telewarrant at his family's residence, the applicant was ordered out of the house, handcuffed, and detained by police for over 20 minutes without being informed of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel.

The police subsequently questioned him in a police cruiser and later at the police station.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion arguing that his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated, and that his statements were involuntary.

The court found that the telewarrant was invalid and lacked reasonable grounds, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

The court also found that the applicant was arbitrarily detained in breach of s. 9, and that his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights were violated.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to an incomplete record of police interactions.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded both the physical evidence and the statements.

The applicant, accused of bank fraud, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the admissibility of evidence seized from his dwelling under a telewarrant.

The court found multiple section 8 Charter violations, including that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was involved or that evidence would be found at his home, the warrant was impermissibly vague, and it unlawfully authorized a night search without justification.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the serious Charter-infringing conduct and profound impact on the applicant's privacy outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The seized evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to comply with an approved screening device breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the accused intentionally failed to provide a proper breath sample despite repeated instructions.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misplaced the onus of proof regarding proper operation of the device, and misapprehended expert evidence concerning the effects of blocking the device’s exhaust vent.

The appeal court held that although the reasons were sufficient, the trial judge misapprehended the expert evidence and incorrectly concluded that it did not align with the officers’ testimony.

This misapprehension was material to the finding that the accused feigned attempts to provide a breath sample and therefore refused the demand.

The accused brought a motion to stay proceedings on the basis that his right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, impaired operation causing bodily harm, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood, all straight indictable offences.

The overall delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial completion was approximately 31 months.

The first trial date was adjourned due to late disclosure of a critical expert toxicology report.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was some actual prejudice, the institutional and Crown delay did not rise to the level of a Charter violation when considered holistically against the complexity of the case, the conduct of the defence, and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for dangerous driving and the resulting suspended sentence.

The conviction arose from a collision between the appellant's taxi cab and a moped, preceded by erratic driving including speeding, tailgating, and unsafe lane changes.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, concluding that the appellant's driving constituted a marked departure from the norm.

The appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel David Locke from representing the accused Narankar Dhillon on a first-degree murder charge at a preliminary hearing, alleging a conflict of interest based on Locke's prior professional relationships with three individuals: a Crown witness (Avtar Sidhu), a potential Crown witness (Manpreet Padda), and a co-accused (Charnjit Boughan).

The Crown argued that these prior relationships created a conflict that could undermine the fairness of the trial and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused opposed the motion, asserting his Charter right to counsel of choice and proposing that the conflict could be eliminated through an informed instruction to Locke not to cross-examine Sidhu or Padda.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the prior relationships were remote and that the accused's informed waiver of cross-examination eliminated any potential conflict.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats against his wife.

The charges arose from incidents occurring between 1997 and 2010.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's evidence due to material misrepresentations.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence regarding most of the incidents, finding the accused guilty of two counts of sexual assault, two counts of assault, and one count of uttering threats.

The accused was acquitted of one count of sexual assault from 1997 due to reasonable doubt arising from delayed disclosure and inconsistencies.