Shawn Hamilton

The accused was charged with publishing, distributing, or transmitting an intimate image of his wife without consent contrary to section 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent photographs of his wife via Snapchat to an unknown male, including one photograph of her in a bra and another digitally altered image with her head placed on a nude body.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The court found that neither photograph met the statutory definition of "intimate image" under section 162.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The photograph of the wife in a bra did not depict her as nude or with her breasts exposed, and the digitally altered photograph was not of her actual body.

The motion for a directed verdict was granted and the accused was acquitted.

The respondent brought a motion for a temporary order for primary residence of the children and weekend parenting time for the applicant.

The applicant cross-moved for the children to attend a different school on Bear Island and for primary residence with her.

The court found that the applicant had been removing the children from their current school in North Bay, Vincent Massey, despite a previous order.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding her reasons for relocation and school change unconvincing and her actions detrimental to the children's best interests.

The respondent's motion was allowed, granting him primary residence and establishing a new parenting schedule for the applicant, with the children to remain at Vincent Massey.

Costs were awarded to the respondent due to the applicant's inappropriate conduct.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to strike the statement of defence or compel a further and better affidavit of documents from the defendant, the Town of Oakville, in a construction dispute.

The motion to strike was not pursued.

The court granted the motion for a further affidavit of documents in part, finding the Town's initial affidavit deficient and ordering a supplementary affidavit with specific relevant documents, including those related to privilege claims.

However, many of the plaintiffs' broad production requests were dismissed due to insufficient evidence of relevance or existence, with the court emphasizing that such inquiries are better suited for examination for discovery.

The court also rejected the Town's threshold objections regarding unpaid costs and failure to agree on a discovery plan, noting that the latter default was shared by both parties.

The Applicant sought to relocate with the children from North Bay to Bear Island, Lake Temagami, and to vary an existing interim parenting order.

The Respondent opposed the relocation.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion, finding that she had not met the test for varying a temporary order for relocation.

The decision emphasized the importance of maintaining the status quo in North Bay, citing the children's need for stability and the substantial reduction in contact with the father that the proposed move would entail.

The court also noted the Applicant's inconsistent positions and unilateral actions throughout the proceedings.

The accused, Travis Larose, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application was assessed under the R. v. Jordan framework, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 30 months for Superior Court cases.

The applicant argued the total delay exceeded this ceiling, while the Crown contended that significant portions of the delay were attributable to defence conduct, including lack of diligence in disclosure, failure to elect, and lack of urgency in setting trial dates.

The court agreed with the Crown's calculation, finding the net delay to be 26.4 months, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the onus remained on the defence to demonstrate the delay was unreasonable, which they failed to do.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Mohammed Shaikh, faced charges of impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the breath demand was valid, not violating section 8.

The court also found no unreasonable delay in facilitating the right to counsel under section 10(b), as police acted reasonably given safety and privacy concerns.

Consequently, the Charter applications were dismissed, the breath samples were admitted, and the accused was found guilty on both counts of impaired operation and over 80.

The accused, David Eyong-Eyong, brought an application seeking an order to compel the Crown to call specific eyewitnesses or, alternatively, for the court to call them.

The defence argued that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses adversely impacted trial fairness, especially given the lack of audio in video evidence forming the crux of the Crown's case.

The Crown opposed, asserting prosecutorial discretion and arguing that judicial intervention was only warranted for abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not met the onus for intervention on any standard of review and that the circumstances were not exceptional enough to impact trial fairness, particularly as the defence would have the opportunity to call and examine these witnesses.

The plaintiff, Lou Maieron, sued Ugo Guila (and related corporate defendants) and the Town of Erin, alleging an improper easement on his land.

The dispute arose from a 1997 settlement agreement between Maieron and Guila for the transfer of land (Block 56) subject to a water monitoring easement.

In 2003, Guila and the Town of Erin entered a Subdivision Agreement granting an expanded, permanent easement for stormwater management, including construction, over Block 56, without Maieron's involvement.

Maieron objected to this expanded easement in the deed and did not register it, but paid property taxes on the land.

At trial, Maieron sought to amend his claim to remove the expanded easement, replace it with the original monitoring easement, obtain reimbursement for taxes paid, and gain the right to remove installations.

The court dismissed the amendment request due to lengthy and unexplained delay, finding presumed prejudice to the defendants and that the claim was stale-dated.

The court also dismissed all of Maieron's claims, finding the Town of Erin was not a party to the original 1997 agreement and had statutory authority for its easement.

While Guila breached the 1997 agreement, Maieron failed to prove any damages.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter following his conviction for sexual assault at a second trial.

The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the judge due to scheduling issues.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework.

While the mistrial was an exceptional circumstance, the subsequent 9.5-month delay to schedule the second trial was largely systemic and unreasonable.

The court also found the accused suffered specific prejudice due to the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The appellant, an Uber driver, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by using the complainant's 911 call as a prior consistent statement to corroborate her trial testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the trial judge's reasons indicated the 911 call was impermissibly used as powerful confirmatory evidence of the commission of the offence, rather than for a permissible purpose such as assessing demeanour.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

This trial concerned an application for spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory bases.

The respondent conceded entitlement, leaving the quantum and retroactivity as the primary issues.

The court found the respondent lacked credibility, intentionally underemployed, and misrepresented his financial situation and relationship with a new partner.

The court imputed the respondent's income based on a three-year average and the applicant's income, ordering indefinite spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Retroactive support was also ordered from the date of the application.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

She argued her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police failed to leave a message for her counsel of choice, failed to advise her she could leave a message, and failed to provide a 'Prosper warning' when she declined duty counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge agreed, finding the police breached her s. 10(b) rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the judge excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The parties, former common-law spouses, brought competing motions for summary judgment regarding the ownership of their former home.

The applicant had previously transferred his 50 percent joint interest in the property to the respondent gratuitously to protect it from creditors.

The court found that the gratuitous transfer created a presumption of resulting trust, which the respondent failed to rebut, as an intention to defeat creditors is not conclusive evidence of a gift.

The applicant's motion for a declaration of a resulting trust was granted, and the respondent's motion to dismiss or compel undertakings was dismissed.

However, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's substantial indemnity costs of $5,000 due to his conduct in the litigation.

In a high-conflict parenting dispute, the responding parent moved for a contempt finding arising from repeated non-compliance with interim week-about parenting orders concerning two of the children.

Applying the contempt framework, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the moving party had notice of clear orders and failed to take the concrete parental steps necessary to require the children’s compliance, instead leaving them with the impression that parenting time was optional.

The court accepted that caution is required in family contempt matters and, prioritizing the children’s best interests, declined to proceed immediately to a formal contempt order.

A staged reintegration order was imposed for June through August 2022, with the original week-about regime to resume on September 1, 2022, and a further status hearing scheduled.

The moving party sought to change a 2016 consent order for spousal support, arguing that his income had materially decreased due to a strike and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The responding party opposed the motion, noting her significant physical disabilities and that the original order was intended to equalize joint debt.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the income decrease was temporary and that the responding party's circumstances justified continued support.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for the production of documents and information relating to two of the responding party's accounts: an investment account and a bank account.

The court found that the responding party had sufficiently answered the request regarding the investment account.

Regarding the bank account, the court ordered the responding party to provide an affidavit clarifying whether the account into which deposits were made was closed, or whether the account from which corresponding withdrawals were made was closed.

The motion was largely dismissed, and the responding party was awarded costs of $2,000.

The applicant mother sought child support under the Divorce Act for the parties' 27-year-old disabled daughter, who resides in a therapeutic home and receives ODSP benefits.

The court found that the daughter's receipt of ODSP displaced the presumptive Guidelines amount, and that she did not have a monthly budget deficit.

However, the court ordered the respondent father to pay $100 per month as his proportionate share of the daughter's section 7 expenses, such as clothing and personal hygiene items.

In a family law matter involving three children from a common law relationship, the court determined custody and access arrangements following separation.

The applicant father sought to make permanent the existing temporary orders providing him with primary residence of the two youngest children and week-about shared residency for the oldest child.

The respondent mother sought week-about shared residency for all three children or, alternatively, primary residence of the oldest child with access to the two youngest.

The court found both parents capable and loving, but determined that a week-about shared residency arrangement for all three children best served the children's interests, allowing maximum contact with both parents and siblings.

The court also adjusted child support obligations based on the new shared parenting arrangement and the parties' current incomes.

The applicant mother sought an order for security for costs in the amount of $30,000 against the respondent father in a motion to change custody and access arrangements.

The respondent father, self-represented, opposed the motion.

The court found that the respondent father's motion to change was contrary to all previous court orders and the recommendations of the Ontario Children's Lawyer's report.

The respondent father's conduct throughout the proceedings was troublesome, including refusal to amend pleadings despite court direction, aggressive communications with opposing counsel, refusal to approve disclosure orders, and substantial arrears in child support payments.

The court determined that the respondent father lacked the financial means to pay costs and that the case constituted a waste of time and a nuisance.

The court ordered security for costs in the reduced amount of $15,000, finding that $30,000 was excessive given the anticipated trial length of 2-3 days.

This motion concerned a dispute over a child's custody and access arrangement.

The Mother unilaterally withheld the 11-year-old son from the Father, citing the child's emotional distress and stated preference not to reside with the Father.

The Father sought compliance with the existing week-about order or custody, alleging parental alienation.

The Mother sought a suspension of the week-about access.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's significant anxiety and emotional trauma regarding the existing arrangement.

While acknowledging the Father's concerns about parental alienation, the court found insufficient direct evidence to prove it.

The court temporarily suspended the week-about arrangement, ordering the child to reside full-time with the Mother and granting the Father supervised access.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was encouraged to become involved.