Fraser Kelly

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements from a deceased declarant, Lori Parker, against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who is charged with manslaughter and other offences.

The court considered two material aspects of Parker's statements to her then-husband, Robert Parker: (1) that she gave the accused information about the victim, Henrietta Knight, having money and plotted with him to steal it; and (2) that the accused threatened her family if she disclosed this.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the first statement substantively reliable due to a lack of motive to fabricate and strong corroboration from the accused's own statements to an undercover officer.

Consequently, the first statement was admitted for the truth of its contents.

However, the second statement regarding threats was deemed unreliable due to a plausible motive for fabrication (to prevent Robert Parker from going to the police) and lack of corroboration, and was therefore admitted only for the fact that it was said, not for its truth.

The accused was charged with multiple historical offences spanning 1995 to 2001, including manslaughter, bank robbery, car bombing, and two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions the accused made to an undercover officer and a police agent during a 'Mr. Big' operation in 2018-2019.

The court carefully assessed the reliability of these confessions, finding them compelling, detailed, and corroborated by independent evidence.

The accused was found guilty of the robbery of Henrietta Knight (but acquitted of her manslaughter due to a gap in medical evidence regarding causation), the TD Bank robbery, the car bombing of David Allan's vehicle, and the first-degree murders of Richard Kimball and Stephen St. Denis.

During a trial for robbery, the defence sought to cross-examine a police officer about other suspects identified early in the investigation to raise a reasonable doubt about identity.

The Crown objected, arguing the defence needed to establish relevance and admissibility first.

The trial judge ruled the questioning impermissible, finding the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance and invited mere speculation.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held that the defence must establish a sufficient connection between the crime charged and the third-party suspect before pursuing such cross-examination.

The Crown applied to admit hearsay statements from the deceased victim and the post-mortem report of an unavailable pathologist in a manslaughter trial.

The court admitted the victim's statements, finding they met the criteria for spontaneous utterances and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, with sufficient markers of threshold reliability.

However, the court excluded the pathologist's report, concluding that the inability to cross-examine the expert on his baldly stated opinion regarding the cause of death would cause significant prejudice to the accused, outweighing its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit statements made by the accused during a nine-month undercover police investigation involving a police agent and an undercover officer.

The accused was charged with three homicides, a bank robbery, and a car bombing.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Hart and found that the statements met the threshold for reliability, their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect, and the police conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The Crown applied for an order to protect the identities of a civilian police agent and an undercover officer involved in the investigation of a criminal case against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who faced charges including manslaughter, first-degree murder, robbery, and arson.

The application was brought under sections 486.31(1) and 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused did not oppose the order, and no media intervened.

The court granted the order, finding it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the safety and security of the police agent and undercover officer from intimidation or retaliation, while balancing this need with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

The order specified terms for pseudonyms, non-disclosure of identifying information, publication bans, and restrictions on recording and access to exhibits.

The applicant, Stephen Jurkus, jointly charged with Leslie Lonsbary for failing to provide the necessaries of life, sought severance from Lonsbary for their joint jury trial.

Jurkus argued that a joint trial would be unjust due to differing allegations, roles, and evidence, and that severance would allow for an earlier judge-alone trial.

The Crown opposed, citing judicial economy, avoiding inconsistent verdicts, and the Court of Appeal's prior comments on complexity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Jurkus failed to establish that severance was in the interests of justice, emphasizing the legal and factual nexus between the charges and the jury's capacity to compartmentalize evidence.

The accused Dhillon ordered the kidnapping of the victim over a suspected drug debt.

The victim was bound, beaten, and confined in Dhillon's garage, where he subsequently died.

The cause of death was undetermined but involved either asphyxiation or methamphetamine toxicity.

The court found that the stress and exertion of the kidnapping significantly contributed to the victim's death, satisfying the causation requirement for manslaughter.

Dhillon was found guilty of manslaughter, kidnapping, and interfering with a dead body.

The co-accused Johal was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact for providing the keys to the victim's vehicle to help dispose of the body.

Arnold Thiessen was convicted of attempt murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The court considered sentencing objectives under s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the egregious nature of the offence involving the recruitment of his children to attempt to drown their mother, and the profound impact on the victim and children.

The decision addressed credit for pretrial custody, applying principles from R. v. Summers and R. v. Rezaie regarding both quantitative and qualitative factors justifying enhanced credit.

Despite the severity of the crime and a continued lack of full remorse, the court imposed an effective sentence of one day in jail followed by three years' probation, reflecting significant credit for 11 years of pretrial custody already served.

The Crown brought an application at a preliminary inquiry for an order permitting audio/video recording of testimony from certain witnesses in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown argued that the evidence of witnesses directly involved in the alleged offence or closely associated with the accused was vulnerable and that videotaping would preserve a complete record for potential use under Criminal Code section 715(1) if witnesses became unavailable or hostile at trial.

The defence argued the court lacked jurisdiction to order videotaping.

The court granted the application in part, permitting videotaping of witnesses directly implicated in the offence but denying it for family members and associates not implicated in the crime.

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel David Locke from representing the accused Narankar Dhillon on a first-degree murder charge at a preliminary hearing, alleging a conflict of interest based on Locke's prior professional relationships with three individuals: a Crown witness (Avtar Sidhu), a potential Crown witness (Manpreet Padda), and a co-accused (Charnjit Boughan).

The Crown argued that these prior relationships created a conflict that could undermine the fairness of the trial and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused opposed the motion, asserting his Charter right to counsel of choice and proposing that the conflict could be eliminated through an informed instruction to Locke not to cross-examine Sidhu or Padda.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the prior relationships were remote and that the accused's informed waiver of cross-examination eliminated any potential conflict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and failing to comply with a breath demand.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to make the breath demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the constellation of facts—including the appellant sleeping in a running car at 3 a.m., the smell of alcohol, a partially consumed bottle of vodka, fumbling with his wallet, and stumbling—objectively supported the officer's subjective belief of impairment.

A secondary ground regarding re-examination of the officer was also dismissed.