Dr. Shkrum

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two young children were in need of protection and should be placed in extended society care with no access to the parents.

The parents had a history of child protection involvement, including the death of one child from malnutrition and the severe malnourishment of another child.

The parents sought the return of the children under a supervision order or placement with a kin caregiver, and requested access if extended care was ordered.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the parents' failure to acknowledge past medical neglect and their rigid adherence to religious beliefs that put the children at risk.

The court ordered extended society care with no access, finding that the parents' mistrust of medical professionals and the society would impair the children's future opportunities for adoption.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit expert evidence from a Brazilian Jiu Jitsu practitioner regarding the mechanics and effects of blood chokeholds.

The Crown theorized that the accused used a rear naked choke to kill the victim, explaining the lack of structural damage to her neck.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the Abbey two-step process to assess the admissibility of the evidence.

The court found that the evidence had low probative value because there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to martial arts training, and high prejudicial effect.

Furthermore, the court held that evidence regarding the physiological effects of chokeholds should be introduced by medical experts, not a martial arts practitioner.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The accused Dhillon ordered the kidnapping of the victim over a suspected drug debt.

The victim was bound, beaten, and confined in Dhillon's garage, where he subsequently died.

The cause of death was undetermined but involved either asphyxiation or methamphetamine toxicity.

The court found that the stress and exertion of the kidnapping significantly contributed to the victim's death, satisfying the causation requirement for manslaughter.

Dhillon was found guilty of manslaughter, kidnapping, and interfering with a dead body.

The co-accused Johal was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact for providing the keys to the victim's vehicle to help dispose of the body.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his housemate, who subsequently died of a heart attack due to severe underlying heart disease.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable because the medical expert could not definitively state the stab wounds contributed to the death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to consider non-medical evidence, including the circumstances of the altercation, which reasonably linked the extreme stress and blood loss from the attack to the victim's death.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, which was initially investigated as a horse riding accident.

Fifteen years later, the police re-opened the investigation and the appellant confessed during a polygraph interview.

On appeal, the appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, the trial judge erred in not leaving manslaughter to the jury, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting an accidental death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breach, no air of reality to manslaughter, and that the fresh evidence failed the Mohan and Palmer tests.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.