Mark C. Halfyard

The applicant sought release pending appeal from manslaughter conviction and sentence.

The court accepted the appeal was not frivolous, surrender and safety concerns were manageable, and public confidence favored review before immediate enforcement in the circumstances.

Release pending appeal was ordered on agreed terms.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching of his stepsister.

On appeal, the court found two critical errors: (1) the trial judge improperly discontinued cross-examination of a key witness based on insufficient medical evidence and then relied on that witness's testimony to support the conviction, and (2) the trial judge placed undue weight on the appellant's demeanour to reject his evidence as untruthful, despite initially finding him credible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions on two counts were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years and 9 months.

He appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's Corbett application ruling regarding his criminal record, the adequacy of jury instructions on propensity reasoning and post-offence conduct, the sufficiency of corrective measures following inflammatory Crown closing arguments, and the application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge and upholding both the conviction and sentence.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference, internet luring, and two counts of failing to comply with a release order.

He was sentenced to six years and ten months imprisonment.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The motion judge refused bail, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, it barely met that threshold.

The enforceability considerations arising from the grave nature of the offences—ongoing sexual abuse of a 13-year-old child—outweighed the weak grounds of appeal.

The motion judge concluded that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and counselling to commit murder after his ex-girlfriend was shot with a concealed crossbow.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's strong financial and emotional motive, his request to an ex-biker friend to find a hitman, and his counter-surveillance conduct after the attack.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no palpable and overriding error in assessing the victim's testimony, no improper reliance on police opinion evidence, and that the verdicts were reasonable given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal in an impaired driving case.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs following a serious motor vehicle collision.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the accused's urine sample analysis and observations by police officers, finding insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and demand for a drug recognition expert evaluation.

The appellate court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the arresting officer possessed reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the serious nature of the collision, observations of impairment, a 911 call about an impaired driver, and the negative breath sample result.

The court also found the trial judge breached natural justice by acquitting the accused without hearing submissions from the Crown on the remaining admissible evidence.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions on two counts of sexual assault and one count of criminal harassment.

The appellant, a massage therapist, was convicted of sexually assaulting a client during a massage therapy session on April 24, 2018.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally and inappropriately touched the complainant's breasts and vaginal area.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's testimony over the appellant's defence that any contact was accidental and part of legitimate treatment.

The appeal raised three grounds: failure to reconcile material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, uneven scrutiny applied to the appellant's evidence compared to the complainant's, and insufficient reasons regarding the essential elements of sexual assault.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed B.N.'s application for bail pending appeal from convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The court found that, although the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel clearly surpassed the "not frivolous" standard, public safety concerns—given B.N.'s extensive history of breaches and violence—outweighed reviewability and enforceability interests.

The decision applies the Oland/Farinacci framework for bail pending appeal and emphasizes the stand-alone importance of public safety in intimate partner violence cases.

The appellant, Fouad Barkouk, appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from his conduct as a driving instructor.

The appeal was allowed due to a material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, specifically regarding whether the appellant admitted to touching the complainant’s leg.

The court found that this error was significant in the trial judge’s reasoning and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The appellant, Harvin Fraser, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding whether the complainant’s sexual interaction with the appellant included oral sex as well as sexual intercourse.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge’s credibility and reliability findings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Lorne Rappaport’s appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation.

The appellant, a hockey coach, was found to have engaged in a sexual relationship with the complainant, who was 15 at the time.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of evidence and improper application of legal principles regarding credibility.

The Court found no material misapprehension and held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and application of the law were reasonable and thorough.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from acquittals entered after a trial judge excluded evidence of narcotics seized from Prince Asante's vehicle, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the standard for reasonable and probable grounds, improperly discounting circumstantial and pattern evidence, and requiring proof of the accused's identity beyond what the law demands for a lawful arrest.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Garett Roy, appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s credibility assessment or in the handling of alleged inconsistencies in the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge’s reference to trauma was properly contextualized and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The court also found no material misapprehension regarding evidence about rent payments.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.N., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appeal focused on whether a 60-day period of delay, attributed by the trial judge to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance, was properly deducted from the total delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s reliance on local knowledge and internal court statistics to find the delay was justified, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Hang Shi, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an incident in which his wife sustained significant injuries after a parking lot altercation.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds of appeal, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the bystander’s eyewitness testimony, which was corroborated by Mr. Shi’s own text messages.

The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof or in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, C.O., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual interference involving his then partner’s 14-year-old daughter.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in her application of the principles from R. v. J.J.R.D. and whether she drew speculative inferences or misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of the law, including her treatment of peripheral evidence and credibility findings.

The appellant’s application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as not meeting the legal threshold.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a criminal appeal as of right, the central issue was whether a handgun found in the appellant’s car met the Criminal Code definition of “firearm” under s. 2.

The trial judge had acquitted on several firearms counts after concluding operability required special expertise, considerable time, and parts not readily available.

The appellate court set aside acquittals, entered convictions on two firearms offences, and ordered a new trial on remaining firearms counts.

The Court held the handgun was a firearm and substantially agreed with the appellate reasons, including that the trial judge failed to assess all evidence on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions and new trial order were upheld.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted Morthaza Amirdad’s application for bail pending appeal after his conviction for 50 firearms offences.

The court found that the applicant’s argument regarding the trial judge’s failure to properly apply the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Debot to confidential informant information was a credible ground of appeal.

The court also considered public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice, ultimately concluding that the applicant’s strict compliance with bail conditions, strong proposed bail plan, and status as a first-time offender justified release pending appeal, despite the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant, P.M., appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving his niece and daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge’s findings that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages with the complainant provided to police with her mother’s consent, that the trial judge properly excluded a sexually explicit text from an unknown sender under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code, and that the jury was properly instructed regarding the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate.

The decision clarifies the law on privacy expectations in electronic communications in the context of child complainants and the admissibility of evidence of sexual knowledge.