Robin Allan Flumerfelt

The appellant, Sasikaran Thanapalasingam, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Tharshika Jeganathan.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or conclusions.

The court held that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the finding that the murder was planned and deliberate, and that the appellant’s intoxication did not impair his capacity to form the requisite intent.

The trial judge’s consideration of the evidence, including the impact of alcohol and alleged mental disturbance, was thorough and appropriate.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of proposed Crown expert opinion evidence from Dr. Mark Crowther in a first-degree murder trial against Dr. Brian Nadler.

Dr. Nadler is accused of causing the deaths of four patients through the administration of narcotics and sedatives.

The Crown sought to introduce Dr. Crowther's "holistic" analysis, which contradicted the findings of forensic pathologists who concluded the deaths were due to natural causes.

The court, applying the Mohan criteria, found that Dr. Crowther, a hematologist, lacked the specific expertise in forensic pathology, toxicology, palliative care, or acute COVID-19 treatment relevant to the complex medical issues at hand.

Despite his impressive general credentials, the court determined his expertise was not properly connected to the material issues, posing a risk that his general impressiveness would give his opinion undue weight.

Consequently, Dr. Crowther's expert opinion evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant, Doru Vasile Robas, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He argued that the trial Crown's closing address improperly suggested the Remington shotgun used in the killing was loaded with Remington shells, thereby undermining his credibility regarding the accidental discharge and his belief that the gun was empty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's argument was supported by ample evidence, including expert testimony that the shell remnants were "most likely" from a Remington shell, the appellant's own admission of using the Remington, and circumstantial evidence regarding other ammunition found.

The appellant, Odain Gardner, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He was tried jointly with Erick Reid, who was convicted of manslaughter.

Gardner argued the trial judge erred by failing to properly relate material evidence to the issues for the jury and by giving an erroneous after-the-fact conduct instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's instructions were not perfect, they were adequate in conveying the central issues of identity and credibility to the jury.

The court also found no reversible error in the after-the-fact conduct instruction, noting it was not circular or prejudicial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and life sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The victim was shot three times at close range at a busy Toronto intersection after exiting a TTC bus, resulting in permanent paralysis.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the basis of eyewitness identification concerns, arguing the trial judge failed to exercise appropriate caution regarding the reliability of the victim's identification.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh surveillance video evidence and argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit given his age at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and that the life sentence was justified given the serious nature of the unprovoked attempted murder committed with a firearm in a public place.

Both defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over three years, they published a community newspaper called Your Ward News that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorified Nazism, denied the Holocaust, and counselled violence against women.

The court imposed consecutive sentences: James Sears received one year incarceration (six months on each count, the procedural maximum for summary conviction); Leroy St. Germaine received a 12-month conditional sentence (six months on each count served consecutively, with house arrest conditions).

The court declined to impose probation on either defendant, finding such restrictions would unduly curtail Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-year period, the defendants published and edited a community newspaper that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorifying Nazism, denying the Holocaust, and demonizing both groups.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence, the application of consecutive versus concurrent sentencing, aggravating and mitigating factors, community impact, and the scope of probation conditions.

The court imposed a one-year jail sentence (six months on each count served consecutively) and declined to impose probation restrictions on publishing activities, finding such restrictions would violate Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his trial after conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding ineffective assistance and proposed witnesses.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arabia and R. v. Kowall, considering both the Palmer fresh evidence criteria and whether the application was an attempt to reverse tactical decisions made at trial.

The court found that the decision to call no defence evidence was a deliberate tactical choice made by trial counsel based on professional judgment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for re-opening and that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The defendant brought an application four months after conviction and four days before sentencing to re-open the trial and/or declare a mistrial.

The application raised multiple grounds including ineffective counsel, abuse of process, apprehension of bias, constitutional challenges regarding freedom of expression and jury trial rights, and inadequate reasons for judgment.

The court applied the Palmer test for admissibility of fresh evidence after conviction and found most issues lacked merit.

However, regarding the failure to call a defence, the court determined it could not assess the application without hearing from the defendant and counsel, and without a proffer of the evidence sought to be adduced.

The court allowed the application to proceed by way of affidavit evidence to ensure no miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, Gary Eunick, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under section 745.61 of the Criminal Code, having been convicted of first-degree murder and attempt murder in 2004.

The Crown opposed the application.

Applying the pre-2011 Criminal Code amendments test, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the parole ineligibility.

While the applicant's conduct in prison had improved, his persistent denial of guilt and lack of remorse were significant negative factors.

Considering the brutal nature of the offences and the profound, ongoing impact on the victims' family, the court found no reasonable prospect of a unanimous jury reducing the parole ineligibility period.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings in his retrial on charges including possession of handguns and cocaine, and public mischief, following a successful appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct.

The misconduct involved improper cross-examination and a "deliberate ploy" by Crown counsel during the first trial.

The court applied the two categories for abuse of process (trial fairness and residual integrity of the justice system) from R. v. Babos.

It found that the trial fairness issues were remedied by the new trial and that the Crown's conduct, while improper, did not meet the high threshold for a stay under the residual category, as it did not shock the community's conscience to the extent required to outweigh the public interest in a trial on the merits.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The conviction arose from an incident in which the appellant's motor vehicle struck and severely injured a pedestrian in a parking lot outside a pub, following an altercation with another patron.

The appellant argued the collision was inadvertent, while the Crown alleged it was intentional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility determinations were reasonable and entitled to deference, and the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The applicant, Anthony Edward Ringel, brought two pretrial applications: one challenging the constitutionality of section 579(2) of the Criminal Code, which deals with stays of proceedings, and another seeking to exclude inculpatory statements made to undercover officers in 2013 on the basis of "tainting" by previously excluded 2004 confessions.

The court dismissed both applications.

It found section 579(2) of the Criminal Code to be constitutional, reaffirming that a stay of proceedings does not equate to an acquittal and does not inherently violate Charter rights under sections 7, 11(b), or 11(h).

Regarding the tainting application, the court found no sufficient temporal, contextual, or strong causal connection between the 2004 excluded confessions and the 2013 admissions to undercover officers, thus ruling the 2013 statements admissible.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to limit defence cross‑examination of a non‑accused witness regarding prior discreditable conduct and the underlying facts of home invasion charges for which the witness had been acquitted.

The defence opposed the limitation and sought an order preventing the witness from referring to the acquittal.

The court reviewed the broad right of an accused to cross‑examine ordinary witnesses as part of the right to make full answer and defence.

Distinguishing authorities dealing with cross‑examination of an accused, the court held that limitations applicable to accused persons do not apply to ordinary witnesses.

Balancing probative value against potential prejudice, the court permitted cross‑examination on the underlying facts of the acquitted charges and declined to prohibit the witness from mentioning the acquittal if it arose naturally.

During a criminal proceeding, the defence sought to qualify a forensic odontologist as an expert on the diagnosis, causation, and assessment of oral maxillofacial trauma.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence and concluded the proposed expert possessed sufficient expertise to testify about diagnosis of mandible injuries and the mechanism and pattern of jaw fractures.

However, the court found the expert lacked specialized education, research, and practical experience regarding causation, direction of force, or magnitude of force relating to jaw fractures.

Applying the gatekeeping function for expert evidence, the court also held that permitting opinions on causation would risk intruding on the ultimate issue for the jury and could improperly influence fact‑finding.

The expert was therefore limited to opinion evidence concerning diagnosis and injury patterns.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal following convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault against a minor and a custodial sentence of five months.

The court considered the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, including whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Crown conceded the second and third criteria but argued the appeal lacked merit.

After reviewing the four proposed grounds of appeal concerning character evidence, alleged misapprehension of GPS evidence, DNA contamination issues, and reliance on a transcript of a police statement, the court concluded none demonstrated arguable merit.

The applicant failed to establish that the appeal was not frivolous and the bail application was dismissed.