Harry G. Black

Police officers Paul Fyke and Jeffrey Smith were jointly charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation with Mario Maurice Baptiste Jr. during an attempted arrest for theft.

The court found that Constable Smith's initial arrest for theft lacked reasonable and probable grounds, making his use of force unlawful.

However, Constable Fyke's subsequent involvement was justified as he had reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Baptiste for assaulting a peace officer or resisting arrest.

The court acquitted Constable Fyke, finding the Crown failed to prove his force was excessive.

Constable Smith was acquitted of assault causing bodily harm but found guilty of the lesser included offence of assault, as the Crown failed to prove his force caused the specific bodily harm alleged.

The applicant, a police sergeant, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for assault and assault with a weapon, alleging abuse of process and violations of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 10(b), 15).

He argued that the police improperly re-investigated him after initially taking criminal charges "off the table" and compelling a statement under the Police Services Act, and that his solicitor-client consultation was improperly videotaped.

The court dismissed the application, finding no bad faith or ulterior motive in the re-investigation, that the compelled statement was inadmissible at trial, and that the inadvertent video recording without audio did not breach his Charter rights or privilege, thus not warranting a stay.

This criminal trial concerned an assault charge against a police officer, Constable Scott Douglas, for an incident involving the arrest of Mr. Trevaughn Titus.

The defence relied on section 25 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the officer acted on reasonable grounds and used necessary force during the arrest for a Trespass to Property Act violation.

The court found that the officer had a credible basis for reasonable grounds to arrest and that the single distractionary punch delivered was a reasonable and necessary use of force in the circumstances, consistent with police training.

The officer was found not guilty.

The defendants were charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit expert toxicologist evidence regarding the effects of "date rape" drugs, consistent with the complainant's symptoms of incapacitation, despite no direct evidence of drug administration.

The defence objected, arguing irrelevance due to the absence of a drug charge and late disclosure of new testimonial details.

The court ruled the expert evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the issue of consent and the complainant's incapacitation, even without knowing the exact drug or its administration method.

The court noted that late disclosure, if remedied by adjournment, affects weight rather than admissibility.

The Toronto Police Service and a police officer sought access to youth records of a young person (L.D.) who was a witness and complainant in a police disciplinary hearing.

The officer was alleged to have assaulted L.D. while in police custody.

The court considered whether access to L.D.'s youth records was permitted under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that the applicants failed to establish a valid or valid and substantial interest in the records, and that permitting access would undermine the proper administration of justice under both the YCJA and the Police Services Act.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial application seeking admission of a photograph allegedly depicting a police officer assaulting a protester during the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto.

The image had been anonymously uploaded to a website and lacked metadata, raising concerns about provenance and possible manipulation.

Competing expert evidence addressed whether the photograph had been altered, but neither expert could confirm its authenticity or trace its origin.

Applying the established criteria for authenticating photographic evidence, the court held the Crown failed to establish fairness and absence of manipulation.

As a result, the photograph was not authenticated and was ruled inadmissible at trial.

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused, an off-duty Peel Regional Police officer, was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly possessed crack cocaine and powder cocaine found in his briefcase.

The accused testified that he had lawfully seized the drugs during a residential raid conducted in his capacity as a police officer, inadvertently failed to submit them at shift end, and subsequently retained them with the intent to submit them for lawful destruction.

The central legal issue was whether the accused's possession fell within the regulatory protection afforded to police officers under the Narcotic Control Regulations.

The accused brought a motion to amend his Charter Notice to add relief pursuant to sections 9 and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms after the Crown had closed its case at trial.

The motion was brought on the basis of simple oversight by defence counsel.

The court denied the application, finding that while the accused has a right to make full answer and defence, the late timing of the application, the prejudice to the Crown, the impact on judicial resources, and the availability of alternative remedies through section 24(2) analysis of the properly served section 8 claim warranted denial of the motion.

The accused, a Toronto police officer, was charged with criminal harassment and assault on the basis of a private complaint laid in December 2010.

The accused brought an application to stay the charges pursuant to s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the grounds of unreasonable delay.

The Crown's office had delayed assigning an outside Crown to the case due to a conflict of interest, and the complainant had refused to provide disclosure until after her own trial was completed.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the scheduled trial date was approximately 35 months, with the court attributing 23 months of that delay to the state.

The court found that the delay was unreasonable and stayed the charges.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.