Jean Chin Hang Iu

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding they knowingly registered an invalid bill of sale and breached registration conditions, resulting in an eight-month suspension for the individual appellant and a two-year lien registration prohibition for the corporate appellant.

The Divisional Court upheld the liability findings but allowed the appeal in part on penalty, finding the sanctions were at the high end for an isolated incident and lacking in reasoning linking them to the misconduct.

The sanctions were varied to time completed.

The appellant sought compensation from the Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund after a dealer failed to pay out his original vehicle loan upon refinancing, leaving him with two loans for the same vehicle.

The Board of Trustees denied the claim on the basis that the refinancing transaction did not constitute a 'trade' under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transaction was merely a transfer of a loan to obtain a better interest rate, not a trade involving the buying, selling, leasing, or exchanging of an interest in a motor vehicle.

The accused was charged with four counts of acting as a motor vehicle dealer without registration contrary to the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act and two counts of making false, misleading or deceptive representations contrary to the Consumer Protection Act.

The accused purchased and resold four vehicles over a period of approximately five months, typically listing them for sale within days of acquisition at substantial markups.

The accused argued the section 5 personal use exemption applied.

The court found the exemption inapplicable as the pattern of trading demonstrated a profit motive rather than legitimate personal use, considering the speed of resale, profit margins, and volume of trades.

The accused was found guilty on five counts and acquitted on one count at the invitation of the prosecution.

The applicant brought a motion to extend the time to file an application for judicial review of a decision by the Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund.

The Fund had deferred consideration of her claim pending the outcome of a related civil trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the 13-month delay and that there were no apparent grounds for relief, as the Fund was entitled to require the applicant to obtain a judgment before paying compensation.

The appeal concerns the openness of a police services board hearing regarding an extension of time for service of a disciplinary notice.

Following an investigation by the Ontario Independent Police Review Director into allegations of police misconduct in the investigation of the death of an Indigenous man, a retired judge appointed as a substitute decision-maker ordered that the extension hearing be held in camera.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and First Nation complainants sought judicial review, arguing that the hearing should be open pursuant to section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Divisional Court upheld the in camera order, finding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test did not apply to administrative proceedings and that the statutory test under the Police Services Act was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative proceedings, the Charter right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press recognized in Langenfeld applies to police services board meetings, and the presumption of openness under the Police Services Act must be considered in light of this Charter protection.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) which found their complaints against a police officer unsubstantiated.

The Director had initially found evidence of misconduct and referred the matter for adjudication, but later reopened the investigation and reversed his decision after undisclosed communications with the police service.

The Divisional Court found that these undisclosed communications compromised the independence of the Director and breached procedural fairness.

The court quashed the Director's decision and remitted the matter for a fresh investigation by a different investigator.

The applicant media organization sought judicial review of a decision to hold an in camera hearing for an extension of time application under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act regarding police misconduct allegations.

The applicant argued the decision-maker erred by failing to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test for open court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative or procedural functions under the Police Services Act, which contains its own statutory framework for determining when hearings may be closed to the public.

The appellant appealed the penalty of forfeiture of five days' pay imposed on the respondent police officer for discreditable conduct.

The respondent had previously been convicted of assault with a weapon for his actions during the appellant's arrest at the G20 Summit.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer erred in assessing aggravating and mitigating factors, and the intervener argued the Hearing Officer improperly allowed a collateral attack on the criminal conviction.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer's penalty decision was reasonable and did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack.

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence at the hearing of his appeal regarding the penalty imposed on a police officer for misconduct during the G20 protests.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and found that the proposed evidence either could have been adduced at the original hearing with due diligence, was already part of the record, or was irrelevant.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed a Hearing Officer's decision convicting her of misconduct for allegedly using unnecessary force by kicking a handcuffed suspect.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission reviewed the evidence and found that the Hearing Officer failed to make a definitive finding on whether the appellant actually kicked the suspect as alleged in the Statement of Particulars.

Concluding that the evidence did not meet the required standard of clear and convincing proof, the Commission revoked the Hearing Officer's decision and dismissed the charge.

The Appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to deliver a Notice of Appeal regarding a police discipline matter.

The Respondent officer argued the appeal was out of time under the Commission's Rules.

The Commission found that the Appellant had formed an intention to appeal within the relevant time period and that the justice of the case required an extension.

The motion was granted, allowing the Notice of Appeal to be filed nunc pro tunc.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the penalty decision of a Hearing Officer, which imposed a forfeiture of five days' pay on the respondent officer for discreditable conduct related to an assault during the G20 Summit.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the matters raised were of significant importance to the policing profession and the community at large, satisfying the third branch of the test for leave to appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an OIPRD decision affirming the Toronto Chief of Police's conclusion that his assault complaint against an officer was unsubstantiated.

The applicant argued the OIPRD breached procedural fairness by refusing to disclose the subject officer's statement before the applicant provided his own.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no statutory obligation to disclose the officer's statement to the complainant at the investigative stage, and held that the OIPRD's decision was reasonable.

The appellant, an unrepresented public complainant, appealed the dismissal of disciplinary charges against a police officer.

The appellant argued that the Hearing Officer breached natural justice and procedural fairness by failing to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission agreed, finding that the Hearing Officer failed to provide the minimum level of assistance required for an unrepresented party, such as explaining the process, confirming his understanding, and inviting him to call or cross-examine witnesses.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing was ordered.

The appellant in a police discipline appeal brought a motion to introduce an affidavit alleging prosecutorial incompetence and breaches of natural justice during the hearing.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the affidavit did not qualify as fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

Applying the Keeprite test, the Commission held that affidavit evidence to supplement the record is only admissible in rare circumstances where the alleged breach cannot be proven by reference to the record.

Because the appellant's allegations could be ascertained from the hearing transcripts, the affidavit was inadmissible.

The moving party brought a motion to strike portions of a Notice of Appeal and factums filed by a public complainant and the intervener.

The impugned portions alleged breaches of natural justice and prosecutorial incompetence during a police disciplinary hearing.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the motion, finding that it lacked the statutory authority under the Police Services Act or the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to strike pleadings that are clearly connected to the central issue of whether misconduct was proved on clear and convincing evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director to screen out his complaint regarding alleged police misconduct.

The respondent screened out the complaint under s. 60(2) of the Police Services Act because it was filed more than six months after the events occurred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's reasons were adequate and its decision not to exercise its discretion to extend the time limit was reasonable given the 40-month delay and the nature of the allegations.

The applicant filed nine human rights applications alleging discrimination and reprisals by the respondents for incidents occurring between 1992 and 1998, and between 2012 and 2013.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine whether the applications should be dismissed for delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations regarding the 1992-1998 incidents, finding the 14-year delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Tribunal also dismissed the allegations regarding the 2012-2013 incidents, finding the applicant failed to point to any evidence linking the alleged incidents to a prohibited ground of discrimination, meaning there was no reasonable prospect of success.

The respondents requested that the human rights applications be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code on the basis that the applicants' prior public complaints under the Police Services Act appropriately dealt with the substance of the applications.

The Tribunal considered the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in Figliola and Penner.

The Tribunal held that section 45.1 should not be interpreted to bar a Code application where doing so would result in an affront to basic principles of fairness.

Given the lack of personal remedies in the police disciplinary process and the broader policy implications, the Tribunal found it would be unfair to preclude the applicants from pursuing their human rights claims.

The respondents' requests to dismiss the applications were denied, and the applications were allowed to proceed.

The applicant, a Quality Control Inspector, suffered injuries from a slip and fall and required a six-week medical leave.

During her absence, the respondent employer failed to issue a Record of Employment (ROE) to allow her to access sickness benefits, insisting she complete a standard form despite her disability.

Upon her return, the employer presented her with a new employment contract that purported to hire her as a new employee, which she refused to sign.

She was laid off shortly thereafter.

The Tribunal found that the failure to accommodate her request for an ROE and the attempt to rewrite her employment contract constituted discrimination on the basis of disability.

While the Tribunal accepted that the employer was undergoing a legitimate workforce reduction, it found that the applicant's disability played a role in her selection for layoff.

The Tribunal awarded $15,000 in monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and ordered the employer to conduct human rights training.