Cullity

The applicant, a licensed standardbred horse trainer and owner, sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission (ORC) decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) refusal to allow him to enter horses to race unless he signed an Access Agreement.

The Divisional Court held that while WEG could impose track rules and require an Access Agreement, the ORC acted unreasonably in permitting WEG to insist on terms that purported to give WEG absolute unfettered power to exclude licensed participants without fault or procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was granted in part, prohibiting WEG from excluding the applicant's horses solely for refusing to sign the current Access Agreement.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for non-payment of rent and dismissing his applications.

At the hearing, the Board granted the landlord's motion to remove the tenant's representative and subsequently denied the tenant's request for an adjournment to obtain new representation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment under the circumstances was arbitrary and constituted a denial of natural justice.

The matter was remitted to a different member of the Board.

The parties were unable to agree on the quantum of fixed costs awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale following a previous decision.

The respondent claimed $25,580 based on a draft bill of costs totalling $32,822.

The applicant argued the claimed hours were excessive and suggested $8,000.

The court fixed costs payable by the applicant to the respondent at $17,500 for fees and $580 for disbursements, plus applicable GST.

Mattamy applied for approval of a plan of subdivision that included laneways with widths of 10.5 metres.

The City of Toronto opposed assuming the laneways because they were substandard in width, proposing instead that they be privately owned.

Mattamy appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), which stated a case to the Divisional Court to determine if it had jurisdiction to compel the City to assume the public lanes and municipal services against its wishes.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB is a statutory tribunal with no inherent jurisdiction and that neither the Planning Act, the Municipal Act, 2001, nor the Ontario Municipal Board Act conferred jurisdiction on the OMB to compel a municipality to assume roads or services.

The appellants sought to certify a class action against the federal government and others for alleged systemic physical, emotional, spiritual, and cultural abuse at a residential school operated between 1922 and 1969.

The motion judge dismissed the certification application, finding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the highly individualized nature of the claims and the necessity of separate inquiries for each student.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's conclusion that the resolution of common issues would not significantly advance the litigation and that individual actions were the preferable alternative.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Racing Commission's decision to suspend him for 74 days and fine him $1,000 for an equine drug violation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the penalty was unreasonable, as the respondent treated his prior offences differently than in a previous hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the penalty was within the applicable guidelines and not patently unreasonable.

The appellants, minority shareholders in Colio Wines of Canada Ltd., appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy and the appointment of an inspector under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The appellants alleged that a 1992 amalgamation unfairly valued their shares at one cent each.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to provide cogent evidence that oppressive conduct appeared to have occurred, as required by s. 161(2) of the Act.

The court confirmed that mere suspicion or a report suggesting oppression 'may have been' present is insufficient to warrant the appointment of an inspector.

The appeal was dismissed.