G. Dennis Lane

The appellant Registrar appealed a Board decision granting a liquor licence to the respondent nightclub.

The appellant argued the Board failed to properly consider the past conduct of the respondent's principal and the public interest concerns of local residents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal tests, properly weighed the evidence, and provided adequate reasons for its conclusions.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action following a jury trial.

The jury found the appellant sustained no injuries in a motor vehicle accident, despite the trial judge ruling that the appellant met the statutory threshold.

The appellant argued that defence counsel's closing address, which improperly focused on the appellant's immigrant status and speculated on how he would use a damages award, was inflammatory and prejudiced the jury.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the comments were irrelevant, offensive, and likely swayed the jury based on improper considerations, and that the trial judge's correcting instruction was inadequate.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a Complaints Committee's finding of no misconduct by his treating physicians.

The applicant argued that the Committee breached procedural fairness by withholding the identity of an independent assessor, thereby preventing cross-examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Committee exercises a screening function and owes a limited duty of procedural fairness to complainants, which does not include the right to cross-examine an assessor.

The corporate respondents sought costs of $32,950.29 on a partial indemnity basis following their success on an application for judicial review.

The applicants, represented by community legal clinics, argued no costs should be awarded as the application raised an issue of public interest regarding the related employer provisions of the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs, finding the applicants were individuals of limited means who brought the application in good faith to enforce protective legislation, and the case raised an issue of importance for other vulnerable employees.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle the appeal.

The court held that Rule 49 does not apply to offers to settle appeals and awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed the costs at $12,000 for fees plus disbursements and GST, finding the appellant's claimed hours slightly excessive for a case dismissed at the pleadings stage.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a FSCO Director's Delegate, who had revoked an Arbitrator's award of statutory accident benefits and ordered a new hearing on the basis of inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court determined that the standard of review for the adequacy of reasons is correctness.

The Court found that the Arbitrator's reasons were sufficiently thorough to explain her rejection of the insurer's medical expert and her acceptance of the applicant's evidence.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the Director's Delegate's decision was set aside, and the Arbitrator's decision was restored.

The applicants, two high school students, sought judicial review of a principal's decision to suspend them and transfer them to another school following a violent altercation.

The applicants argued the principal lacked jurisdiction to transfer them, breached procedural fairness, and violated their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the principal had the statutory authority to deny access and transfer students for safety reasons.

The court also held that there was no breach of procedural fairness and that the applicants failed to establish any Charter violations.

The Ministry of Correctional Services and a journalist (Jane Doe) both brought applications for judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) regarding access to records relating to allegations of abuse by Ministry employees.

The Divisional Court held that the IPC correctly interpreted the employment-related exclusion in s. 65(6) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, finding it did not apply to records of civil litigation where the Crown is vicariously liable for employee torts.

The Court also upheld the IPC's findings on solicitor-client and litigation privilege under s. 19, and personal privacy under s. 21.

However, the Court found the IPC erred by failing to apply the public interest override in s. 23 to records exempted under s. 19, and referred the matter back to the IPC.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to quash a motion by the hospital's Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) requiring him to undergo independent conduct and clinical assessments before the MAC would make a recommendation on his reappointment application.

The applicant argued the MAC's process lacked procedural fairness and was tainted by bias due to a history of conflict and a failure to provide timely disclosure of complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that the hospital had a statutory duty to assess qualifications and that the applicant had adequate alternative remedies, including a full hearing before the hospital board and an appeal to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, to address any procedural unfairness.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying him temporary total disability benefits for a specific period.

The applicant argued the Tribunal failed to apply Board policies, breached its duty of fairness, made findings contrary to the record, and violated s. 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions were not patently unreasonable, the duty of fairness was met, and the Charter claim could not be raised for the first time on judicial review without an evidentiary record.

The appellant, a recipient of disability benefits, applied for a retroactive special diet allowance for the period from June 1998 to November 2003.

The Director denied the application, and the Social Benefits Tribunal dismissed the subsequent appeal.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by not applying the relevant regulation retroactively and breached natural justice by requiring corroborative evidence without notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal made no error of law in determining the facts did not justify a retroactive award, and held there was no breach of procedural fairness as the onus was on the appellant to prove his claim.

The applicant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently gave birth to a child.

An arbitrator awarded her nanny expenses as a rehabilitation benefit under s. 15(5)(l) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, finding as a fact that the expenses were rehabilitative.

The Director's Delegate set aside the award, holding that child care expenses could only be claimed as caregiver benefits under s. 13.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Director's Delegate's decision was patently unreasonable and incorrect in law.

The court restored the arbitrator's decision, confirming that child care expenses can be recovered as a rehabilitation benefit if they are factually found to be rehabilitative for the insured.

The applicant, a university student seeking judicial review of an academic decision, brought a motion to examine witnesses, strike an affidavit, and cross-examine opposing counsel.

The respondents brought a cross-motion arguing a prior settlement agreement restricted the applicant to examining only specific personal respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike the affidavit and cross-examine counsel, finding no basis for either.

The court also dismissed the respondents' cross-motion, interpreting the settlement agreement as only restricting the examination of the named personal respondents, not other witnesses.

The court granted the applicant's request to examine the Chair of the Senate Committee to explore issues of procedural fairness.

The respondent, a self-represented lawyer, successfully defended an appeal regarding a judgment for unpaid legal fees.

He sought costs of $9,787 based on his usual hourly rate.

The appellant argued for a significant reduction, asserting that self-represented lawyers should not be awarded costs as if they had retained counsel and emphasizing proportionality.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $5,500 plus disbursements and GST, balancing the respondent's forgone remunerative activity with the need for proportionality given the $8,200 judgment.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision that found two special education positions fell within the teachers' bargaining unit rather than being excluded as principal or vice-principal positions.

The school board argued the arbitrator misinterpreted the Education Act and the collective agreements, and that he lost jurisdiction by delaying his decision for over two years.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation was not patently unreasonable and that the statutory time limit for rendering a decision is directory rather than mandatory.

The defendants abandoned their motion for security for costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs sought costs of the abandoned motion.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not conceal assets and were entitled to costs.

The court reduced the quantum of costs claimed, noting that the self-represented plaintiff was not entitled to claim fees at a lawyer's rate despite his litigation experience.

Costs were fixed at $8,000 for fees, plus disbursements and GST.

The appellant brought a motion to stay the execution of his disbarment by the Law Society of Upper Canada pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that he was denied procedural fairness when the Law Society refused an adjournment and proceeded with the hearing in the absence of his newly retained counsel.

The court found that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding procedural fairness, that the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if disbarred before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $13,395 for fees and $559.58 for disbursements.

The appellant objected to the hourly rates claimed for senior counsel and a student.

The Divisional Court reduced the hourly rates to $275 for senior counsel and $60 for the student, allowed the disbursements, and fixed total costs at $9,500 inclusive of disbursements plus GST.

The applicant, a former officer of Nortel, sought judicial review to prohibit the Ontario Securities Commission from proceeding with a hearing against him.

He argued that the Commission's prior settlement with Nortel, which included admissions of misconduct by its managers, created a reasonable apprehension of bias against him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative proceedings before the Commission had an opportunity to consider the matter and hear evidence regarding the applicant's actual role.

The appellant law firm appealed an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that certain bank accounts in the respondent's name were held in trust for the appellant, and for a garnishment order.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata, as the trust claim was not part of the earlier proceedings regarding personal liability.

However, the appeal was dismissed because garnishment under Rule 60.08 was not the proper procedure to resolve a disputed trust relationship.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant commencing a separate action.

Leave to appeal costs was granted, and the costs order was varied to a partial indemnity basis.