Larissa Easson

The applicant sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision that dismissed an appeal from an Arbitrator.

The Arbitrator had dismissed the applicant's arbitration proceeding because of a parallel civil action raising accident benefit claims from the same accident.

The Divisional Court found no error regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and held that the Director's Delegate reasonably upheld the Arbitrator's decision on choice of forum, noting the diseconomies of parallel proceedings.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Superintendent of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario refusing to stay discipline proceedings against him for delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that judicial review of interim administrative decisions is generally refused absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias or denial of procedural fairness that would justify intervening before the hearing on the merits.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Ministry of Health decision ordering it to pay the long-term care fees of its insured, who was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The insured had applied for a reduction in nursing home co-payments under the Nursing Homes Act, but the Director refused, finding the insurer liable.

The insurer argued it was exempt under s. 75(13) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because the reduction was a benefit 'reasonably available' to the insured.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Director's decision was reasonable and that social assistance benefits based on financial need do not fall within the ambit of s. 75(13).

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a FSCO Director's Delegate, who had revoked an Arbitrator's award of statutory accident benefits and ordered a new hearing on the basis of inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court determined that the standard of review for the adequacy of reasons is correctness.

The Court found that the Arbitrator's reasons were sufficiently thorough to explain her rejection of the insurer's medical expert and her acceptance of the applicant's evidence.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the Director's Delegate's decision was set aside, and the Arbitrator's decision was restored.