J. David McCombs

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

The appellant was convicted at trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder, obstructing police, and public mischief.

She appealed only the accessory conviction.

The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that Joshua Barreira, the alleged principal, was guilty of murder.

However, rather than acquitting the appellant, the trial judge convicted her on the basis that she had assisted Chad Davidson (the actual shooter) by serving as a witness to his wedding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction was based on a theory of liability that fell outside the scope of the indictment, which was limited to the appellant's conduct in relation to Joshua Barreira.

The court entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered at the close of its case on a charge of manslaughter.

The trial judge had held that the Crown was bound by its factual theory that the accused was the getaway driver and that witness evidence precluded such a finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for a directed verdict and erred in restricting the Crown to a single factual theory.

The court found ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code based on a common unlawful purpose to commit robbery, regardless of the accused's specific role.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in rejecting his evidence as lacking credibility and defying logic.

The appellant specifically challenged three of the trial judge's six reasons for rejection.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant's conditional sentence resumed operation effective November 8, 2017.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempted murder following a judge-alone trial.

The charges arose from the appellant using his motor vehicle as a weapon against two complainants.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant intended to kill the complainants.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence that, if he had intended to kill the complainants, he would have driven at them while they lay helpless on the ground after being struck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainants had been struck and rendered helpless, having identified credibility and reliability issues with their evidence.

Instead, the trial judge relied on evidence from three independent neighbours and forensic evidence, including photographs showing tire tracks and extensive damage.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant pursued the complainants at high speed with intent to kill was reasonable and grounded in the evidence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and related charges entered by the trial judge.

The complainant, the respondent's biological daughter, testified to two sexual assaults occurring approximately 10-11 years prior when she was 10-11 years old.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts, treating the timeframe alleged in the indictment as an essential element of the offence that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by requiring proof of the specific timeframe, as this was not an essential element of the offence.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed his conviction for fraud in the amount of approximately $1.9 million and his sentence of three and one-half years imprisonment.

The central issue on the conviction appeal was whether the appellant knew that his purported client did not exist.

The trial judge found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was a knowing participant in the fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversal of the burden of proof and that the inferences drawn by the trial judge were reasonably available on the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding that the additional six months imposed on the appellant compared to his co-accused was justified by his status as a lawyer and the aggravating role that status played in the commission of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he possessed and fired a firearm into the complainant's vehicle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring him to identify an alternative suspect.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's question regarding alternative suspects was merely rhetorical and that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof.

The court found ample evidence supported the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought a bail review based on a claimed material change in circumstances, proposing new sureties and electronic monitoring.

The applicant faces serious firearms trafficking and drug charges, with trials scheduled imminently.

The court found the proposed supervision plan inadequate, noting the reluctance of a former surety and the new surety's reservations about bail conditions.

The court concluded that detention was necessary on both secondary (protection of the public due to substantial likelihood of committing further offences) and tertiary (maintain confidence in the administration of justice) grounds, considering the gravity of the offences, the apparent strength of the Crown's case, and the potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned a large-scale drug trafficking operation, 'Project Odyssey,' which led to the seizure of significant quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, and GHB.

Six defendants were arraigned, with one passing away during the trial.

The court addressed preliminary motions regarding confidential informant privilege and a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, both of which were dismissed.

The core issues at trial involved proving possession, knowledge, and intent for trafficking and importing charges, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied the principles of reasonable doubt and the Supreme Court's guidance on circumstantial evidence from *R. v. Villaroman*.

Ultimately, four defendants were convicted of trafficking, while one was fully acquitted.

Importing charges against two defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The applicant, Marco Viscomi, brought a Charter application to exclude Canadian-gathered evidence from a second extradition application, alleging unlawful residential searches, improper execution of searches, unauthorized forensic searches, unlawful detention of seized items, and a breach of the affiant's duty of candour in obtaining a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the search warrants were lawfully issued, the forensic searches were authorized, the detention of items was not contrary to the Charter, and there was no material breach of the duty of candour.

While acknowledging potential minor Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, the court concluded that these were not serious and had no meaningful impact on the lawfulness of the evidence seizure, thus not warranting exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Eran Shomonov was sentenced after being convicted of unauthorized possession of semi-automatic handguns, careless use of a firearm, and simple possession of marijuana.

The court considered mitigating factors, including his lack of prior record, strong community support, and genuine remorse, alongside the aggravating factor of serious firearms offences.

The court found that the firearms were possessed for protection, which, while not a mitigating factor per se, influenced the placement of his conduct on the spectrum of criminal behaviour.

A reformatory sentence of 21 months, reduced by two months for pre-trial custody and bail restrictions, was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, Randeep Sandhu, brought a mid-trial motion seeking disclosure of a confidential informant's identity and a stay of proceedings, arguing the informant was either a police agent or a material witness.

The court conducted an in-camera hearing and an open-court hearing, ultimately finding that the informant was not a police agent and that the "innocence at stake" exception to informer privilege was not engaged, as Sandhu failed to demonstrate the informant was likely to provide evidence creating reasonable doubt about his innocence.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused stood trial before a judge alone on allegations of sexual interference and related offences involving a young child who was his grandchild.

The Crown relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant and her mother, along with a videotaped statement admitted under the Criminal Code.

The defence called the accused and the complainant’s grandmother, both denying the allegations and challenging the reliability of the complainant’s account.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant’s evidence when compared with other evidence at trial.

Applying the principles in R. v. W. (D.), the court concluded the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals.

Following dismissal of the applicants’ motion concerning the legal validity of a long‑standing agreement registered on title to residential property, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondents, who were wholly successful on the motion, sought over $32,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court determined that partial indemnity costs should be calculated at 60% of counsel’s hourly rate and accepted the reasonableness of time spent by a senior real estate lawyer assisting with the matter.

However, a $2,000 disbursement for legal research was disallowed for lack of supporting documentation under Rule 57.01(5) and Form 57A of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ultimately fixed costs at $22,809.82 payable forthwith.

The accused brought a motion requesting a judicial inquiry into jury deliberations following a conviction for second-degree murder.

The motion relied on an affidavit from a juror alleging coercion and improper comments during deliberations.

The court held that after a verdict is received and the jury discharged, the trial judge is generally functus officio and lacks authority to revisit the verdict, subject to limited exceptions such as errors in recording the verdict.

Applying the jury secrecy rule under s. 649 of the Criminal Code and the principles articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the allegations related to intrinsic aspects of jury deliberations rather than extrinsic information capable of impeaching the verdict.

As the affidavit did not demonstrate the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the court declined to conduct an inquiry and held that any challenge to the verdict must proceed on appeal.