David Bruce Harris

Appeal from a first degree murder conviction arising from the death of a victim who was strangled and subsequently subjected to post-mortem sexual interference.

The appellant challenged the admission of confessions made during a "Mr. Big" undercover operation, the validity of a one-party consent wiretap authorization, and the first degree murder conviction based on section 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that the Mr. Big statements were admissible under the Hart test, the wiretap authorization was properly issued, and the evidence supported a finding that the murder and sexual assault formed a single continuous transaction despite the post-mortem nature of some sexual acts.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a second trial following the Crown's successful appeal of his acquittal at the first trial.

The key difference between the trials was the admission of expert evidence from Mark Totten regarding the meaning of teardrop tattoos in gang culture.

At the first trial, the trial judge excluded Totten's evidence as unreliable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that Totten was qualified to give expert evidence.

At the second trial, Totten testified that a teardrop tattoo could signify one of three things: the loss of a loved one, time in prison, or the killing of a rival gang member.

He provided statistics claiming that of 290 gang members in his studies, 97 had been convicted of homicide, 71 had teardrop tattoos, and all 71 obtained the tattoo to signify killing a rival gang member.

The appellant was convicted.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence impeaching Totten's credibility and the reliability of his statistical evidence, including evidence from Totten's cross-examination in an unrelated murder trial and Totten's own research studies.

The fresh evidence demonstrated serious deficiencies in Totten's research methodology, misrepresentations regarding sample size, and unsupported statistical claims.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found it sufficiently cogent to have disqualified Totten from testifying, and concluded that the absence of his evidence would reasonably have affected the verdict.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

Appeal from conviction for robbery, use of an imitation firearm while attempting to commit robbery, obstructing police, and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged his convictions for robbery and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that the evidence showed only presence and passive acquiescence in a carjacking.

The trial judge found the appellant was the third perpetrator who entered the victim's vehicle during an armed carjacking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the appellant's conduct in getting into the stolen vehicle, fleeing with the other perpetrators, and the constellation of circumstantial evidence (including cell phone records, similar clothing, and after-the-fact conduct) supported a finding of party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his voyeurism conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding of "explicit sexual activity" and the treatment of a witness's statement as an informal admission.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that one photograph unequivocally depicted explicit sexual activity and that the trial judge correctly considered the witness's "acknowledged evidence" as an informal admission in the context of a directed verdict motion.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man adopted by non-Aboriginal parents, pleaded guilty to serious firearms and robbery offences and was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge declined to consider the appellant's Aboriginal heritage, finding no causal link between his background and the offences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred by requiring a causal connection and failing to consider the intergenerational systemic factors that bore on the appellant's moral blameworthiness.

The Court admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's reconnection with his Aboriginal heritage and reduced the global sentence to nine years.

In an addendum to a previous judgment, the Court of Appeal clarified the disposition of the appellant's conviction for possession of an explosive substance.

The court confirmed that because the argument regarding the rebuttal of the presumption of integrity was rejected, the conviction on that count stands.

The appeal from the conviction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder for sending tampered water bottles and letter bombs.

Seventeen months after the convictions, during dangerous offender proceedings, the trial judge amended his reasons to add an alternative theory of liability for the water bottle counts.

The Court of Appeal held that the late amendment rebutted the presumption of integrity and excised it from the reasons.

Based on the original reasons, the court found the attempted murder convictions for the water bottles unreasonable and entered acquittals.

The letter bomb convictions were upheld.

A new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee regarding Aboriginal offenders.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had thoroughly reviewed the appellant's history, the Gladue report, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The court concluded the sentencing judge properly applied the relevant principles and reasonably found no evidence that the appellant's risk to reoffend could be controlled in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellants were convicted of administering a stupefying thing to enable sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two complainants.

They appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on evidence of the complainants' out-of-character conduct, misapprehended toxicological evidence, and improperly used post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The appellant appealed a nine-month sentence for robbery-related offences on the basis of fresh evidence showing that a recent amendment to the immigration regime eliminated his right to appeal a removal order if he received a sentence of six months or more.

As a permanent resident, he faced near-certain deportation to Syria, where the evidence indicated extreme danger and likely compulsory military service.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance on collateral immigration consequences in sentencing, the court held that a sentence just under six months remained within the fit range for this youthful first offender and better served rehabilitation and individualization.

The appeal was allowed and the custodial sentence was reduced to six months less 15 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing his s. 8 Charter rights were violated.

During a traffic stop, an officer asked the appellant for consent to search his vehicle, prompting the appellant to voluntarily produce a bag of marihuana before the officer could explain the consent process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the officer's request did not constitute a search, and the appellant's production of the drugs was voluntary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The police arrested the appellant based on a tip from a confidential informant, which was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arresting officers had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest, applying the Debot criteria.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault of a young child.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the first incident occurred in his truck and that this error tainted the credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the trial judge erred regarding the location of the first incident, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process or taint the overall credibility assessment.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered after the trial judge quashed a CDSA search warrant and excluded drugs, firearms, and other seized evidence from an apartment searched during a nightclub drug-trafficking investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that refusal of leave to cross-examine the affiant did not bar a sub-facial challenge to the warrant, but concluded that the trial judge nevertheless exceeded the proper scope of Garofoli review by reweighing the amplified record, preferring inferences, and effectively conducting a de novo assessment.

The court reaffirmed that warrant review asks whether reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed remained on the basis of which the warrant could have issued.

The acquittals tied to the seizure at 306 Adelaide were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and failing to consider the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly treated the case as a credibility contest between diametrically opposed accounts.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was reasonable and that the defence of mistaken belief in consent did not arise on the facts.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after her girlfriend killed the appellant's boyfriend with an axe.

The Crown alleged the appellant planned the murder and manipulated her girlfriend into committing it.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by giving a Carter instruction (co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule) because the alleged conspiracy involved only two people.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed its prior decision in Bogiatzis, holding that the Carter instruction applies to two-person conspiracies.

The Court found no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the Carter framework, post-offence conduct, or party liability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He died while on bail pending appeal.

His widow brought a motion to continue the appeal, arguing that the ground of appeal relating to expert evidence on recovered memory was of broad public importance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no special circumstances to justify expending limited judicial resources on a moot appeal, as the issue of recovered memory is not evasive of appellate review and a successful appeal would only result in a new trial, which is impossible.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an “over 80” impaired driving charge.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on concerns about the misidentified serial number of an approved screening device and the officer’s failure to ask when the accused last consumed alcohol.

The appellate court held these considerations were legally irrelevant to the elements of the offence and could only have been relevant in the context of a Charter application, which had not been advanced at trial.

Applying the standard for Crown appeals from acquittals, the court found the legal error could have materially affected the verdict.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial Crown engaged in improper cross-examination by asking him to comment on the veracity of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the question violated the rule against asking an accused for their opinion on another witness's truthfulness.

The trial judge erred by relying on the appellant's equivocal response to this improper question to erase his reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.