David Bruce Harris

Two appellants appealed jury convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement arising from an assault on an intoxicated teenage complainant at a rural gravel pit.

The court held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that it could consider defence counsel's failure to cross-examine the complainant on a central factual issue later contradicted by one appellant's evidence when assessing credibility.

The court also rejected objections to evidence that two witnesses had pleaded guilty to perjury in relation to their preliminary inquiry testimony.

Although aspects of Crown cross-examination and submissions touched improperly on one appellant's pre-trial silence, the curative instruction was held sufficient and no miscarriage of justice was found.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement arising from a jury trial in which the central issue was whether the complainant consented to sexual activity.

After the defence evidence, the Crown sought a jury instruction on vitiated consent under s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code on the theory that the appellant was the complainant’s drug supplier and had abused a position of power.

The Court of Appeal held that this theory had not been properly advanced from the outset and lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation, particularly given the complainant’s denial of any consent-based drug dependency scenario.

The jury charge on vitiated consent was inadequate and potentially confusing, and the court could not conclude the verdict was safe.

The appeal was allowed, the verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed sentence for a very serious violent offence committed by a young first offender.

The Court of Appeal held that the six-month custodial sentence followed by probation was clearly inadequate and that appellate intervention was warranted.

Considering the respondent's completed incarceration, fragile psychological state, remorse, first-offender status, and the absence of any demonstrated ongoing danger to the community, the court concluded that a penitentiary term was not fit.

The sentence was varied to an 18-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, with probation to follow.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Following the murder, they fled the jurisdiction, committed two bank robberies, violated parole, fled from police, and attempted to dispose of the murder weapon.

At trial, they argued this post-offence conduct was explained by the robberies and parole violations, and thus had no probative value regarding the murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the appellants denied any involvement in the murder, their identity was in issue, and the post-offence conduct was relevant and properly left to the jury.

The Court further held that the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the ultimate verdict, not to individual items of circumstantial evidence such as post-offence conduct.

Criminal appeals arising from convictions for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances where a substantial part of the Crown's case rested on intercepted private communications.

The central issue was whether the trial judge over-edited affidavits supporting wiretap authorizations, thereby preventing an effective Wilson review and depriving the appellants of their Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The majority held that full disclosure is the governing premise, subject only to narrow public-interest exceptions, and that the deletions improperly withheld material that could have been used to challenge the validity of the authorizations.

The Court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings and remitted the matter to trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, applying the principles from R. v. Morin.

The Court held that there was no unreasonable delay within the meaning of s. 11(b) of the Charter and ordered that the trial be expedited.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial that hinged on the credibility of the accused versus the complainant.

During the main charge, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, in a brief recharge requested by the Crown, the judge erroneously framed the core issue as whether the jury believed the complainant or the accused, omitting the third alternative that they might disbelieve the accused but still have a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, despite the error in the recharge, the charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the proper standard of proof, given the correct instructions in the main charge and the short time elapsed before the recharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, leaders of a white nationalist political organization, were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code for publishing a magazine promoting white supremacy and anti-Semitism.

They challenged the constitutionality of s. 319(2) and the reverse onus in the defence of truth under s. 319(3)(a).

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in R. v. Keegstra, held that while both provisions infringe the Charter (s. 2(b) and s. 11(d) respectively), they are justified under s. 1 as reasonable limits in a free and democratic society.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.