Thomas C. Lemon

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from acquittals entered after a trial judge excluded evidence of narcotics seized from Prince Asante's vehicle, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the standard for reasonable and probable grounds, improperly discounting circumstantial and pattern evidence, and requiring proof of the accused's identity beyond what the law demands for a lawful arrest.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Matthew Shedden, appealed his convictions for various drug offences, arguing that the search warrant used to obtain evidence was invalid.

The challenge at trial, which contended there were no reasonable and probable grounds to believe drugs would be found at the residence (his mother's home), was unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard or provided insufficient reasons, the record amply supported the valid issuance of the search warrant.

The court concluded that reasonable inferences could be drawn from the appellant's observed conduct, including frequent visits to the residence between suspected drug transactions, to establish the necessary reasonable grounds.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, based largely on the testimony and eyewitness identification of a co-conspirator who had already been convicted.

On appeal, the appellants argued the verdicts were unreasonable and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but allowed the appeals and ordered new trials due to errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec caution that distracted the jury from the witness's motive to cooperate with police, and gave boilerplate instructions on eyewitness identification that failed to highlight the specific frailties of the witness's evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

She raised three grounds of appeal: (1) a Sekhon error regarding inadmissible expert evidence, (2) reversal of the onus of proof regarding personal use, and (3) an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the Crown expert offered some inadmissible anecdotal information, the expert's ultimate opinion was well-grounded in objective facts and the trial judge did not rely on the inadmissible evidence.

The court also found no reversal of the onus of proof, as the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the amount of cocaine, its value, and its form (pressed chunk rather than powder).

The verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence supporting the inference that possession was for trafficking purposes.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds of a Charter section 8 violation relating to an unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge found that the appellant had abandoned his house and car keys when approached by police, thereby defeating any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the police officers' testimony.

The court also rejected arguments of uneven scrutiny and misapprehension of evidence.

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentencing judge had granted 1.5:1 credit for only some of the time served, noting poor facility conditions and loss of parole eligibility.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal held that enhanced credit is the norm and varied the sentence to allow 1.5:1 credit for all time spent in pre-trial custody.

The appellant pled guilty to production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, involving a substantial commercial enterprise with over 6,000 plants across multiple locations.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in valuing the drugs, finding him the controlling mind, and imposing a manifestly unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the acceptable range given the gravity and scale of the operation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic cocaine and oxycodone, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, and failing to comply with probation orders.

He was sentenced to a global term of seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with a co-accused's sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the differences in his offences compared to the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the admissibility of his statements on the basis of alleged Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact.

The court held it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant was not detained during the early part of the search, the police were not required to reiterate his s. 10(b) rights, and he did not invoke his rights at the station.

The appellant appealed his convictions for producing marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Police discovered a marijuana grow operation in an apartment leased to the appellant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable and that the reasons for judgment were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by strong circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's rental application and supporting documents.

The Court also held that while the reasons could have been more comprehensive, the basis for the finding was apparent from the record, satisfying the requirements for appellate review.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States.

He argued the extradition judge erred in accepting his counsel's waiver of submissions and concession of the case, and that appellate delay affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge was entitled to accept counsel's position, the evidence for committal was overwhelming, and the appellate delay caused no prejudice and was partly attributable to the appellant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges arising from the confinement, robbery, deportation and deaths of Jewish civilians in wartime Hungary, prosecuted in Canada under the war crimes provisions of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that Canadian courts had jurisdiction only where the acts constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity, and that these international elements, including the requisite subjective awareness of the surrounding facts, formed integral aspects of the offences for jury determination.

The Court also held that superior orders and peace officer defences remained available subject to manifest illegality and the absence of moral choice, and upheld the admission of key hearsay evidence and the trial judge’s decision to call certain witnesses.

The Crown appeal was dismissed and the respondent’s Charter cross-appeal was also dismissed.

Four applicants brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality and interpretation of war crimes provisions in the Criminal Code.

Three public interest groups sought to intervene on issues of international law and Canada's obligations regarding war crimes.

A private individual also sought to intervene based on his expertise.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to the three public interest groups, finding they had a direct interest and could provide useful and novel submissions.

The Court denied leave to the private individual, concluding he lacked a direct stake in the outcome of the appeal.