Ira Glasner

The decision concerns the prosecution of Rasim Kaba and Hassan Talebi for importing and possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to commit those offences.

The court reviews the evidence, including the defendants' backgrounds, their relationship, the importation process, intercepted communications, and the police investigation.

The court finds both defendants' explanations implausible and concludes that the only reasonable inference is that both knew of the opium and conspired to import and traffic it.

Both are found guilty on all counts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, and was sentenced to a global term of nine years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of lockdown conditions and triple bunking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting the aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of the drugs and the appellant's criminal record.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but declined to reduce the sentence, concluding it remained fit.

The accused, John, David, and Jonathan Pham, brought a Charter application under section 11(b) for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was nearly 28 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to an "exceptional circumstance" related to their post-ruling investigation into surveillance evidence.

The court found that the Crown's decision to investigate and introduce new evidence after a section 8 ruling (which found police misrepresentations) was not a reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable event, as the issues were central to the litigation from the outset.

Therefore, the delay was not attributable to an exceptional circumstance, and the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded without justification.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the issuance of a tracking warrant, alleging violations of their s.8 rights due to misrepresentations and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The application also included a s.7 claim for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence (CCTV footage).

The court found that the affiant made significant misrepresentations and omissions regarding a confidential human source's criminal record and surveillance observations, particularly concerning a trip to Whole Foods characterized as "counter-surveillance" driving and an alleged "drug transaction." These misrepresentations were found to be intentional or reckless, tainting the reliability of the ITO.

Consequently, the court excised the misleading portions, rendering the warrant invalid.

The s.7 application for a stay was not granted, as the s.8 remedy was deemed sufficient at this stage.

The accused was discharged on all counts following reconsideration of a committal for trial order.

The original committal was based on evidence that the accused was found alone in an apartment where drugs and a firearm were discovered.

The Court of Appeal quashed the original committal order because the judge had misapprehended key evidence—specifically, a baseball hat that was thought to link the accused to the firearm was not, in fact, the same hat the accused had been seen wearing previously.

On reconsideration, the judge found that without this evidence, the Crown's case rested on impermissible speculation and inferential leaps.

The evidence was insufficient to establish the accused's knowledge and control of the contraband, as multiple other individuals had access to the apartment and forensic evidence linked others to the drugs.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants issued for his apartment and vehicle on Charter grounds, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds to justify the warrants.

The Crown conceded that the redacted ITO was insufficient and sought to rely on unredacted portions protected by informer privilege.

The court applied the Debot criteria to assess whether information from a confidential informant, combined with police investigation and the accused's criminal record, established reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused unlawfully possessed a firearm.

The court found the information sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to justify the warrant issuance.

The accused's section 8 Charter rights were not infringed.

Talel Khan was charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The trial involved applications regarding the voluntariness of Khan's statement to police and alleged breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter rights (right to counsel).

The court found Khan's statement voluntary but his s. 10(b) rights were violated due to delayed access to counsel and police eliciting a statement after he requested a lawyer.

The elicited statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but physical evidence (fentanyl, scale, money) was admitted.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown failed to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt, as a reasonable alternative inference was that Khan's common-law spouse was in sole possession.

Khan was found not guilty on both counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 26 months imprisonment, less four months credit for pre-trial custody, plus two years' probation for possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued the sentence was excessive given the small quantity of drugs, his addiction status, and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's addiction and rehabilitation attempts, but reasonably concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist.

The court noted the appellant had failed to complete a residential treatment program, continued using opiates, committed further offences while on bail, and failed to appear for sentencing.

The offender, barely 18 years old at the time of the offence, was convicted of trafficking in approximately one ounce of heroin and one ounce of cocaine.

She was a courier with a minimal role in the criminal enterprise, likely exploited by others.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of concurrent probation, finding that exceptional circumstances justified departure from the custodial range ordinarily applicable to hard drug trafficking.

The court emphasized the offender's youth, first-offender status, demonstrated rehabilitation over nearly two years of bail compliance, exemplary employment record, educational progress, and strong rehabilitative potential.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking crack cocaine involving the sale of 1.44 grams to an undercover officer for $120.

The Crown sought 90 days' intermittent imprisonment plus two years' probation, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, finding that significant mitigating circumstances, including the accused's status as a first-time offender, genuine remorse, positive rehabilitation efforts, and history of severe trauma, warranted a non-custodial approach.

The court found that collateral consequences of conviction and probation conditions adequately addressed principles of deterrence and denunciation.

The defendant was charged with possession of heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on police surveillance evidence showing the defendant driving a Honda in which drugs and cash were found on the rear seat.

The court applied the legal principles governing constructive possession and circumstantial evidence, finding that the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge and control of the heroin and cocaine.

However, the court acquitted the defendant of the proceeds charge, finding insufficient evidence that the $350 cash had a criminal source.