Sonya Shikhman

The appellant was convicted of human trafficking and related offences involving two young women.

He was sentenced to a global term of 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge underemphasized the mitigating factor of anti-Black racism and erred in applying the Morris framework to assess his moral blameworthiness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge carefully balanced the appellant's experience with systemic racism against the extreme gravity and violence of the offences.

The court held that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit and proportionate.

The applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash a search warrant for their residence and exclude evidence under s. 8 of the Charter.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, relied on stale information, and omitted material facts regarding a vehicle's registration to a construction company.

The court found that while the affiant ought to have disclosed the vehicle registration information, the omission did not amount to bad faith or subversion of the authorization process.

After amplifying the ITO to include the omitted information, the court concluded the issuing justice could still have reasonably found sufficient grounds based on the totality of the surveillance evidence.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a release order by communicating with the complainant in his pending human trafficking trial.

The communication occurred when third parties approached the complainant with a phone connected to a video call with the appellant, who smirked at her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the smirk was an intentional communication and that the appellant knew the complainant could see him.

The court also held that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of release conditions.

During a court-ordered NCR assessment, the appellant made statements to a forensic psychiatrist.

The Crown introduced those statements at trial without a voir dire on admissibility under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, without first putting the statements to the appellant in cross-examination as required by ss. 10 and 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and without disclosing its intention to use the statements for impeachment purposes.

The Court of Appeal held that the combined effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm, as well as his three-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a series of assaults against a single complainant, including an attempt to throw her off a balcony.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in treating rehabilitation as a neutral factor.

Furthermore, the Court found no error in the denial of Downes credit for strict bail conditions, as the appellant failed to lead evidence regarding the specific terms of his house arrest and their impact on his liberty.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, K.Q.S., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, as well as the resulting five-year custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach to the evidence or in the treatment of delayed disclosure.

The sentence was deemed fit and within the appropriate range.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The court sentenced S.F. for mischief to computer data and failing to comply with a recognizance, both relating to his former partner R.J. The court found S.F. changed R.J.'s passwords to control her and maintained contact with her in breach of a court order.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with probation for the mischief to data offence and an absolute discharge for the breach, citing S.F.'s lack of criminal record, addiction recovery, and the limited harm caused.

The decision reviews sentencing ranges and factors for mischief to data, and the appropriateness of a discharge in domestic contexts.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, and was sentenced to a global term of nine years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of lockdown conditions and triple bunking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting the aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of the drugs and the appellant's criminal record.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but declined to reduce the sentence, concluding it remained fit.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by an applicant convicted of six serious sexual offences against two younger cousins, for which he received a 12-year global sentence.

The applicant sought bail under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing his appeal was not frivolous and his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found the first ground of appeal (lack of accredited interpreter) frivolous due to insufficient evidence.

The second ground (jurisdiction to amend indictment for charges spanning youth and adult periods) was deemed weak, with the court finding no material prejudice from the amendment.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the diminished strength of the appeal grounds, the court concluded that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The accused, S.F., was tried on multiple criminal charges including sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, assault, mischief to computer data, voyeurism, distributing an intimate image, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court found the complainant's evidence to have reliability issues.

S.F. was acquitted on the sexual assault counts, as the Crown failed to prove a lack of subjective consent or vitiated consent under the "position of power" provision (s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code), which the court interpreted narrowly.

Acquittals also occurred for threatening bodily harm, assault, most mischief counts, voyeurism (due to lack of surreptitiousness), and distributing an intimate image (due to hearsay).

S.F. was found guilty on one count of mischief to computer data and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused, R.M., charged with sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 17 months, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defence took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, primarily due to the Crown's delay in providing core disclosure (the complainant's video statement).

Despite the delay being below the presumptive ceiling, the court deemed it one of the rare cases warranting a stay, emphasizing the Crown's obligation for prompt disclosure and the "culture of complacency" condemned in R. v. Jordan.

The charges against R.M. were formally stayed.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, specifically contesting the Crown's assertion of informant privilege over redacted materials related to a source.

The court conducted a *Basi* hearing, including *viva voce* evidence, to assess the privilege claim.

The application for further disclosure was dismissed, with the court upholding the Crown's claim of privilege for Source #1.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search warrant and the respondent's assertion of informant privilege over redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After reviewing sealed materials regarding Source #2, the court upheld the privilege claim.

The applicants expanded their challenge to Source #1, alleging the source may have acted as a police agent.

The court reviewed further sealed materials and ordered an in camera, ex parte hearing to hear viva voce evidence regarding Source #1.

The appellant, A.I.B., appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, and the dismissal of his application to re-open the trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis and the refusal to re-open the trial based on new legal developments and alleged inconsistencies in the victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the application of the Palmer test for re-opening the trial.

The applicant, Eze Moses Ojukwu, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence (heroin found in a knapsack) under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued the search was unlawful as it was not truly incidental to the arrest and reflected a systemic failure by the Toronto Police Service.

The Crown contended the search was lawful for safety and evidence discovery purposes, or alternatively, that the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2).

The court found the search was a lawful search incident to arrest based on safety concerns, given the high-risk domestic violence context and the accused's breach of release terms.

Even if there was a s. 8 breach, the court found the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) due to the minor nature of the breach, the moderate impact on the accused's privacy, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicants sought broad disclosure and privileged prosecutorial communications to support an abuse of process claim after new charges were laid following a prior stay of related charges arising from the same investigation.

The court held that the tax evasion allegations were demonstrably independent of the prior stay because the investigation had been ongoing well before the original takedown and continued throughout.

However, the timing and surrounding circumstances of the later money laundering and possession of property obtained by crime charges created a sufficient threshold basis to review prosecutorial discretion and order targeted disclosure.

Applying the prosecutorial-discretion abuse standard and the innocence-at-stake framework, the court concluded solicitor-client privilege could be pierced as a last resort to test whether those charges were laid to circumvent the earlier stay.

Michael Simonelli’s application was dismissed, while Raffaele Simonelli’s application was allowed in part.

The defendants, Jamal and Jamis Yusuf, sought to reopen their trial after conviction for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement, and subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was based on a new affidavit from co-accused Aziz Pauls, who did not testify at trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence failed to meet the credibility and impact requirements of the test for reopening a trial after conviction, particularly given the strong video evidence and prior judicial findings.

The defendant, Jun Liu, was tried for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

While the commission of the offence was conceded, several Charter violations were submitted.

The court found no violations of s.8 (unreasonable search and seizure regarding screening test reliability) or s.10(a) (right to be informed of reasons for arrest).

The court also found no violation of the right to be immediately informed of counsel under s.10(b).

However, the court determined that the police seriously violated Mr. Liu's s.10(b) right to counsel of choice by failing to facilitate consultation with his identified counsel and by not ensuring a meaningful consultation, especially given a language barrier.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breath samples, though reliable and critical to the Crown's case, must be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter to maintain confidence in the justice system.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the 'step six' procedure for challenging search warrants based on confidential informant information, arguing it infringed the right to full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant also argued the search warrant was invalid as the information to obtain (ITO) was not credible, compelling, and corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'step six' procedure appropriately balances the accused's Charter rights with the need to protect confidential informants, and that the warrant was properly issued based on sufficiently credible, compelling, and corroborated information.