Sonya Shikhman

The appellant, K.Q.S., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, as well as the resulting five-year custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach to the evidence or in the treatment of delayed disclosure.

The sentence was deemed fit and within the appropriate range.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The court sentenced S.F. for mischief to computer data and failing to comply with a recognizance, both relating to his former partner R.J. The court found S.F. changed R.J.'s passwords to control her and maintained contact with her in breach of a court order.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with probation for the mischief to data offence and an absolute discharge for the breach, citing S.F.'s lack of criminal record, addiction recovery, and the limited harm caused.

The decision reviews sentencing ranges and factors for mischief to data, and the appropriateness of a discharge in domestic contexts.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, and was sentenced to a global term of nine years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of lockdown conditions and triple bunking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting the aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of the drugs and the appellant's criminal record.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but declined to reduce the sentence, concluding it remained fit.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by an applicant convicted of six serious sexual offences against two younger cousins, for which he received a 12-year global sentence.

The applicant sought bail under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing his appeal was not frivolous and his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found the first ground of appeal (lack of accredited interpreter) frivolous due to insufficient evidence.

The second ground (jurisdiction to amend indictment for charges spanning youth and adult periods) was deemed weak, with the court finding no material prejudice from the amendment.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the diminished strength of the appeal grounds, the court concluded that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The accused, S.F., was tried on multiple criminal charges including sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, assault, mischief to computer data, voyeurism, distributing an intimate image, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court found the complainant's evidence to have reliability issues.

S.F. was acquitted on the sexual assault counts, as the Crown failed to prove a lack of subjective consent or vitiated consent under the "position of power" provision (s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code), which the court interpreted narrowly.

Acquittals also occurred for threatening bodily harm, assault, most mischief counts, voyeurism (due to lack of surreptitiousness), and distributing an intimate image (due to hearsay).

S.F. was found guilty on one count of mischief to computer data and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused, R.M., charged with sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 17 months, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defence took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, primarily due to the Crown's delay in providing core disclosure (the complainant's video statement).

Despite the delay being below the presumptive ceiling, the court deemed it one of the rare cases warranting a stay, emphasizing the Crown's obligation for prompt disclosure and the "culture of complacency" condemned in R. v. Jordan.

The charges against R.M. were formally stayed.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, specifically contesting the Crown's assertion of informant privilege over redacted materials related to a source.

The court conducted a *Basi* hearing, including *viva voce* evidence, to assess the privilege claim.

The application for further disclosure was dismissed, with the court upholding the Crown's claim of privilege for Source #1.

The appellant, A.I.B., appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, and the dismissal of his application to re-open the trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis and the refusal to re-open the trial based on new legal developments and alleged inconsistencies in the victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the application of the Palmer test for re-opening the trial.

The applicant, Eze Moses Ojukwu, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence (heroin found in a knapsack) under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued the search was unlawful as it was not truly incidental to the arrest and reflected a systemic failure by the Toronto Police Service.

The Crown contended the search was lawful for safety and evidence discovery purposes, or alternatively, that the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2).

The court found the search was a lawful search incident to arrest based on safety concerns, given the high-risk domestic violence context and the accused's breach of release terms.

Even if there was a s. 8 breach, the court found the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) due to the minor nature of the breach, the moderate impact on the accused's privacy, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendants, Jamal and Jamis Yusuf, sought to reopen their trial after conviction for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement, and subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was based on a new affidavit from co-accused Aziz Pauls, who did not testify at trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence failed to meet the credibility and impact requirements of the test for reopening a trial after conviction, particularly given the strong video evidence and prior judicial findings.

The defendant, Jun Liu, was tried for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

While the commission of the offence was conceded, several Charter violations were submitted.

The court found no violations of s.8 (unreasonable search and seizure regarding screening test reliability) or s.10(a) (right to be informed of reasons for arrest).

The court also found no violation of the right to be immediately informed of counsel under s.10(b).

However, the court determined that the police seriously violated Mr. Liu's s.10(b) right to counsel of choice by failing to facilitate consultation with his identified counsel and by not ensuring a meaningful consultation, especially given a language barrier.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breath samples, though reliable and critical to the Crown's case, must be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter to maintain confidence in the justice system.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the 'step six' procedure for challenging search warrants based on confidential informant information, arguing it infringed the right to full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant also argued the search warrant was invalid as the information to obtain (ITO) was not credible, compelling, and corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'step six' procedure appropriately balances the accused's Charter rights with the need to protect confidential informants, and that the warrant was properly issued based on sufficiently credible, compelling, and corroborated information.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering threats, arguing errors in identification evidence, credibility assessment, motive, burden of proof, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, or application of legal principles, and concluding that trial counsel's performance, while not perfect, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicants, charged with serious firearms and gaming offences, experienced a 12-day delay before their special bail hearing was held.

They brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay violated their s. 11(e) rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach and acknowledged systemic issues in scheduling lengthy bail hearings in Brampton.

The court found that the systemic and ongoing nature of the bail delays severely compromised the integrity of the justice system.

Despite the seriousness of the charges, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy to address the persistent institutional failure.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault, forcible confinement, failure to comply with probation, and sexual assault against his wife.

At trial, the complainant recanted her initial police statement, which was admitted for the truth of its contents.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions for assault, forcible confinement, and breach of probation, finding no misapprehension of evidence or improper shifting of the burden of proof.

However, the appeal judge quashed the sexual assault conviction, finding the trial judge reversed the burden of proof on consent and relied on impermissible myths and stereotypes regarding the complainant's sexual preferences.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of breaching his bail.

The police arrested the appellant after observing him with an individual they believed was not his surety, contrary to his bail conditions.

The trial judge accepted the officers' evidence that the individual was not the surety, despite a description matching one of the sureties.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to address the apparent conflict in the identification evidence and its impact on the reliability of the officers' testimony.

The offender, Andrew Medford, brought a motion for recusal of the trial judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias during his conviction for assault, sexual assault, and related offences, and during a subsequent dangerous offender application.

The allegations included the judge's facial expression while viewing video evidence, the short deliberation time before conviction, the judge's statement about convicting on 'pretty much everything,' and the revocation of bail.

Further allegations during the dangerous offender application concerned the judge's handling of a publication ban, an alleged excusal of the complainant's inappropriate gesture, and signs of frustration with defence counsel during cross-examination of an expert witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, either individually or cumulatively, and affirmed the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.