Jennifer Conroy

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He had originally elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, but due to scheduling delays that would have exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the Deputy Attorney General preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that his election to be tried in the provincial court vested his right to that mode of trial and that the direct indictment was an abuse of process aimed at avoiding a s. 11(b) Charter stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 577 provides broad authority to prefer a direct indictment even after an election is made.

The Court further held that there was no abuse of process, as the direct indictment actually facilitated an earlier trial date, consistent with the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

On a criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the appellant challenged an order staying proceedings.

The Supreme Court heard the appeal and delivered oral judgment the same day.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay order, and remitted the matter for trial.

Reasons were stated to follow.

The appellant, Jomal Brown, appealed his convictions for possession of various illicit drugs for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of trafficking, and several firearm offences.

The appeal also challenged the application judge’s dismissal of his Charter application, which was denied on the basis that Brown had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the unit where the items were seized.

During appeal preparation, Crown counsel identified a trial fairness issue: the Crown had taken inconsistent positions regarding Brown’s residence in the unit at different stages of the proceedings.

With the consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and Charter ruling, and ordered a new trial on all issues.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police, without a warrant, used an arrested drug dealer's seized cellphone to impersonate him and continue a text message conversation with the appellant, luring him to deliver heroin laced with fentanyl.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text message conversation, the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because the police faced an urgent situation calling for immediate action to prevent the imminent trafficking of fentanyl to protect public safety and it was impracticable to obtain a warrant.

Karakatsanis, Martin and Moreau JJ. dissented, finding no exigent circumstances and that the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence obtained during a border search, finding that a border services officer violated the respondent's ss. 7 and 10 Charter rights.

The trial judge determined that the officer had formed a particularized suspicion, engaging the respondent's Charter rights, and applied the R. v. Grant test to exclude the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, deferring to the trial judge's fact-driven findings, particularly on the officer's credibility, and finding no reversible error in the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant, Stephen Tello, appealed his convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime, and his 15-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's instructions on multiple counts, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, or the PGP messages.

The court also refused to allow a new Charter issue regarding the PGP messages to be raised on appeal, finding the decision not to raise it at trial was tactical and no miscarriage of justice would result.

The sentence was deemed fit, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale drug offences.

The applicant sought bail pending an application for leave to appeal his conviction for possessing heroin mixed with fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed his conviction and sentence appeal.

The motion judge applied the three-part test for bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, considering whether the leave application was frivolous, if the applicant would surrender, and if detention was necessary in the public interest.

While the applicant satisfied the surrender criterion and the leave application was deemed not frivolous (though with low prospects), the court found that the public interest, particularly the enforceability of the sentence for a serious drug trafficking offense, outweighed the reviewability interest, especially after the conviction had been affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

The application for bail pending leave to appeal was denied.

The applicant, convicted of fentanyl trafficking, sought bail pending his application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown opposed, arguing the application was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court found the proposed application for leave had low to nil chances of success, as the Court of Appeal had already thoroughly addressed the Charter issues.

The court emphasized the high public interest in enforceability, particularly given the gravity of large-scale fentanyl trafficking, which outweighed the applicant's health concerns.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The Crown appealed from a Court of Appeal decision striking down Criminal Code provisions (ss. 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii)) that made conditional sentences unavailable for certain serious offences, as applied to an Indigenous offender convicted of importing cocaine.

The majority (5-4) allowed the appeal, restoring the 18-month custodial sentence, holding that the respondent failed to satisfy step one of the s. 15(1) Charter analysis by not demonstrating that the impugned provisions created or contributed to a disproportionate impact on Indigenous offenders relative to non-Indigenous offenders.

The majority also held the provisions were not overbroad under s. 7 because maximum sentences are a reasonable proxy for offence seriousness.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding the provisions both overbroad under s. 7 and discriminatory against Indigenous offenders under s. 15(1) by impairing the remedial Gladue framework.

The applicant, Joshua Isaac, sought bail pending appeal of his drug trafficking convictions.

His initial bail was revoked after he was charged with new firearms offences, allegedly committed while on bail.

The Crown opposed his re-release, arguing that his detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Oland, found that while the appeal grounds were not frivolous, they were not particularly strong.

Given the serious nature of the new charges, the alleged breach of prior bail conditions, and concerns about the effectiveness of the proposed supervision plan, the court concluded that re-release would diminish public confidence.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the 'step six' procedure for challenging search warrants based on confidential informant information, arguing it infringed the right to full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant also argued the search warrant was invalid as the information to obtain (ITO) was not credible, compelling, and corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'step six' procedure appropriately balances the accused's Charter rights with the need to protect confidential informants, and that the warrant was properly issued based on sufficiently credible, compelling, and corroborated information.

The appellant, Roch St. Denis, appealed his sentence.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 324 days.

This adjustment was made to enable the appellant to immediately apply for parole under s. 127(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The appellant was convicted at trial of drug offences including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of oxycodone, production of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that although the trial judge erred in relying on the wrong legislative provision to admit cell phone data and may have erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case and in admitting an accused's statement without a voluntariness voir dire, the curative proviso applied because the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The Supreme Court majority agreed, finding the pre-reopening evidence was overwhelming and the curative proviso was properly applied.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that allowing the Crown to split its case led to an unfair trial that could not be cured.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to one year imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of production orders and tracking warrants obtained through informations to obtain that relied on information from two confidential informants.

The trial judge applied the Debot factors and found reasonable grounds to support the authorizations.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test and erred in assessing the reliability of the confidential informants' information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the correct statutory test or her analysis of the Debot factors.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in property obtained by crime and possession of property obtained by crime after police discovered $1,136,555 in cash in his vehicle.

The primary issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the funds were proceeds of crime.

The appellant testified he believed the money was "Shoah Gelt" (money belonging to Jewish people in Europe or Asia seeking to move funds to safety).

The trial judge rejected this testimony and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: improper application of the W.(D.) test, insufficient reasons for conviction, and a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of oxycodone.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 rights based on an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip and subsequent police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the Debot factors, concluding that the anonymous tip was neither credible nor compelling, and that the surveillance provided minimal corroboration.

The court determined that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant, thereby breaching his Charter rights.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court found that exclusion of the evidence was appropriate given the seriousness of the state conduct, the profound impact on the accused's Charter-protected rights, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

On appeal, he challenged the issuance of the search warrant that resulted in the charges against him.

The Court of Appeal found that the reviewing judge's decision was deserving of deference and that, on the basis of the record before her, the issuing justice could properly issue the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

Rehab Dughmosh was found guilty by a jury of four terrorism-related charges, including attempting to leave Canada to join ISIS, two counts of assault with a weapon for the benefit of ISIS, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose for the benefit of ISIS.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors, such as the planned nature of the attacks and the violent ideology of ISIS, alongside significant mitigating factors, primarily the offender's major mental illness (likely schizophrenia) which played a central causal role in her adopting extremist beliefs and committing the offences.

The court emphasized that while deterrence and denunciation are paramount for terrorism offences, the mental illness reduced the offender's moral culpability, shifting the primary sentencing concern towards treatment and public protection through rehabilitation.

A global sentence of 7 years imprisonment was imposed, significantly lower than the 10-12 years the Crown suggested for an offender without mental illness, with parole to be determined in the ordinary course.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for orders in lieu of prohibition, procedendo, and certiorari with respect to a trial judge's ruling on territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant had been arrested by York Regional Police in Mississauga on drug trafficking charges alleged to have occurred in Peel Region, but was transported to York Region where the information was laid and trial proceedings commenced.

On the first day of trial, the appellant challenged the court's territorial jurisdiction.

The trial judge dismissed the application, and the appellant sought extraordinary remedies from the Superior Court, which were also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that extraordinary remedies are available only for jurisdictional errors, not for errors of law in the exercise of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed their convictions for methamphetamine production and possession, and challenged a pre-trial ruling dismissing their Charter applications.

The appellants obtained a residential property through fraud and converted it into a methamphetamine laboratory.

They were arrested during a police search warrant execution.

The application judge found the appellants lacked standing to bring a section 8 Charter claim and dismissed their section 7 claim as lacking factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, concluding that the appellants' tenuous connection to the property through fraudulent means, combined with their temporary and illegal use of it, precluded any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.