Daniel C. Santoro

The court sentenced Shane Campbell following his guilty plea to three firearms offences arising from a gunfight in a Toronto residential neighbourhood.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, Campbell’s personal background, and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight-and-one-half years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, but also recognizing Campbell’s remorse, family support, and the impact of systemic racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court sentenced Jamaal Lloyd Williams following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and breach of a prohibition order.

The sentencing reasons review the factual background, Mr. Williams' criminal record, the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, and the joint submission of counsel.

The court considered the impact of systemic racism, the seriousness of the offences, and the mitigating effect of the guilty plea and pre-sentence custody conditions.

A global sentence of 7.25 years was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized property.

The defendant, Shamal Searchwell-Beals, subpoenaed D.C. Graham for a Charter application.

D.C. Graham sought to be excused from testifying under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code due to medical grounds (PTSD).

The court applied a modified four-part test from R. v. N.S., considering whether the witness's health would be seriously jeopardized, if excusing them would risk trial fairness, if accommodation was possible, and if salutary effects of testifying outweighed deleterious effects.

The court found D.C. Graham's health would be seriously jeopardized, excusing him would risk trial fairness for the defendant, but no effective accommodation was possible.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the salutary effects of compelling testimony did not outweigh the deleterious effects on the witness's health, especially given the potential unreliability of his testimony and the existence of alternative evidence.

D.C. Graham was excused from testifying.

Two brothers were convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death of a gang member.

The Crown's theory was that the brothers acted pursuant to a joint venture to hunt down and kill the victim.

One brother testified he was the shooter and raised defences of self-defence and provocation; the other testified he had no involvement in the killing.

The trial judge's jury instructions improperly conflated the two accused into a single entity by repeatedly using the phrase "John and/or Mato" when describing elements of the offence and defences, failing to distinguish between liability as a perpetrator and liability as an aider or abettor, and assigning the shooter's defences to the non-shooter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the cumulative errors created a significant risk that the jury would approach the liability of the brothers jointly rather than separately.

The appellants were convicted of importing cocaine after returning from vacation in St. Lucia with 1.4 kilograms of cocaine each.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof regarding the defence of duress and erroneously required corroboration of the evidence.

The appellants argued duress was the only defence at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made a misstatement regarding the burden of proof, this was a simple error that did not affect the outcome when the reasons were read as a whole.

The defence failed because the trial judge did not believe the evidence of the testifying appellant and found no reasonable doubt regarding the threats and assaults, and further found that the appellants had a safe avenue of escape once within Canadian jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel on appeal pursuant to section 684(1) of the Criminal Code following his conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence.

The initial application was dismissed on the basis that the applicant had not established insufficient means to retain counsel.

On renewal, the applicant provided comprehensive financial disclosure including tax returns, property assessment, and pension information, along with evidence of a separation agreement executed prior to trial.

The court found the applicant had insufficient means and appointed counsel, conditional upon the applicant entering into a contribution agreement to pay $500 per month toward legal expenses commencing April 1, 2018.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant was committed on charges of fraud and possession of property obtained by crime related to his management of a pharmaceutical business that sold drugs to U.S. doctors and clinics without complying with American regulatory requirements.

The Minister surrendered the appellant on charges of conspiracy and unlicensed distribution of prescription drugs rather than fraud.

The appellant challenged the process as unfair, arguing he lacked opportunity to respond to conspiracy allegations and that there was insufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the committal judge lacked jurisdiction to compel disclosure of anonymous witness identities, the evidence supported the possession charge satisfying double criminality requirements, and the Minister had broad discretion under the Extradition Act to describe the offence as the Minister saw fit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for methamphetamine production and possession, and challenged a pre-trial ruling dismissing their Charter applications.

The appellants obtained a residential property through fraud and converted it into a methamphetamine laboratory.

They were arrested during a police search warrant execution.

The application judge found the appellants lacked standing to bring a section 8 Charter claim and dismissed their section 7 claim as lacking factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, concluding that the appellants' tenuous connection to the property through fraudulent means, combined with their temporary and illegal use of it, precluded any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

A 67-year-old first-time offender was sentenced for importing approximately 11-14 kilograms of cannabis hashish into Canada as a drug courier.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to three years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the offender's age, health, prior good character, and remorse.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day in the community followed by 18 months of probation, finding that while denunciation and deterrence were paramount, the offender's age and serious health conditions warranted a community-based sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of drug importation and the violation of national border security.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The applicants, Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial.

The court applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases, as established in R. v. Jordan, finding the 29-month delay to the anticipated trial completion to be reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that a preferred indictment should trigger an 18-month ceiling.

It also found that Maone failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, while Fazzari, despite some efforts, did not establish that the case took 'markedly longer' than it should have, considering the complexity of the multi-accused drug trafficking investigation.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The accused, an anti-abortion activist, was charged with disobeying a court order pursuant to section 127(1) of the Criminal Code.

The charge arose from her conduct on September 2, 2015, when she protested outside the Morgentaler Clinic in Toronto carrying a sign and speaking to patients entering the clinic, attempting to persuade them not to have abortions.

The court found that her conduct breached paragraphs (c) and (h) of a 1999 injunction by disturbing and interrupting the functioning of the clinic and causing a nuisance within 500 feet of the premises.

The court distinguished the present case from a prior 2014 appeal decision where similar conduct had resulted in acquittal, finding that the evidence of disruption to clinic operations and impact on patients and staff was substantially different and more compelling.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.

A clinic sought leave to intervene in a summary conviction appeal brought by an accused convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed intervention related only to the interpretation of a permanent injunction previously issued against demonstrators outside the clinic’s premises.

The court accepted that the clinic had a significant interest in the interpretation of the injunction but found that its proposed submissions were substantially the same as those the Crown would advance.

Given the limited scope for third‑party intervention in criminal proceedings affecting liberty interests and the lack of distinct submissions, the court concluded that intervention was unnecessary.

The motion for leave to intervene was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code, stemming from her breach of a 1994 injunction prohibiting protests outside abortion clinics.

She argued that s. 127 was ultra vires Parliament, overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and that her prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding s. 127 to be valid criminal law and appropriately tailored.

The court also held that the appellant's attempt to challenge the enforcement of the injunction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the original order.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal to stand trial for offences relating to a large marijuana grow operation.

He argued there was insufficient evidence linking him to the property and insufficient evidence that the seized plants were marijuana because no certificate of analysis had been filed.

Applying the standard articulated in R. v. Arcuri, the court held that the reviewing judge’s role is limited to determining whether there was any evidence upon which the preliminary inquiry judge could conclude the evidence was sufficient to commit the accused to trial.

The court found there was some circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to the property and vehicles observed at the grow operation, and some evidence identifying the seized plants as marijuana based on the officer’s observations and experience.

As a result, the application to quash the committal was dismissed.

Five defendants were tried on over 100 fraud-related counts involving a sophisticated "bust out" credit card fraud scheme spanning approximately a decade.

The Crown alleged that Kuhen Neshan and Ramanan Kenegarajah were the leaders of a criminal organization that defrauded financial institutions of hundreds of thousands of dollars through fraudulent credit card applications, identity theft, and money laundering.

The scheme involved creating false identities, using post office boxes to evade detection, and purchasing real estate to launder proceeds.

The trial lasted 28 days over 18 months, with the Crown calling 47 witnesses and tendering 134 exhibits.

The defendants elected not to call evidence and raised various Charter challenges and legal arguments regarding jurisdiction, conspiracy, and the single transaction rule.

The appellant challenged a criminal charge under s. 127(1) for allegedly disobeying an injunction, arguing Ontario civil contempt rules provided an express alternative mode of proceeding.

The majority held the statutory exception applies only where legislation provides the legal foundation for contempt, defines contempt circumstances, and provides punishment or procedure.

The Court found Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are procedurally detailed but remain dependent on common law substratum for legal foundation and contempt definition.

Accordingly, the exception was not triggered and prosecution under s. 127(1) could proceed.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the rules themselves constituted an express legislative mode of proceeding.