Daniel C. Santoro

The court sentenced Shane Campbell following his guilty plea to three firearms offences arising from a gunfight in a Toronto residential neighbourhood.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, Campbell’s personal background, and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight-and-one-half years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, but also recognizing Campbell’s remorse, family support, and the impact of systemic racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court sentenced Jamaal Lloyd Williams following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and breach of a prohibition order.

The sentencing reasons review the factual background, Mr. Williams' criminal record, the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, and the joint submission of counsel.

The court considered the impact of systemic racism, the seriousness of the offences, and the mitigating effect of the guilty plea and pre-sentence custody conditions.

A global sentence of 7.25 years was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized property.

Following a jury conviction for sexual interference, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on the loss of the complainant's diary and the late disclosure of a police officer's email regarding the diary.

The trial judge assumed jurisdiction to hear the post-verdict application but dismissed it on the merits.

The court found that the police acted reasonably in photographing rather than seizing the diary, and that while the late disclosure of the email breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights, it was not a deliberate attempt to undermine the trial's fairness and did not warrant the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion alleging violations of his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) and seeking the exclusion of cocaine and cash seized from his residence.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a brief delay in advising the applicant of his right to counsel upon arrest.

However, the court dismissed the s. 8 claims, finding that exigent circumstances justified the initial warrantless entry to freeze the residence, and that the subsequent search warrant was valid despite errors in the Information to Obtain.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.

The defendant, Shamal Searchwell-Beals, subpoenaed D.C. Graham for a Charter application.

D.C. Graham sought to be excused from testifying under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code due to medical grounds (PTSD).

The court applied a modified four-part test from R. v. N.S., considering whether the witness's health would be seriously jeopardized, if excusing them would risk trial fairness, if accommodation was possible, and if salutary effects of testifying outweighed deleterious effects.

The court found D.C. Graham's health would be seriously jeopardized, excusing him would risk trial fairness for the defendant, but no effective accommodation was possible.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the salutary effects of compelling testimony did not outweigh the deleterious effects on the witness's health, especially given the potential unreliability of his testimony and the existence of alternative evidence.

D.C. Graham was excused from testifying.

The respondents brought a motion to strike an application for judicial review of the Prime Minister's decision to advise the Governor General to call the 2021 election.

The applicants alleged the Prime Minister violated section 56.1 of the Canada Elections Act.

The Federal Court granted the motion to strike, concluding the application was bereft of any possibility of success because the Federal Court of Appeal previously decided in Conacher that section 56.1 does not constrain the Prime Minister's ability to advise the Governor General to dissolve Parliament.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a statement he made after police violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The arresting officer had twice asked if the appellant wanted to make a statement after he requested counsel.

However, the appellant later spontaneously asked if his wife would be arrested, and upon receiving a truthful answer, confessed to owning drugs in a safe.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was a Charter breach, the statement was spontaneous and not causally connected to the breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Prior to the hearing of his appeal, the appellant died.

His counsel filed a notice of abatement.

The Court of Appeal applied the established principles regarding mootness and abatement, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify proceeding with the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

Two brothers were convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death of a gang member.

The Crown's theory was that the brothers acted pursuant to a joint venture to hunt down and kill the victim.

One brother testified he was the shooter and raised defences of self-defence and provocation; the other testified he had no involvement in the killing.

The trial judge's jury instructions improperly conflated the two accused into a single entity by repeatedly using the phrase "John and/or Mato" when describing elements of the offence and defences, failing to distinguish between liability as a perpetrator and liability as an aider or abettor, and assigning the shooter's defences to the non-shooter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the cumulative errors created a significant risk that the jury would approach the liability of the brothers jointly rather than separately.

The appellants were convicted of importing cocaine after returning from vacation in St. Lucia with 1.4 kilograms of cocaine each.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof regarding the defence of duress and erroneously required corroboration of the evidence.

The appellants argued duress was the only defence at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made a misstatement regarding the burden of proof, this was a simple error that did not affect the outcome when the reasons were read as a whole.

The defence failed because the trial judge did not believe the evidence of the testifying appellant and found no reasonable doubt regarding the threats and assaults, and further found that the appellants had a safe avenue of escape once within Canadian jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel on appeal pursuant to section 684(1) of the Criminal Code following his conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence.

The initial application was dismissed on the basis that the applicant had not established insufficient means to retain counsel.

On renewal, the applicant provided comprehensive financial disclosure including tax returns, property assessment, and pension information, along with evidence of a separation agreement executed prior to trial.

The court found the applicant had insufficient means and appointed counsel, conditional upon the applicant entering into a contribution agreement to pay $500 per month toward legal expenses commencing April 1, 2018.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant was committed on charges of fraud and possession of property obtained by crime related to his management of a pharmaceutical business that sold drugs to U.S. doctors and clinics without complying with American regulatory requirements.

The Minister surrendered the appellant on charges of conspiracy and unlicensed distribution of prescription drugs rather than fraud.

The appellant challenged the process as unfair, arguing he lacked opportunity to respond to conspiracy allegations and that there was insufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the committal judge lacked jurisdiction to compel disclosure of anonymous witness identities, the evidence supported the possession charge satisfying double criminality requirements, and the Minister had broad discretion under the Extradition Act to describe the offence as the Minister saw fit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for methamphetamine production and possession, and challenged a pre-trial ruling dismissing their Charter applications.

The appellants obtained a residential property through fraud and converted it into a methamphetamine laboratory.

They were arrested during a police search warrant execution.

The application judge found the appellants lacked standing to bring a section 8 Charter claim and dismissed their section 7 claim as lacking factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, concluding that the appellants' tenuous connection to the property through fraudulent means, combined with their temporary and illegal use of it, precluded any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

A 67-year-old first-time offender was sentenced for importing approximately 11-14 kilograms of cannabis hashish into Canada as a drug courier.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to three years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the offender's age, health, prior good character, and remorse.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day in the community followed by 18 months of probation, finding that while denunciation and deterrence were paramount, the offender's age and serious health conditions warranted a community-based sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of drug importation and the violation of national border security.

The defendant pleaded guilty to importing 14 kilograms of hashish, a Schedule II substance, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

At sentencing, the defendant sought a judicial exception from the operation of section 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and section 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded him from receiving a conditional sentence.

The defendant challenged these provisions as arbitrary, overbroad, and contrary to sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court found that section 6(3)(a) of the CDSA is overbroad contrary to section 7 of the Charter and cannot be saved by section 1.

The court also found that the combined operation of section 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and section 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code infringes section 7 of the Charter in an overbroad manner and is not saved by section 1.

The defendant was granted a judicial exception permitting him to seek a conditional sentence.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The applicants, Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial.

The court applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases, as established in R. v. Jordan, finding the 29-month delay to the anticipated trial completion to be reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that a preferred indictment should trigger an 18-month ceiling.

It also found that Maone failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, while Fazzari, despite some efforts, did not establish that the case took 'markedly longer' than it should have, considering the complexity of the multi-accused drug trafficking investigation.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.