François Lacasse

The appellant was convicted at trial of drug offences including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of oxycodone, production of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that although the trial judge erred in relying on the wrong legislative provision to admit cell phone data and may have erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case and in admitting an accused's statement without a voluntariness voir dire, the curative proviso applied because the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The Supreme Court majority agreed, finding the pre-reopening evidence was overwhelming and the curative proviso was properly applied.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that allowing the Crown to split its case led to an unfair trial that could not be cured.

The Crown appealed a Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision that set aside convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge's instructions on party liability for first degree murder were in error, such that the first degree murder conviction could not stand.

However, the Court held that the trial judge was not required to charge the jury on manslaughter, as the evidence did not meet the air of reality test.

The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in the evidence left for the jury under the third prong of the Carter test for admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part: the conspiracy conviction was restored and a conviction for second degree murder was substituted.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.

The Court allowed multiple appeals from pre-trial and appellate orders that had permitted accused former police officers to discuss informer-privileged information with defence counsel.

It held the declaratory order was criminal in nature, that objections and appeal routes under sections 37 and 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act were available, and that informer privilege could not be pierced absent a successful innocence-at-stake application.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal decision that set aside his acquittals and ordered a new trial in a prosecution involving a telewarrant and Charter search-and-seizure issues.

The central issues were whether the issuing judicial justice's impartiality was compromised and whether the impracticability requirement for a telewarrant was met.

The Court agreed substantially with Justice Frankel's reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The appellant, a francophone, was charged alongside anglophone co-accused.

A bilingual preliminary inquiry was held.

The Crown assigned unilingual anglophone prosecutors, provided English-only disclosure and notices, and the court refused to provide a bilingual court reporter or issue interlocutory judgments in French.

The certiorari judge found language rights violations but denied a remedy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding systemic failure by the Crown and the preliminary inquiry judge to respect the equality of official languages.

The committal for trial was quashed and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellants were convicted of producing marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge imposed an 18-month conditional sentence and ordered the forfeiture of the house where the grow operation was located, finding it was purchased for the sole purpose of growing marihuana.

The Court of Appeal upheld the forfeiture order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that forfeiture orders should be approached independently of the broader sentencing inquiry and that full forfeiture of the property was not disproportionate under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The respondent was convicted of producing and possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after a grow operation was found in his home.

The trial judge ordered full forfeiture of the home and a 10-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to partial forfeiture of half the house.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that partial forfeiture is permissible under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and that forfeiture orders should be approached independently of the broader sentencing inquiry.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing marihuana in her home.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and a fine, declining to order forfeiture of her home.

The Court of Appeal set aside the fine and ordered forfeiture, holding that forfeiture and imprisonment should be considered together as a global punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the forfeiture order, holding that the forfeiture inquiry under s. 19.1(3) of the CDSA is a discrete and distinct inquiry from sentencing, and that partial forfeiture of real property may be ordered.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was convicted of hostage-taking for his role in capturing UN military observers in Bosnia in 1995 and using them as human shields against NATO air strikes.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave certain statutory defences with the jury, misdirecting on other defences, and refusing to stay the proceedings due to alleged Charter violations under ss. 7 and 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the proposed defences, no error in the jury instructions, and that the complex national security disclosure process and trial delay did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying case involved whether a Canada Revenue Agency official was engaged in an investigation or an audit, and whether Charter rights were violated.

Because the Crown had stayed the prosecution, the Supreme Court found the appeal to be moot and granted the motion to quash.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine and attempted importation of cocaine.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including that his trial should have been held in Gatineau instead of Ottawa, that he was denied full answer and defence, that the trial judge erred in limiting the role of amicus curiae, that the jury was not exclusively francophone, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that Ontario courts had jurisdiction due to overt acts committed in Ontario, that the appellant was given adequate time and access to prepare his defence, and that the jury composition complied with the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the offence was not known to law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that previous binding decisions had already rejected this argument and confirmed the offence remained in full force and effect.

The court also found no merit in the appellant's arguments regarding the Crown's exercise of discretion and the trial judge's refusal to hear a late Charter argument.

The appellants appealed their convictions for production and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the prohibitions were invalid and inoperative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, noting that previous jurisprudence, including R. v. Turmel and Hitzig v. Canada, had already rejected the argument that section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was invalid.

Any constitutional invalidity regarding medical access had been remedied by the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

Police stopped and detained a person matching the description of a recent break-and-enter suspect, conducted a protective pat-down, and then reached into his pocket and found marijuana, leading to a trafficking prosecution.

The Supreme Court recognized a limited common law power of investigative detention where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a connection to a particular crime and detention is reasonably necessary, together with a limited protective pat-down search power grounded in officer safety.

The Court held, however, that the more intrusive pocket search was not justified on the facts and violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the Court excluded the non-conscriptive evidence because the unjustified search represented a serious breach and admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellants' locked safe was stolen from their restaurant and later recovered by police.

An officer investigating the appellants for suspected tax violations, who was not involved in the theft investigation, photocopied documents from the safe without a warrant and forwarded them to Revenue Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants retained a residual expectation of privacy in the stolen safe's contents.

The officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the officer's disregard for regular police procedures and failure to leave the investigation to taxation authorities rendered the breach sufficiently serious that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.