W. Paul Riley

The appeal considered whether the confessions rule applies to accused statements used only on a Charter voir dire, whether police had exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for a warrantless home entry, and whether seized evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The majority held the confessions rule does not govern this voir dire use, found the warrantless entry violated s. 8 because obtaining a warrant was practicable, and excluded the resulting evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal decision that set aside his acquittals and ordered a new trial in a prosecution involving a telewarrant and Charter search-and-seizure issues.

The central issues were whether the issuing judicial justice's impartiality was compromised and whether the impracticability requirement for a telewarrant was met.

The Court agreed substantially with Justice Frankel's reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that former section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was overbroad under section 7 of the Charter.

It captured humanitarian aid, mutual aid among asylum-seekers, and assistance to family members, which fell outside Parliament’s objective of targeting organized people smuggling.

Attorney General consent to prosecute did not cure the constitutional defect.

The Court read down the former provision to exclude those protected categories and remitted the charges for trial.

The Court dismissed the Crown's appeal and held that restricting lawful medical marihuana possession to dried form unjustifiably violates section 7 of the Charter.

The prohibition was arbitrary because it undermined health and safety by forcing some patients toward riskier or less effective treatment methods.

The remedy declared sections 4 and 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to be of no force and effect only to the extent they prohibit authorized persons from possessing cannabis derivatives for medical purposes, without suspension.

This appeal addressed whether a place-search warrant, which did not specifically authorize computer or cellphone searches, permitted police to search digital devices found on site.

The Court held that while the warrant validly authorized a search for occupancy and ownership documents, it did not authorize digital-device searches absent specific prior judicial authorization.

Computers were treated as raising distinct and heightened privacy concerns under section 8, requiring targeted authorization before data searches.

Despite the breach, the Court admitted the challenged evidence under section 24(2), citing the then-uncertain legal landscape, otherwise reasonable police conduct, and strong societal interest in adjudicating serious drug charges on their merits.

The appeal was dismissed and the new-trial order upheld.

The Court held that issue estoppel in a prior jury matter applies only when a finding in favour of the accused was logically necessary to the acquittal.

Because the acquittals on criminal organization counts could be explained by more than one route, including failure to prove association elements, the Crown was not barred from litigating whether the Hells Angels was a criminal organization in later proceedings.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision granting a constitutional exemption to Insite, a safe injection facility in Vancouver, from federal drug possession and trafficking laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is valid federal criminal legislation that applies to provincial health facilities, the federal Minister of Health's refusal to grant an exemption under section 56 of the Act violated the claimants' section 7 Charter rights.

The Court found the Minister's decision was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in its effects, as it denied life-saving medical care to vulnerable individuals without a corresponding benefit to public safety.

The Court ordered the Minister to grant the exemption forthwith.

The appellants were convicted of producing marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge imposed an 18-month conditional sentence and ordered the forfeiture of the house where the grow operation was located, finding it was purchased for the sole purpose of growing marihuana.

The Court of Appeal upheld the forfeiture order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that forfeiture orders should be approached independently of the broader sentencing inquiry and that full forfeiture of the property was not disproportionate under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The respondent was convicted of producing and possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after a grow operation was found in his home.

The trial judge ordered full forfeiture of the home and a 10-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to partial forfeiture of half the house.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that partial forfeiture is permissible under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and that forfeiture orders should be approached independently of the broader sentencing inquiry.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing marihuana in her home.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and a fine, declining to order forfeiture of her home.

The Court of Appeal set aside the fine and ordered forfeiture, holding that forfeiture and imprisonment should be considered together as a global punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the forfeiture order, holding that the forfeiture inquiry under s. 19.1(3) of the CDSA is a discrete and distinct inquiry from sentencing, and that partial forfeiture of real property may be ordered.

The appellant, a store owner who sold hemp products and marihuana seedlings, was convicted of possession and trafficking of cannabis sativa.

He challenged the constitutionality of the prohibition on simple possession of marihuana under the Narcotic Control Act, arguing it infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the availability of imprisonment engages the right to liberty, the prohibition accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court rejected arguments based on privacy, overbreadth, and statutory interpretation regarding THC levels.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Narcotic Control Act provisions prohibiting the possession of marihuana for personal use and for the purpose of trafficking.

They argued that the prohibition, and the potential for imprisonment, violated section 7 of the Charter because marihuana use causes little or no harm to others (the 'harm principle').

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prohibition is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power.

The Court rejected the argument that the 'harm principle' is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7.

The Court found that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable groups and society from the harms associated with marihuana use, and that the availability of imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate.

The appeals were dismissed.