Daniel J. Song

The appeal concerned whether police misconduct findings that were administratively expunged from an officer’s disciplinary record under provincial regulation remain subject to first party criminal disclosure.

The Court held that administrative expungement for police discipline purposes does not alter the constitutional disclosure regime, does not erase the underlying finding, and does not convert relevant misconduct records into third party records subject only to an O’Connor application.

Applying Stinchcombe, O’Connor and McNeil, the Court clarified that relevance is a low, utility-based threshold, that police must triage and transmit relevant misconduct information to the Crown, and that the Crown remains the ultimate arbiter of relevance with a duty to inquire when put on notice of potentially relevant information.

The appeal was dismissed, the motion to file further evidence was allowed, and solicitor-client costs were awarded to the accused against the police appellant.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a jury trial in which he was self-represented and frequently excluded from the courtroom due to chronic disruptive conduct.

The trial judge appointed amicus curiae partway through the trial with a limited mandate to cross-examine Crown witnesses but instructed not to advocate on behalf of the defence.

The appellant argued that the delayed and limited appointment created an appearance of unfairness rising to the level of a miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed that amicus can perform a broad spectrum of adversarial functions, including closing argument, without essentially becoming defence counsel, provided the appointment respects the accused's right to control their own defence and the amicus's duty of loyalty to the court.

The Court held that no miscarriage of justice arose on the facts, as the trial judge's discretionary decisions were not shown to have created an irregularity of sufficient gravity to shake public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision restoring stay applications for abuse of process that a trial judge had summarily dismissed following a Vukelich hearing.

The accused had alleged systemic police misconduct and inhumane conditions of confinement prejudicing their right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal and held that the correct threshold for summary dismissal of applications in the criminal law context is whether the application is manifestly frivolous — a rigorous standard requiring that the frivolous nature of the application be obvious on the face of the record.

The trial judge erred by failing to assume the truth of the alleged facts and inferences and by applying an insufficiently rigorous threshold that slid towards the merits of the underlying applications.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge found that the victim's unlawful confinement in a moving truck had ended when the victim jumped out and therefore the murder was not committed 'while committing' unlawful confinement under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for first degree murder, holding that unlawful confinement continued after the victim escaped from the truck and that the confinement and murder were part of a single transaction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that unlawful confinement does not require physical restraint in an enclosed space and that coercive restraint through violence, fear, and intimidation suffices.

The Court held that the victim remained unlawfully confined as he ran for his life, and that the unlawful confinement and murder were temporally and causally connected, forming a single continuous transaction.

The appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance after a police officer, responding to a traffic collision, observed him conceal a pill later identified as gabapentin — a prescription drug the officer mistakenly believed was a controlled substance under the CDSA.

The arrest was based on a mistake of law, rendering it unlawful and arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, and the searches of the appellant's person and car incident to that arrest breached s. 8.

The majority held that although all impugned evidence was obtained in a manner that triggered s. 24(2), the Charter-infringing conduct was inadvertent and at the less serious end of the culpability scale, the impact on Charter-protected interests was moderate, and society's interest in adjudicating serious firearms and drug offences strongly favoured admission.

The evidence was admitted and the convictions upheld.

Brown J. dissented, finding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal considered whether the confessions rule applies to accused statements used only on a Charter voir dire, whether police had exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for a warrantless home entry, and whether seized evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The majority held the confessions rule does not govern this voir dire use, found the warrantless entry violated s. 8 because obtaining a warrant was practicable, and excluded the resulting evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

In a criminal appeal concerning admissibility of fresh evidence, the Court addressed whether post-trial statements by a witness were admissible and reasonably capable of belief.

The appellate record involved convictions for second degree murder and assault with a weapon that had been set aside with a new trial ordered.

The Court held that the witness statement satisfied the admissibility criteria and could reasonably have affected the outcome.

The decision admitting fresh evidence and ordering a new trial was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.